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Incident Prioritisation for Intrusion Response Systems 
Nor Badrul Anuar Jumaat (B.Comp.Sc (Malaya), M.Comp.Sc (Malaya)) 
The landscape of security threats continues to evolve, with attacks becoming more serious and the 
number of vulnerabilities rising. To manage these threats, many security studies have been undertaken 
in recent years, mainly focusing on improving detection, prevention and response efficiency. 
Although there are security tools such as antivirus software and firewalls available to counter them, 
Intrusion Detection Systems and similar tools such as Intrusion Prevention Systems are still one of the 
most popular approaches. There are hundreds of published works related to intrusion detection that 
aim to increase the efficiency and reliability of detection, prevention and response systems. Whilst 
intrusion detection system technologies have advanced, there are still areas available to explore, 
particularly with respect to the process of selecting appropriate responses. 
 
Supporting a variety of response options, such as proactive, reactive and passive responses, enables 
security analysts to select the most appropriate response in different contexts. In view of that, a 
methodical approach that identifies important incidents as opposed to trivial ones is first needed. 
However, with thousands of incidents identified every day, relying upon manual processes to identify 
their importance and urgency is complicated, difficult, error-prone and time-consuming, and so 
prioritising them automatically would help security analysts to focus only on the most critical ones. 
The existing approaches to incident prioritisation provide various ways to prioritise incidents, but less 
attention has been given to adopting them into an automated response system. Although some studies 
have realised the advantages of prioritisation, they released no further studies showing they had 
continued to investigate the effectiveness of the process. 
 
This study concerns enhancing the incident prioritisation scheme to identify critical incidents based 
upon their criticality and urgency, in order to facilitate an autonomous mode for the response selection 
process in Intrusion Response Systems. To achieve this aim, this study proposed a novel framework 
which combines models and strategies identified from the comprehensive literature review. A model 
to estimate the level of risks of incidents is established, named the Risk Index Model (RIM). With 
different levels of risk, the Response Strategy Model (RSM) dynamically maps incidents into 
different types of response, with serious incidents being mapped to active responses in order to 
minimise their impact, while incidents with less impact have passive responses. The combination of 
these models provides a seamless way to map incidents automatically; however, it needs to be 
evaluated in terms of its effectiveness and performances. To demonstrate the results, an evaluation 
study with four stages was undertaken; these stages were a feasibility study of the RIM, comparison 
studies with industrial standards such as Common Vulnerabilities Scoring System (CVSS) and Snort, 
an examination of the effect of different strategies in the rating and ranking process, and a test of the 
effectiveness and performance of the Response Strategy Model (RSM). With promising results being 
gathered, a proof-of-concept study was conducted to demonstrate the framework using a live traffic 
network simulation with online assessment mode via the Security Incident Prioritisation Module 
(SIPM); this study was used to investigate its effectiveness and practicality. 
 
Through the results gathered, this study has demonstrated that the prioritisation process can feasibly 
be used to facilitate the response selection process in Intrusion Response Systems. The main 
contribution of this study is to have proposed, designed, evaluated and simulated a framework to 
support the incident prioritisation process for Intrusion Response Systems. 
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 1 Introduction and Overview 
Although the level of investment into security is increasing (Richardson, 2011), the problem of ever 
evolving and persistent threats seems far from contained. As the following statistics suggest, the war 
against attacks is anything but over. 
 
A quantitative telephone survey conducted between October 2007 and January 2008 by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers on UK businesses revealed an increased percentage of security-related 
activity, such as investment, training and awareness, in comparison to the previous years; for 
example, there was an increase of 7% in the average IT budget spent on security since 2002 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). In addition, the latest survey conducted in 2010 revealed a dramatic 
increase on security breaches, especially for small organisations (<50 staff), with nearly twice as 
many respondents being affected than in 2008. For instance, 83% of respondents had encountered at 
least one incident, compared to only 45% in 2008 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010). Furthermore, 
Schouwenberg (2008) revealed how financial malware has evolved over time and indicated that the 
problem is consistent.  
 
Symantec (2009) reported that there were 1,656,227 new malicious code samples detected in 2008, an 
increase of more than 165% on the previous year. They also observed an average of 75,158 active bot-
infected computers per day, an increase of 31% in comparison to 2007.  In addition, the published 
incident statistics for the first half of 2011 indicate a 147% increase in the number of cases reported to 
MyCERT in comparison to the same period in 2010, with an additional 4,413 cases compared to 
2,991 cases in 2010 (MyCERT, 2011). 
 
The number of vulnerabilities is also rising. Based upon daily statistics published by the National 
Vulnerability Database, in the third quarter of 2011 the number of registered vulnerabilities is 
approximately 50,000
1
. This statistic is an identification of known vulnerabilities which have been 
identified, assigned and published under the Common Vulnerabilities Exposures (CVE) scheme 
(NIST, 2011). In 2010, Symantec (2011) encountered more than 286 million unique variants of 
malware; giving further evidence that the numbers are rising. The infographic in Figure 1 gives a 
summary of the landscape of security threats, with a combination of new threats, current situations 
and challenges to the security communities; threats are evolving and numbers are rising, which means 
better ways are needed to manage them. 
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Figure 1. The landscape of security threats 
1.1 Intrusion Detection Studies 
In order to counter threats, different approaches are available for security analysts, such as antivirus 
software, firewalls, access control and other security systems, like Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs). The use of an IDS or similar system, such as an Intrusion Prevention System, is one of the 
most popular options in business due to their operation, openness and wide-acceptance as security 
devices (Nicolett and Kavanagh, 2009). In addition, security techniques such as authentication and 
access controls act as a first line of defence to prevent systems being compromised. An intrusion 
detection system (IDS) acts as the second line of defence and operates to detect suspicious activities 
and respond to them. 
 
There are hundreds of published works related to intrusion detection (Sherif and Dearmond, 2002; 
Sherif et al., 2003), which all aim to improve the efficiency and reliability of detection, prevention 
and response systems.  There are still areas to explore, particularly with respect to the process of 
selecting appropriate responses. Existing studies have so far focused on reducing alerts, identifying 
critical attacks, prioritising incidents (Alsubhi et al., 2008), eliminating and reducing false alarms 




(Tian et al., 2008), and increasing the confidence level of incident responses (Yu and Frincke, 2005). 
Alsubhi et al. (2008) categorise the research studies into two types: low-level and high-level alert 
operations. High-level operations apply aggregation, clustering, correlation, and/or fusion to sets of 
alerts in order to identify trends and abstractions within them, while low-level operations aim to 
identify the contextual information of each alert individually, and rate it based on its potential risk. As 
such, high-level operations aim to reduce alerts and improve detection efficiency, whereas low-level 
operations aim to enable a response mechanism by informing decisions with contextual information 
and information on the risk of each incident. Examples of some relevant studies are listed below: 
 
(a) Alarm reduction. High-level operations aim to improve detection efficiency and include 
aggregation (Debar and Wespi, 2001; Yu and Rubo, 2008), clustering  (Xiao et al., 2008; Al-
Mamory and Zhang, 2009), correlation (Ning et al., 2002; Kruegel et al., 2004; Alserhani et al., 
2010) and fusion (Ning et al., 2001; Valdes and Skinner, 2001), which all aim to reduce the 
number of alerts and false alarms.   
 
(b) Incident management. Low-level operations aim to improve the process of managing incidents 
and selecting appropriate responses. They can be used to examine a large number of incidents and 
prioritise them by identifying which incidents are important, which are urgent and which are 
critical based on the potential risk. For example, alert or incident prioritisation (Porras et al., 
2002; Lee and Qin, 2003; Alsubhi et al., 2008; Dondo, 2008), risk assessment of incidents (Mu et 
al., 2008) and security incident management (SIM) (Alberts and Dorofee, 2004; Libeau, 2008) 
(also known as Security Information and Event Management, SIEM). 
 
Thus, to increase the manageability of incidents and facilitate an autonomous mode in the response 
selection process in Intrusion Response Systems (IRSs), this study focuses upon low-level operations 
and specifically on the incident prioritisation process. The process examines incidents
2
, manages 
them, identifies urgent and important incidents, and maps them with appropriate responses based upon 
their priorities. 
1.1.1 Incident Prioritisation 
When this study began in late 2008, only a few studies had been conducted on incident prioritisation. 
Early work on incident prioritisation had been proposed by Porras et al. (2002) in M-Correlator. A 
recent work by Alsubhi et al. (2008) proposed a fuzzy system based on metrics such as the 
applicability of attacks, the importance of victims, the relationship between the alert under evaluation 
and previous alerts, and the social activities between attackers and victims. Also, there are other 
                                                     
2
 In this particular context, an incident is referring to an event detected by security systems, which it may cause 
a violation or imminent threat of violation to systems. 




studies that can help incident prioritisation; for example, the Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS) (Mell et al., 2009) was introduced in 2007 as an alternative to rating vulnerabilities 
quantitatively and it has been widely adopted as a medium through which to support the incident 
prioritisation process (FIRST, 2011). In addition, a practical approach introduced by Snort (1998), 
Snort Priority, also aims to prioritise groups of incidents.  
 
In order to enable the autonomous mode in the response selection process, it is important to prioritise 
incidents as this provides a methodical way in which to identify which incidents are critical, which 
incidents are urgent and which incidents are less critical. Having prioritised these incidents, they can 
then be mapped automatically and flawlessly with an appropriate type of response based upon their 
characteristics, criticality and urgency. In this particular context, the incident criticality refers to a 
comparative state where one incident is critical to another based upon the important of a target asset; 
and it is measured based upon the impact on the asset as a result of an attack. The incident urgency 
refers to a state where one incident requires a speedy response compared to other incidents and it may 
causes a severe impact in case there is a delay; and unlike the incident criticality it is measured based 
upon the likelihood of threat and vulnerability. For example, a serious incident can be mapped to an 
active response in order to minimise its impact, while a less impactful incident can be mapped with a 
passive response. 
 
The aforementioned approaches all have the ability to prioritise incidents, but they also have 
limitations. For example, Snort Priority groups similar critical incidents into similar groups of 
priorities (e.g. high, medium and low priority), with the consequence that security analysts face a 
challenge in analysing and differentiating which incidents are urgent and important. In addition, 
CVSS does not provide full coverage of new incidents, instead limiting itself to incidents with CVE-
IDs; this consequently produces incomplete results that security analysts have little confidence in. 
Furthermore, other studies, such as Alsubhi et al. (2008) and Porras et al. (2002), have other 
limitations, particularly in the technical aspects of the methods adopted in their proposal. For 
example, although existing approaches consider multiple decision factors, they do not consider 
different weightings based upon the importance of different decision factors. The use of different 
weightings could provide more flexibility and allow the incident prioritisation process to reflect 
different organisational policies. 
 
The aforementioned approaches provide various ways to prioritise incidents, but less attention has 
been given to adopt them in an automated response system. Porras et al. (2002) and Alsubhi et al. 
(2008) realised the advantages of the prioritisation process, but released no further studies showing 
their continuing investigating of the process’s effectiveness. Thus, this gap has opened an opportunity 




for this study to evaluate the feasibility and suitability of the incident prioritisation process in 
facilitating an autonomous mode in the response selection process.  
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this study is to propose a novel framework to address the incident prioritisation process 
and to facilitate the autonomous mode in the response selection process in IRSs. In order to achieve 
this aim, several issues need to be thoroughly understood, analysed and evaluated, as follows: 
 
(a) To comprehensively understand the domain of intrusion detection and incident response and 
identify the key issues with respect to the effective management of incidents. 
 
(b) To establish the need for an incident prioritisation process as well as rating, ranking and response 
procedures when responding to critical incidents. 
 
(c) To design and propose a novel framework and a new approach to more effectively rate, rank, 
prioritise and respond to incidents. 
 
(d) To evaluate the performance of a proposed framework by validating it using evaluation studies at 
different stages in order to demonstrate the progress of results. 
 
(e) To design and implement a novel prototype of the proposed framework to facilitate a practical 
evaluation using live traffic within an on-line assessment environment. 
 
The objectives presented above relate to the general sequence of the material presented in this study, 
the structure of which is discussed in the next section.  




1.3 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 introduces Intrusion Detection Systems, Intrusion Prevention Systems and Intrusion 
Response Systems, and specifically reviews their response capabilities. A response model, based on 
the attack time frame is also introduced to define the different response options. The intention of this 
is to link priorities with responses in an Intrusion Response System. Based upon the response model, 
the chapter presents an investigation and survey of the current response options available in 
commercial and research products. The chapter also aims to underline what are the different response 
options for use with different priorities of incident. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses upon existing incident prioritisation studies and presents a critical appraisal of 
them; identifying their similarities and limitations. It then continues with a review of relevant theories 
that could be used in rating, ranking and response, such as risk assessment, decision theories and 
measuring the risk level of incidents using several factors including threats, vulnerabilities and assets. 
This chapter highlights the advantages of such studies and discusses how they can be combined to 
produce a more effective means of rating, ranking and prioritising incidents, as well as responding 
more appropriately to them. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the main contribution of this study: a novel framework and an alternative approach 
to rate, rank, prioritise, and respond to incidents. In presenting the framework, this chapter begins by 
introducing the main rationale behind the framework as well as its operational characteristics. It also 
introduces two integral parts of the framework itself, namely the Risk Index Model (RIM) and the 
Response Strategy Model (RSM). 
  
Chapter 5 extends the study by conducting multiple experiments to validate and evaluate the proposed 
framework. In order to demonstrate the progress of the results, the evaluation study presents the 
experimental results in four stages. The first stage aims to validate the Risk Index Model (RIM) by 
comparing its results to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS v2) and Snort Priority 
approaches. Based upon the preliminary results of the first experiment, the second stage aims to 
enhance RIM by analysing the effect of using different strategies in the proposed framework; the 
evaluation is performed using a similar methodology to the first stage. The third stage investigates the 
effectiveness of the proposed RIM and RSM in achieving two different goals: first it investigates the 
distribution of incidents in comparison with other approaches, such as CVSS v2 and Snort Priority; 
and secondly it investigates the relationship between response strategies and its ability to classify 
incidents between true and false incidents. The fourth stage investigates the performance of the 
proposed framework by measuring the processing time of the rating and ranking process. This chapter 




also gives an in-depth discussion of the implications of applying the proposed framework in practice, 
underlining the advantages as well as the limitations. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the implementation of a prototype system which embodies a full set of the key 
elements of the proposed framework, and described the interactions and relationships among them; 
namely the Security Incident Prioritisation Module (SIPM). Initially, it begins with an overview of the 
system development process, the system design and other modules, such as the application daemon 
and the web modules. In addition, example scenarios are provided to demonstrate how the proposed 
framework operates, and how the web interfaces can be used to assist security analysts in making a 
decision.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 presents the main conclusions drawn from this study, highlights the principle 
achievements and limitations of the work, and makes suggestions for potential further enhancements. 
 
The thesis also includes a number of appendices, which contain a variety of additional information in 
support of the main discussion, including several sets of source code and a number of peer-reviewed 
publications from this study. 
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2 Overview of Intrusion Response Systems 
The trends in security studies related to attacks, threats and vulnerabilities have changed in recent 
decades so that it now mainly focuses upon studies related to detection, prevention and response 
strategy. Over the years of research in this area, this trend has changed the direction of studies leading 
to multiple areas of interest being explored. To understand the incident prioritisation studies, this 
chapter presents an introduction to security systems and response taxonomies, which are closely 
linked to intrusion studies. This chapter starts by giving an introduction to intrusion detection systems 
and discussing their different types which offer different modes of detection and prevention, as well 
as different ways of responding to incidents. It continues by establishing the relationships between the 
response taxonomies and response options, and showing how these relate back to the incident 
prioritisation research. This chapter also introduces a model to define different types of response 
option using an attack time frame. It strengthens these findings by highlighting the results of an 
investigation and survey previously conducted. Having presented the concept of the response model, 
this study will extend its usage to map between different priorities of incidents with different types of 
response options. 
2.1 Detection, Prevention and Response Study 
The preliminary concept of an IDS was devised by Anderson (1980) and then strengthened by the 
models created by Denning (1985; 1987b) and other subsequent researchers. Studies related to 
intrusion and their impacts have become one of the main branches in the network security research 
area. 
 
Denning’s papers (Denning and Neumann, 1985; Denning, 1987b; Denning, 1987a) described the 
components of modern Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), while the extension made by Verwoerd 
and Hunt (2002) introduced four basic fundamental components: the sensor, monitor, resolver and 
controller. In extension to the basic components, the general classifications of IDSs are as follows. 
 
(a) Detection approach. There are two types of detection approach, namely anomaly detection 
(Smaha, 1988; Lazarevic et al., 2003) and misuse detection (Neumann and Parker, 1989; Kumar 
and Spafford, 1994). 
 
(b) Protection approach. This type of system can be used to protect either hosts (Wagner and Soto, 
2002) or networks (Mukherjee et al., 1994), or a combination of both . 





(c) System architecture. This type of system can be implemented either as a stand-alone system 
(Vigna and Kemmerer, 1998) or distributed by using an agent-based system (White et al., 1996; 
Aussibal and Gallon, 2008) 
 
(d) Data source. The data source can be gathered from a combination of audit logs (Dunlap et al., 
2002), network traffic (Mukherjee et al., 1994) or system status events (Forrest et al., 1996; 
Hofmeyr et al., 1998). 
 
(e) Detection and response approach. The detection and response approach can use either an active  
(Wang et al., 2001a) or a passive mode. 
 
(f) Analysis timing. Analysis can be done either in real time, such as in a live traffic network (Lunt et 
al., 1989), or offline using other tools such as data mining (Cuppens and Miege, 2002). 
 
Research initially focused upon enhancing the detection processes rather than on responses (Sherif et 
al., 2003). Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are used to detect signs of malicious activities, and 
they have been an area of active research for more than 30 years, ever since Anderson’s paper 
(Anderson, 1980). However, since the beginning of the 21
st
 century, more attention has been given to 
intrusion response studies, particularly when used in combination with other approaches, such as 
decision-making (Mu and Li, 2010). It appears that the first usage of the term “intrusion response 
systems” in the computer community appeared in the seminal works by a research group at Texas 
A&M University (Carver et al., 2000; Carver, 2000; Ragsdale et al., 2000). However, even more than 
15 years later the opinion of Mukherjee et al. (1994) remains valid as it gives a broad overview of 
why prevention systems like Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) are not feasible, and suggests the 
requirement for an alternative to this, which is an Intrusion Response System (IRS). 
 
Before discussing the multiple types of response options, it is important to distinguish between the 
different modes in which Intrusion Detection, Prevention and Response Systems can operate; the 
following descriptions describe these modes: 
 
(a) Intrusion Detection System (IDS) mode. A system running in an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
mode is able to detect intrusions; traditionally, when such an intrusion is detected, it may produce 
a simple warning or alarm. An IDS might be a piece of software or hardware, or a combination of 
both used to detect intrusions through various techniques and algorithms (McHugh et al., 2000). 
Ultimately, the main goal of this mode is to detect the unauthorized use, misuse and abuse of 
computer systems by both system insiders and external intruders (Aickelin et al., 2003). The main 




goal of this mode is to assist system administrators in determining the security state of the system 
and suggesting an appropriate response (Zhang et al., 2009). Early types of intrusion detection 
system would only produce passive responses, such as producing a log or notifying an 
administrator about suspicious activities.  
 
(b) Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) mode. Systems running in an Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS) mode share similarities with the IDS mode in terms of system deployment and detection 
method, but perform an additional response by blocking potential intrusions or terminating the 
network traffic for the current intrusion. It can therefore be considered an extension to the 
traditional IDS mode. Normally, in order to block malicious traffic an IPS is positioned in-line 
with the network and is deployed together with firewalls or access control appliances (Papadaki 
and Furnell, 2004; Fuchsberger, 2005). In order to provide protection at a host level, a host-based 
IPS utilises an intelligent system, which has the ability to intercept and evaluate system calls 
(Paulson, 2002). For example, Kwon et al. (2008) introduced a host-based IPS called PROBE 
which monitors processes running on a host to identify abnormal process behaviour. Furthermore, 
in order to provide host level protection on servers and workstations, a host-based IPS also 
secures and controls software communication channels between a system’s applications and its 
operating system kernel (Patel et al., 2010). 
 
(c) Intrusion Response System (IRS) mode. Systems running in an IRS mode perform a similar 
function to those in IDS and IPS modes by maintaining several approaches to detect and respond, 
but use multiple types of response after further analysis to minimise the impact of any incidents. 
The IRS mode is clearly tightly coupled with the IDS mode and takes over after signs of any 
intrusion, to either record the attack passively or to attempt to minimise the impact actively (Toth 
and Kruegel, 2002). Existing studies have aimed to create IRSs which are able to run 
automatically as well as reconfiguring, regenerating and rejuvenating systems once an intrusion 
occurs (Wu et al., 2007). Unlike the IDS and IPS modes, the IRS mode offers additional functions 
and exhibits multiple characteristics of response to mitigate the impacts of any intrusion. 
Therefore, it does not just offer a passive response; instead, it also concentrates on responding 
with active responses in order to reduce the impact of incidents actively. In addition, within the 
variety of responses available, this mode is also able to initiate collaboration with other security 
appliances, such as working with firewalls to block and terminate suspicious traffic, working with 
honeypots to collect attackers’ information and trace attackers sources (Wang et al., 2001b), and 
redirecting connections for other additional precautions (Yue and Cakanyildirim, 2007). 
 
The discussion in this section has presented an introduction to the IDS, IPS and IRS mode used in 
detecting, preventing and responding to incidents. It can be seen that all three modes share 




similarities, particularly in the methods of system detection. From the traditional IDS mode, the other 
two modes inherit the system detection techniques and response methods. In terms of responses to 
incidents, none of the three modes are limited only to the passive responses, but can actively use 
multiple techniques and approaches to reduce the impact of an incident. 
  




2.2 Response Taxonomies 
This research focuses upon responding to intrusions, so this section explains the different response 
taxonomies and how they influence the categorisation of responses in the response model proposed.  
To improve the understanding of the intrusion response studies, this section makes a critical appraisal 
of several response taxonomies (Fisch, 1996; Debar et al., 1999; Carver, 2001; Wang et al., 2006; 
Stakhanova et al., 2007b). 
The earliest taxonomy for response systems is known as the Fisch DC&A taxonomy (Fisch, 
1996),which separates responses into two main classifications: 
 
(i) Detection time - when the suspicious activities are detected. For example, the Fisch DC&A 
taxonomy defines that the detection time can be “after the attack” or “during the attack”.  
 
(ii) Response goal - the Fisch DC&A taxonomy defines a specific goal for a response; the available 
response goals are: active damage control, passive damage control, damage assessment, or 
damage recovery.  
 
The classification of a response can be summarised under two main categories: active and passive. 
“During the attack” and “active damage control” are active responses, whereas “after the attack”, 
“passive damage control”, “damage assessment” and “damage recovery” can be classed as passive 
responses. To strengthen these two main categories, Debar et al. (1999) also described two main types 
of response which are also referred to as active and passive response. It appears that they followed the 
Fisch DC&A taxonomy, but went further by dividing the active reaction into two: either a corrective 
mode involving closing the vulnerability holes, or a proactive mode, involving logging out possible 
attackers or closing down servers. They also mentioned that the passive response can be improved by 
giving a simple notification system in order to respond to incidents.  
 
In addition to the Fisch DC&A and Debar et al. (1999) taxonomy, two more recent taxonomies have 
been established by Stakhanova et al. (2007b) and Wang et al. (2006). As depicted in Figure 2, 
Stakhanova et al. (2007b) introduced a complex taxonomy by categorising systems from multiple 
views based upon different angles of characteristics and perspectives.  





Figure 2. Intrusion Response System Taxonomy (Stakhanova et al., 2007b)  
 
The Stakhanova taxonomy categorises and measures IRSs using two main characteristics, namely ‘a 
degree of automation’ and ‘the activity of a triggered response’. Instead of having different 
categories, passive and active responses are categorised together according to their characteristic of 
being ‘the activity of a triggered response’ category. In addition to that, to enhance and strengthen the 
taxonomy, they proposed another characteristic called ‘a degree of automation’; under this category, 
depending upon the response mode, there are a few other responses including notification systems, 
manual response systems and automatic response systems.  
 
The complexity of the taxonomy proposed by Stakhanova et al. (2007b) can be seen because it then 
proposes additional categories according to other characteristics under the automatic response 
systems. There are four other categories under the automatic system response category, including an 
ability to adjust, speed of response, cooperative ability and response selection method.  They 
highlighted several requirements for an ideal IRS that future systems should aim for; these 
requirements include being automatic, proactive, adaptable and cost-sensitive. 
 





Figure 3. 5W2H Intrusion Response Taxonomy (Wang et al., 2006) 
 
In contrast to Stakhanova et al. (2007b), Wang et al. (2006) developed the 5W2H taxonomy as 
depicted in Figure 3.  As can be seen, the taxonomy describes seven dimensions: when (as a 
dimension of time), how serious (potential of destruction), where (location of attacker), how (type of 
attack), what (a target or victim), what (type of attacker), and last dimension is why (plan of attack).  
 
The 5W2H taxonomy seems very complex compared with the previous taxonomy because it has 
many redundant dimensions. For example, the third dimension, which is where (location of attacker), 
the fourth dimension, the type of attack, and the sixth dimension type of attacker, all refer to one 
entity, which is the attacker. In addition, the final dimension defined is unclear and vague. For 
example, the last dimension uses ‘why’ as a keyword to describe the plan of attacks, which it could be 
argued is impractical to classify, and they have not provided any clear classifications for this. Unclear 
and vague explanations with additional redundant terminology make the 5W2H taxonomy less useful 
for differentiating between responses.  
 
Although the 5W2H taxonomy is the most recent taxonomy published by Wang et al. (2006), it is not 
widely used as it is quite similar to the Carver Taxonomy introduced by a group of researchers from 
Texas A&M University (Carver et al., 2000; Carver, 2000, 2001). With Carver Taxonomy, in order to 
have a response decision process, some additional factors need to be considered, including the timing 
of an attack, the type of the attack and attackers, the degree of suspicion, the implications of the attack 
and any environmental constraints. Using these factors, Carver et al. (2000) identified and classified 
responses into three main response systems: notification systems, manual response systems and 




automatic response systems; these response classifications are the ones that have been adopted by 
Stakhanova et al. (2007b) in their taxonomy. 
 
These taxonomies provided a collection of different approaches and perspectives to facilitating an 
autonomous mode in the response selection process in IRSs. Specifically, they provided response 
categorisation, assessment of response selection and response mapping. The main interest of this 
study is to summarise the response categorisation in those taxonomies as they facilitate the 
establishment of a model classifying different types of response option. 
2.2.1 Response Options: Active vs. Passive 
Based upon the various aforementioned taxonomies, the response options can be divided into two 
main types: active and passive. 
 
(a) Active response. An active response is used to counter an incident in order to minimise its impact 
on victims. 
 
(b) Passive response. A passive response normally aims to notify other parties about the occurrence 
of an incident and relies upon them to take further action.  
 
Yue and Cakanyildirim (2007) described proactive responses and reactive responses as an extension 
to an active response. In order to provide an active response, a system needs to have an autonomous 
mode in its operation, since humans are not fast enough to react to high speed or broad scale attacks in 
an effective manner (Lewandowski et al., 2001).  
 
Although an active response gives the advantage of limiting intrusion activities, it sometimes 
produces negative results if the response systems are not configured correctly. For example, an active 
response is capable of generating Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in live networks by denying 
legitimate connections from authorised users by blocking and terminating their connections. Thus, in 
order to minimise this disadvantage, a system must be configured properly so it can respond with 
confidence in minimising errors. In addition, an active response must have the capacity to engage in 
corrective action, such as updating system patches automatically, logging off a user, reconfiguring the 
firewall or disconnecting a port (Jackson, 1999).  
 
Responses can therefore be described according to a number of different factors, such as the level of 
operation, the speed and time of response, the ability to learn and the ability to cooperate with other 
devices; the following descriptions are therefore useful: 
 




(a) Proactive response. A proactive response is an approach that controls a potential incident activity 
before it happens rather than waiting to respond after it has happened. 
 
(b) Reactive response. A reactive response reports any incidents detected directly to security analysts 
or takes action immediately in real-time, in order to minimise their impacts. Unlike the proactive 
response, the reactive response reacts only after an intrusion is detected. 
 
A proactive response refers to an action that can only be taken if there is a trusted decision made by 
the IDS itself, and in certain cases the action can be taken immediately. It is also referred to as an 
immediate response (Yue and Cakanyildirim, 2007). The proactive response approach prevents a 
predicted incident based upon analysis, investigation, reasoning and scientific methods. For example, 
a probability measurement is used to give a value to the possibility of an attack happening 
(Stakhanova et al., 2007a). In addition, a proactive response approach can predict a new intrusion and 
confidently know the best method to use to prevent the intrusion from spreading quickly. These 
proactive responses can be categorised into two further different approaches: 
 
(a) Prediction methods. A prediction method gives an early response to security analysts or 
intelligent agent systems, while at the same time minimising the potential impacts of predicted 
incidents for future protection. This approach can use any machine learning approach, and the 
solutions proposed by Teng et al. (1990) and Schultz (2002) showed the capabilities of predicting 
a new attack and demonstrated that this technique has great potential for future response models. 
 
(b) Case-based reasoning methods. This involves using a case-based reasoning method to pre-empt 
incidents based on historical data. For example, any incident detected in real time is stored and 
can later be used as an input for future responses. This is similar to the case-based reasoning 
approach used in an IDS (Esmaili et al., 1996), but in proactive responses, any previous incident 
response will be used as a reference point in order to prevent future incidents with similar 
characteristics. For example, COBRA (Gangadharan and Kai, 2001), RedAlert (Anuar et al., 
2004) and ADEPTS (Foo et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2007) all provide proactive responses in order to 
minimise an intrusion’s impact on other neighbouring systems. Similar to COBRA and RedAlert, 
a recent study by Thames et al. (2008b; 2008a) used a proactive response by updating and 
reconfiguring a firewall dynamically and periodically. 
 
The second category of active response is the reactive response. There is no clear definition of this, 
but it accepted as an approach where security systems are maintained in a real-time interactive 
environment or by using human experts with automated tools to assist in finding the best responses 




(Fessi et al., 2007).  As mentioned earlier, a reactive response occurs only after an intrusion is 
detected. Therefore, it is suggested that there are two stages of responding in this situation;  
 
(a) The first stage of a reactive response is to issue a confident response immediately after an incident 
is detected. 
 
(b) The second stage of the reactive response involves investigating incidents and learning about 
them so future responses can be refined.  
 
The first stage of the response acts only after incidents are detected and aims to reduce their impact. 
For example, an automated response system with automated system capabilities, such as Cooperating 
Security Managers (CSM), can be considered to be a reactive response. CSM, which was proposed by 
White et al. (1996), proactively detects suspicious activities but reactively responds to them (Wu et 
al., 2007). In addition, in order to reduce the impact of incidents, responses at this stage have the 
ability to collaborate with other security appliances, such as a firewall; this can be seen in the Taichi 
system (Han et al., 2006), which combines heterogeneous IDSs with improved distributed firewall 
systems and is able to detect and prevent intrusion automatically. 
 
The second stage of a reactive response applies to incidents with high uncertainty that need to have 
their behaviour investigated and understood before a further response can be applied. This category is 
fundamentally based upon a study by Yue and Cakanyildirim (2007), who suggest that a reactive 
response is defined as a response involving sending alarms to security analysts. At this stage, unlike 
the first stage, to reduce uncertainty in the incident, no response is made immediately and instead the 
system waits for the incident to be investigated, such as, tracing the incident (Chen et al., 2006) or 
using a honeypot (Feng et al., 2003) to collect additional incident data for investigation purposes. This 
stage is similar to a passive stage, as there is no action being taken to minimise the incident’s impact, 
and it merely provides feedback. However, the literature generally claims that responses in this stage 
are still categorised as an active response (Wang et al., 2001a; Wang et al., 2001b; Jang and Kim, 
2002; Feng et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2006; Stakhanova et al., 2007a). 
 
Finally, a passive response does not react in any way to minimise the impact, and only notifies and 
collects information about the intrusion. A passive response is one of the earliest responses that was 
used in IDSs, and is therefore vulnerable and may give an advantage to the attackers. A case study 
which explains the disadvantages of this approach is clearly given by Cohen (1999). In certain cases, 
ignoring an incident can also be seen as a passive response (Yu and Rubo, 2008). 




2.2.2 Response Model for Intrusion Response Systems 
Based on earlier discussion, it can be seen that the response can be divided into several different 
categories and stages. Therefore, in order to show the relationship between them, this study uses an 
attack time frame, as illustrated in Figure 4, to show a common time frame when attacks or intrusions 
are detected and responded to by any security appliance. In differentiating the type of response and 
describing the response model, the attack time frame clearly depicts the stages of the response.  In the 
figure, the relationship between the responses is formed based upon the attack time frame and 
contains three main lines t0, t1 and t2, where t1 denotes the time of the intrusion alarm. Based on t1, the 
following two stages appear;  
 
(a) Before intrusion alarm, between t0 and t1, 
(b) After intrusion alarm, between t1 and t2.  
 
In addition to these two stages, there is another stage in the attack time frame which comes after t2, 
which refers to the stage after a reactive response. In the stage before  t0, the system is assumed to be 
in a normal state in which no intrusions have been detected. With a total of three main stages, the 
attack time frame in Figure 4 is considered appropriate to describe the variety of responses explained 















Figure 4.  Relationship between passive, proactive and reactive response using attack time frame 
 




The attack time frame for the response model starts at stage t0, which is the stage before any incidents 
are detected by the IDSs, which occurs at t1. In this stage, proactive responses play a big role in 
defending hosts and networks from being attacked. For example, precautionary actions such as 
blocking any predicted potential incident and adjusting system configurations can be taken. Based 
upon the two aforementioned scenarios for proactive responses, this stage provides two critical 
response actions; (i) prevent any future potential incident based on prediction analysis, and (ii) 
prevent current and future potential incidents based on feedback from the passive and active 
responses.  
 
Between t1 and t2, the reactive response is most involved in minimising the incident’s impact. In this 
stage, countermeasures like terminating users, processes or network traffic that have direct influence 
on attackers are taken against for activities identified as suspicious with high levels of confidence. At 
this stage, in order to respond to these countermeasures, significant collaboration between security 
appliances such as access control systems and firewalls would be a great benefit. Since this is a 
critical stage, the response measures should be taken only if the confidence level of the related 
incidents is considered very high, as it is important in order to minimise the response errors. This 
stage ends immediately at t2, and for any incident that cannot be resolved within this time an 
escalation process occur to take it to the second stage of the reactive response. 
 
Unlike the previous stages, the stage after t2 is an investigation phase. The stage is continuous with no 
specific end point; therefore, this stage is suitable for non-critical systems. This stage ends once the 
incident has been investigated and appropriate actions have been taken against them. This stage is the 
second stage of reactive response which involves waiting, investigating and learning about the 
incident before any further response can be applied.  
 
At stage t2, some incident feedback can also be collected from passive responses. This can be 
combined with feedback on the current stage and act as an input for reactive and proactive responses. 
Furthermore, the feedback cycle between reactive and passive responses provide bidirectional 
feedback; both responses communicate continuously in order to provide better investigation and 
analysis of any incident.  
 
The discussion above clearly indicates that the response model for IRSs can be divided into two main 
response zones: the passive and active zones, where the active zone involves proactive and reactive 
responses. 
 
It is important to differentiate the different types of response option. In particular, the different 
capabilities they have should be mapped with different types of incident according to their priority. 




2.2.3 An investigation and survey of response options for IRSs 
This section presents an investigation and survey of the different types of the response option 
available. It helps to investigate the level of response applied in commercial and research products, 
looking at IDS, IPS and IRS technologies, as well as Security Information and Event Management 
(SIEM) products.  
 
SIEM products are being considered due to their characteristics; although the product is considered as 
a new tool in the security industries, the objectives for deploying it are to monitor, identify, document 
and respond to security threats and to reduce false positive incidents (Miller et al., 2010).  
 
SIEM is a technology which provides real-time monitoring of multiple security appliances and 
historical reporting of security events from networks, systems and/or applications (Nicolett and 
Kavanagh, 2009). It can be seen as a new approach for enhancing the IDS, IPS and IRS technologies. 
SIEM technology does not only collect hundreds of incident events from various types of appliances, 
but can also respond to them. Given their relevance to responses, it is proper that SIEM technologies 
be included in this investigation. 
 
A total of 34 systems were compared, including both commercial and non-commercial products. The 
commercial products were selected based on two reports from Gartner, namely the Magic Quadrant 
for Network Intrusion Prevention System Appliances (Young and Pescatore, 2009) and Magic 
Quadrant for Security Information and Event Management (Nicolett and Kavanagh, 2009). As a 
guideline, the non-commercial products were selected based upon the online ratings of open source 
products published by several experts in the area (Bejtlich, 2004; Wotring, 2005; SECTOOLS, 2010). 
 
Using the categorisation in the response model presented the previous section; Table 1 shows the 
results of the survey. In comparing the products, the study tabulates the survey results for the 1
st
 stage 
of reactive response into two categories: collaboration and termination. The first category covers any 
responses that involve collaboration between the product and other products, while the second 
category refers to the ability of the product to terminate users, processes and/or network traffic. In 
addition, the table contains the survey results for the 2
nd
 stage of reactive response in the “collects 
information” column. Finally, the study covers six categories of passive response, namely syslog and 
console, email, pager, SNMP, HTML and PDA/Mobile. 
 
Product literature and documentation, white papers, and online articles were then investigated in order 
to determine the response options offered by the selected products. The potential for misclassification 
of responses is considered low, but there is some minor potential for error. 






























































































































































1 AlienVault AlienVault Both SIEM  X X X X X X X X X
2 ArcSight Enterprise Security Manager ArcSight C SIEM  X X X X X X X X X
3 Bro IDS with Plugin Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory NC NIDS  X X X X X X X X X X
4 CA-Host Based IPS CA Inc C HIDS SIEM X X X X X
5 Checkpoint IPS-1 Checkpoint Inc C NIDS  X X X X X X
6 Cisco IDS Cisco Systems Inc C NIDS SIEM X X X X X
7 Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis and 
Response System (MARS)
Cisco Systems Inc C SIEM  
X X X X X X X X X X
8 DeepNines IPS DeepNines Technologies Inc C NIDS  X X X X X X
9 Enterasys Intrusion Prevention System Enterasys Networks, Inc. C NIDS 
HIDS
SIEM
X X X X X X X X X
10 FlowMatrix AKMA Labs NC NIDS  X X X
11 IBM Proventia Desktop IBM C HIDS SIEM X X X X X
12 IBM Proventia Network IPS Series IBM C NIDS SIEM X X X X X X X
13 IBM Tivoli Security Operation Manager IBM C SIEM  X X X X X X
14 iPolicy Intrusion Detection/Prevention iPolicy Networks C NIDS  X X X X X X X X
15 Juniper IDP Juniper Networks, Inc C NIDS  X X X X X X X
16 Loglogic Exaprotect Loglogic C SIEM  X X X X X X
17 McAfee Host Intrusion Prevention for McAfee, Inc. C HIDS  X X X X X
18 McAfee IntruShield McAfee, Inc. C NIDS SIEM X X X X X X X X
19 McAfee IntruShield® Security Manager 
(ISM)
McAfee, Inc. C SIEM  
X X X X X X X X X X X X
20 netfence gateways phion AG C NIDS  X X X X X X X
21 NetIQ Security Manager SIEM NetIQ C SIEM  X X X X X X
22 NitroSecurity Guard IPS NitroSecurity C NIDS SIEM X X X X X X X X X
23 Osiris Brian Wotring NC HIDS  X X X X X
24 OSSEC Trend Micro, Inc. NC NIDS 
HIDS 
SIEM
X X X X X X X X
25 PHPIDS PHPIDS Team NC HIDS  X X X X
26 Radware's DefensePro (APSolute Immunity) Radware Ltd. C NIDS  X X X X X X
27 SAMHAIN samhain design labs NC HIDS  X X X X X X X
28 SecureNet IDS/IPS Intrusion, Inc. C NIDS  X X X X X
29 Snort IDS (Sourcefire IPS) Sourcefire, Inc. NC NIDS  X X X X X X X X X X
30 StoneGate IPS Stonesoft Inc. C NIDS  X X X X X X X X
31 Strata Guard StillSecure C NIDS  X X X X X X X
32 Symantec Critical System Protection Symantec C HIDS  X X X X X X X
33 TippingPoint IDS/IPS 3Com C NIDS  X X X X X X X X X




From the table, it can be seen that the Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) category is 
dominated by commercial products, and only 4 out of those 19 products are non-commercial. Apart 
from those, the survey results show that 26 products are classed as stand-alone IDS or IPS product 
while the rest are SIEM products or a combination of SIEM and IDSs/IPSs products. This report 
highlights that at least seven IDS/IPS products use an SIEM from same company, namely Trend 
Micro, McAfee, IBM, Enterasys Networks, NitroSecurity, Cisco Systems and CA Inc. 
 
Interestingly, the survey highlights the following; 
 
 Only two products used the first type of proactive response: McAfee IntruShield® Security 
Manager (ISM) and Radware's DefensePro (APSolute Immunity). 




 Most of the products apply the second stage of the proactive response; 80% of the products apply 
blocking mechanism techniques as a proactive response, but only 44% of products had the ability 
to automatically adjust the configuration regularly. 
 
 Not all the products have the ability to establish a collaboration with other security appliances, 
and only 82% of the products surveyed use first stage of the reactive response 
 
 30 products, or 88% of the products surveyed, are able to terminate incident traffic sessions 
actively. 
 
 All the products have an ability to collect information about incidents, which is the second stage 
of the reactive response. 
 
 All the products support passive responses, with 88% of the survey products using either console 
or syslog as the main notification method. 
 
 Email, HTML and SNMP are supported by the majority of products to notify security analysts. 
 
 Pager and mobile notification are relatively rare, with less than 10% using these types of 
notification.  
 
In conclusion, the survey results have demonstrated that there are a wide range of types of response 
option in the latest security tools; it also showed the categorisation of the response model used was 
satisfactory. 
 
Although this survey has provided an analysis of the response options available in IDSs and other 
security tools, the results cannot be used as an evidence to demonstrate the best product for mitigating 
intrusions. For instance, if one of the products listed in the table has more than one type of response, 
or even if it has all of them, that does not necessarily mean it is the best product. 
  





This chapter has underlined the current state-of-the-art types of response by investigating and 
comparing their unique characteristics and operations through the different modes of IDSs, response 
taxonomies and response models. The response model used divides responses into several categories, 
include proactive, reactive and passive responses. 
 
Strengthened by the result of an investigative survey, the categorisation allows the strategy used to 
respond to incidents to be modelled. The objective of the strategy is to map incidents with appropriate 
type of responses flawlessly based upon their characteristics, criticality and urgency. For example, a 
serious incident can be mapped to a proactive response or reactive response in order to minimise its 
impact, as opposed to incidents with less impact which can be mapped to passive ones. 
 
In order to propose a framework to satisfy the latter example, there are many other aspects that need 
to be discussed. Although the mapping process can be achieved manually, it is not as easy as its 
sounds because there are different types of incident that must be dealt with. Several issues therefore 
need to be considered before the selection process can be done, such as the decision factors and their 
assessment. In the next chapter, a review of the relevant theories that could be used in facilitating the 
response selection process will be presented. The review examines the state-of-the-art incident 




3 Incident Prioritisation and Issues 
A response to an incident can be achieved by initiating one or more response options, as detailed in 
the previous chapters. The response selection process can be done manually, where security analysts 
select an appropriate response based upon their experience, in order to minimise the impact of the 
incident. In view of that, a methodical approach that identifies the importance of incidents is essential. 
However, with thousands of incidents being identified every day, relying upon manual processes to 
identify their importance and urgency is tedious, difficult, complicated and error-prone, as well as 
time-consuming, and so an automated operation is needed.  
 
To enable an autonomous mode, two types of assessment can be used: a qualitative or a quantitative 
assessment. After reviewing earlier works on response selection (Carver, 2001; Lee et al., 2002; 
Papadaki, 2004), the consensus is that quantitative assessments are preferable to qualitative 
assessments due to certain characteristics, such as the decision factors (objective data and numerical 
value), the adoptability of the assessment, and the usability of the results. There have been two 
seminal works on the response selection process: the adaptive approaches (Carver et al., 2000; 
Ragsdale et al., 2000; Carver, 2001) and cost-sensitive approaches (Lee et al., 2002; Stakhanova et 
al., 2007a). In addition, several studies have been published more recently, in 2009 and 2010, which 
look at areas such as using decision theories with hierarchical task network planning (Mu and Li, 
2010), decision models using genetic algorithms (Fessi et al., 2009), and the adaptation of game 
theory to give a cost-sensitive approach (Lye and Wing, 2005; Zonouz et al., 2009).  
 
Compared to the amount of work published on the response selection assessment, there has been less 
study of incident prioritisation as part of the response selection process, mainly because the 
quantitative assessment has been dominated by the cost-sensitive approach and its varieties. 
Fundamentally, incident prioritisation is normally used to rate and rank incidents (Porras et al., 2002; 
Lee and Qin, 2003), and based upon some studies (Årnes et al., 2005; Mu et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 
2009), the process of determining the incident priority has huge potential in selecting an appropriate 
response according to the different characteristics of incidents, such as asset criticality and threat 
severity. Although the incident prioritisation process is a quantitative assessment, its characteristics 
are dissimilar to the adaptive and cost-sensitive approaches due to the decision factors and estimation 
models used to facilitate the response selection process. Porras et al. (2002) and Alsubhi et al. (2008) 
realised the advantages of incident prioritisation, but less attention has been given to adapting this 
approach in automated response technologies. Due to these factors, this study explored the feasibility 




of adapting the incident prioritisation process into the response selection process in order to facilitate 
an autonomous mode in IRSs. 
 
Prior to presenting the proposed new framework for incident prioritisation, it is important to analyse 
the existing work in the area. This chapter begins by reviewing the research on incident prioritisation, 
as well as the work that has influenced and informed the proposed framework. The chapter concludes 
by identifying all the important issues that surround and support the incident prioritisation and 











3.1 Incident Prioritisation 
An early study in incident prioritisation was conducted by Porras et al. (2002), who focused on alert 
ranking and introduced a system called the M-Correlator. Since then, several other studies have been 
published (Lee and Qin, 2003; Alsubhi et al., 2008; Dondo, 2008), each adopting a different approach 
to the prioritisation of incidents. The common approaches in prioritising incidents include static 
prioritisation, vulnerability pre-prioritisation and post-incident prioritisation. 
3.1.1 Static Prioritisation 
The static prioritisation approach uses tagging and tuning of signatures based upon the characteristics 
of the vulnerabilities and experts’ experiences in order to prioritise incidents. For example, Snort 2.1 
provides the Severity Identifier option which can be used to set a priority tag for some signatures 
which overrides the default priority (Caswell and Beale, 2004). The process of tagging priorities in the 
Snort IDS involves two different approaches: a manual tagging process for the signatures and a 
typical customisable configuration file named classification.config. Some commercial products have 
adopted a similar approach to the Snort IDS; for example, Cisco Systems Inc (2009) provides an alert-
severity as one of the parameters in its signature engines. The advantage of this approach is that it 
offers a pre-prioritisation process that assists proactive responses, and it estimates the potential impact 
and severity of each specific vulnerability based upon the characteristics of the vulnerability itself. On 
the other hand, there are a number of drawbacks to this approach, such as: 
 
(a) Manual Processes. The manual processes involved in tagging and tuning signatures are time-
consuming and hence impractical. In addition, the signature tuning process needs knowledgeable 
experts, otherwise the it could actually increase the risk of missing real attacks (Tjhai et al., 
2008b). 
 
(b) Static Rules. Since signatures are static, only incidents with particular known vulnerabilities can 
be prioritised. A new and unknown signature needs to be analysed later and, as such, new 
incidents cannot be prioritised. 
 
(c) Different tags in different contexts. Based upon where or when the signature is triggered, its 
priority might need to change accordingly. However, this is not possible with static prioritisation. 
For example, an incident detected in a critical asset, such as a server, might be considered to be a 
high priority incident as opposed to if a similar incident affected a non-critical asset such as a 
personal computer.  
 




(d) Time. Although the process of tagging can be minimised using groups of attack classifications, an 
additional process is still needed to classify new attacks, and so, again, extra time is needed. 
 
(e) No clear guidelines. Determining the value of the priority is largely subjective. Since there is no 
systematic approach, its effectiveness could be influenced by the expertise of the people tagging 
and tuning the signature.  
 
Static prioritisation still has merits as a way to roughly differentiate groups of attacks based on their 
type and severity. However, it is still far from being able to offer a flexible and adaptable 
prioritisation solution to suit different contexts.  
3.1.2 Vulnerability Pre-prioritisation 
Vulnerability pre-prioritisation offers a similar approach to static prioritisation but uses more 
systematic methods such as risk assessment or expert systems to determine the priority of 
vulnerabilities. Dondo (2008) applied a fuzzy system approach in assessing the potential for risk in 
order to rank vulnerabilities. Perhaps the most widely-used approach is the Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (CVSS) (Mell et al., 2009), which provides severity impact scores for known 
vulnerabilities.  The advantages of the vulnerabilities pre-prioritisation approach are similar to those 
of the static prioritisation approach, and include: 
 
(a) More systematic approach. This approach applies clear indicators in estimating the risk of 
potential incidents. For example, the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) provides an 
open framework for communicating the characteristics and impacts of vulnerabilities, which it 
places into three main groups: Base, Temporal and Environmental (Mell et al., 2009). 
 
(b) Increased automation. This approach is more systematic and therefore reduces the need for 
manual prioritisation by using semi-automatic or fully-automatic processes. 
 
(c) Proactive responses. This approach offers a pre-prioritisation process which benefits proactive 
responses. For instance, a manual proactive response, such as blocking specific events using 
firewall rules, can be done for potential incidents with a high severity impact. 
 
However, it also has some drawbacks: 
 
(a) Increased complexity. The method of calculating the vulnerability risk can be complex, and the 
number of indicators that need to be estimated can be considerable. This could be even more 
significant when the process is completed manually.  





(b) Applies only to known vulnerabilities. A vulnerability score needs to be given before incidents can 
be prioritised. Therefore, unknown and new vulnerabilities cannot be considered in the first 
instance. Given the increasing number of vulnerabilities discovered every day (Symantec, 2011), 
this poses a significant disadvantage.  
 
(c) Does not consider the asset characteristics. The estimation of risk is solely based upon the risk of 
the vulnerability and not on the characteristics of the target.  
 
(d) Limited flexibility. Another limitation is that the estimation of risk is static and does not take into 
account changes in the environment over time. For example, a risk cannot change automatically if 
new patches or solutions are discovered.  
 
The two aforementioned approaches allow incidents to be prioritised based upon pre-determined 
vulnerability tags, the priority of those vulnerabilities and signature tuning. Their main limitation is 
that they only prioritise incidents with known vulnerabilities. 
3.1.3 Post-incident Prioritisation 
Unlike the previous approaches, post-incident prioritisation focuses upon the process of investigating 
and evaluating incidents based on the level of potential risk after incidents occur. It has been 
introduced by Porras et al. (2002), Lee and Qin (2003), Yu et al. (2004), Årnes et al. (2006) and 
Alsubhi et al. (2008).  
 
(a) M-Correlator. Porras et al. (2002) introduced an incident ranking computational model in a 
“mission-impact-based” correlation engine, known as the M-Correlator, which bases its 
judgements upon several factors, such as the likelihood that an attack will succeed, the importance 
of the targeted assets and the popularity of an attack.  
 
(b) Bayesian Network Model. Lee and Qin (2003) proposed a priority computational model based 
upon Bayesian Networks which estimate risk by considering three criteria; computer network 
assets, attacks and vulnerabilities. 
 
(c) Collaborative Architecture. Yu et al. (2004) proposed a general collaborative architecture for 
multiple IDS products by combining intelligent agents and knowledge-based alert evaluation. 
They evaluated the alert priority, based on asset characteristics, and they used it as the input to 
their correlation system. 
 




(d) Risk Assessment Model. Årnes et al. (2006) proposed a network risk assessment using several 
strategies including examining the composition of risks to the individual host and applying the 
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to represent the likelihood of transitions between security states. 
 
(e) Fuzzy system. Alsubhi et al. (2008) proposed a fuzzy system based upon several metrics, such as 
the applicability of attacks, the importance of victims, the relationship between the alerts under 
evaluation and previous alerts, and the social activities occurring between the attackers and the 
victims.  
 
The advantages of adopting post-incident prioritisation are as follows: 
 
(a) It includes pre-prioritisation. The post-incident prioritisation scheme incorporates the advantages 
of pre-prioritisation, and extends them by offering real-time risk assessment of incidents. 
 
(b) Increased automation. Inherited from the pre-prioritisation approach, this approach increases 
automation by applying semi-automatic or fully-automatic processes. 
 
(c) Increased contextual awareness. In order to increase contextual awareness it incorporates more 
decision factors, such as ones related to assets and vulnerabilities.  
 
(d) Evaluates new and unknown vulnerabilities. Given that the estimation of risk does not rely solely 
on the risk of vulnerabilities, it is also possible to prioritise incidents that involve new and 
unknown vulnerabilities. 
 
(e) Increased flexibility. Priorities can be changed to accommodate changes in the environment, such 
as the release of new patches or solutions.  
 
However, the post-incident prioritisation also displays the following drawbacks: 
 
(a) Increased complexity. The increased number of indicators could result in a lengthier and more 
complicated process for the collection and gathering of information. For example, the approach 
uses many matrices, which can arguably place practical limitations on live traffic networks and 
online assessment systems. 
 
(b) Unavailability of information. The prioritisation process could be affected by missing or 
unavailable information, which is used to estimate indicators.  
 




(c) Lack of weighted factors. It does not allow for different weightings based upon the importance of 
different factors. The use of different weightings could provide more flexibility and allow the 
incident prioritisation process to reflect organisational policies. 
 
(d) Lack of prioritisation schemes. It does not provide any specific scheme to prioritise incidents. It 
only uses a high number for high priority and a low number for low priority, without specifying 
any detail about the priority itself. 
 
Apart from studies focusing on incident prioritisation, there are also other approaches that are loosely 
related, mostly focused upon response selection. Zhang et al. (2009) explored the relationship 
between network assets and intrusion alerts in an effort to provide alert prioritisation. Incident 
prioritisation is often attempted indirectly by cost-sensitive response approaches in which a response 
is selected based on cost factors, such as the operational, damage and response costs. Lee et al. 
(2002), Stakhanova et al. (2007a) and Wang et al. (2007) all discussed the relationship between cost 
and responses. Incidents are often prioritised indirectly based on the relationship between the response 
and cost, but, again, there is not enough emphasis on incident prioritisation.  
 
In order to facilitate the response selection process, post-incident prioritisation is the best approach. 
With the advantages it brings, the process could be implemented to be automatic. In addition, it also 
considers different contexts in initiating the response selection. As this is the first attempt to consider 
the feasibility of prioritisation as one of the response selection assessments, there are other key areas 
that need to be examined, particularly the details of the process itself. 
  




3.2 Proposed study key focus areas 
In order to establish a methodological approach to prioritising incidents and to support the response 
selection process, based on the limitations of existing studies, the proposed study believes the most 
important issues to be focussed on are rating, ranking and response. 
 
Generally speaking, the combination of these three issues is necessary in order to provide a 
methodical approach to facilitating the incident prioritisation and response selection process. Figure 5 
illustrates briefly how this combination of factors can be used to determine the importance of each 
issue as well as the relationships between these factors. 
 
Firstly, in order to differentiate between the most critical incidents and less critical ones, it is 
important to rate them. The rating procedure rates incidents and aims to produce quantitative values. 
Risk assessment plays a key role in achieving that by evaluating and investigating incidents. Based 
upon the values produced, the rating procedure aims to rank them quantitatively and then categorise 
them into qualitative groups. To achieve the second part, decision theories are the focal point of the 
study. Finally, the next step after the rating and ranking procedures is to respond to them. Thus, the 
key area upon which to focus is the strategy to be used to map incidents to appropriate responses 
based upon their priorities.  
 
 
Figure 5. Rating, Ranking and Response 
3.2.1 Rating incidents 
This section discusses the role of risk assessment and how it can be used in incident prioritisation. 
Fundamentally, risk assessment is a risk estimation process based on a combination of the likelihood 
of an event and the consequences of that event, as well as the relationship between risk and 
































adopted in the many studies in areas such as engineering, science, manufacturing, business, 
management and public policy, as it not only helps analysts to evaluate risks, but also to identify, 
measure and quantify them and evaluate their consequences and impacts (Haimes, 2009). Its most 
valuable aspect is therefore in facilitating the decision-making process (Haimes, 2009). In security 
contexts, the assessment is done in the following stages. 
 
(a) Risk assessment models. One of the earliest models, proposed by Campbell and Sands (1979),took 
a modular approach to managing computer security risk and its design provides a model that 
consists of several sub-models, including value analysis, threat analysis and identification, 
vulnerability analysis, risk analysis, risk assessment, management decision and control 
implementation (Hamdi and Boudriga, 2005). 
 
(b) Risk assessment adoption. Gehani and Kedem (2004) and Mu et al. (2008) introduced an online 
risk assessment model and Zhang et al. (2008) presented a model-based semi-quantitative 
approach to evaluate security in enterprise networks. These projects offer only general risk 
assessment and have not been designed with incident prioritisation in mind. 
 
(c) Risk assessment standards. Risk assessment is the core competence of information security 
management and has been adopted in many standards, such as the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) (Stoneburner et al., 2002; NIST, 2009) and the ISO/IEC 27000 family 
(Calder and Watkins, 2010). In general, these standards provide a foundation for the development 
of an effective risk management programme. 
 
(d) Risk assessment frameworks. The risk assessment framework is not a new concept (for examples 
see FMEA (IEC, 2006), OCTAVE (CERT, 2009), CRAMM (1987) and CORAS (2001)); they 
generally provide comprehensive tools to evaluate risk.  
 
Risk assessment is a methodical approach used to aid security analysts in evaluating an incidents’ risk 
using threats, vulnerabilities and assets. In managing the risk assessment, risk management is used to 
express the entire management process of risk assessment (Haimes, 2009). In computer security 
contexts, risk management is defined as a systematic process used to identify, mitigate and control 
risks. It consists of several sub-processes, including risk assessment, risk identification, risk 
mitigation, risk monitoring and risk evaluation (Stoneburner et al., 2002; Hamdi and Boudriga, 2005). 
Risk assessment offers several advantages to the incident prioritisation process, such as: 
 
(a) Systematic procedures. Risk assessment combines systematic processes in identifying incidents’ 
risk, and in determining their consequences and how to deal with them. In addition, it gives a 




wide definition of risk by focusing upon the relationships between incidents, threats, 
vulnerabilities and assets, which benefits the incident prioritisation process. 
 
(b) Covers various factors. Risk assessment covers various factors to facilitate decision making such 
as an analysis of assets and values, an identification of threats and vulnerabilities, management 
control, and cost-benefit evaluation. 
 
(c) Easy to adopt. Risk assessment is not a new concept and so is easy to adopt in organisations. In 
addition, risk assessment supports various standards, frameworks and tools that allow the incident 
prioritisation process to be understood easily by different levels of management. 
 
(d) Appropriate responses to risks. Risk assessment facilitates decision makers in identifying the risk 
of incidents using a variety of approaches, such as qualitative or quantitative approaches (Kaplan 
and Garrick, 1981), and it allows the identification of high-risk incidents based upon their 
priority, urgency and importance. As a result, an appropriate response could be arranged to 
counter those incidents. 
 
(e) Usability of results. Risk assessment always uses the same decision factors to evaluate an 
incident’s risk and so produces consistent results. This allows information sharing between 
networks and organisations and allows the incident prioritisation process to cover a wide range of 
networks. 
 
(f) Easy to understand results. Although the incident prioritisation process can be done 
systematically, sometimes the assessment results are not user friendly and can be hard to 
understand. However, the use of risk assessment allows assessment results to be shared with other 
third parties, such as employees, board members, and shareholders, because the results can be 
represented in many ways (such as using qualitative or quantitative results). Furthermore, the 
diversity in the presentation of results offers a simple and practical way to aid different levels of 
management in their decision making. 
 
Apart from the aforementioned general advantages, there are also more specific advantages to be 
gained depending upon the specific approach taken towards risk assessment. There are two 
approaches to risk assessment: qualitative and quantitative (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). Figure 6 
briefly illustrates the common objective of both approaches, despite their dissimilarities in terms of 
their processes.  
 
 






Figure 6. Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Assessment 
 
A quantitative risk assessment is a methodical, step-by-step calculation of asset valuation, exposure to 
threat and the financial impact or loss of an event (Gregg and Kim, 2005). Quantitative assessment 
uses monetary values and applies it to the components used in the estimation process (Munteanu, 
2006). Using quantifiable data and results, quantitative risk assessment applies mathematical models, 
functions and theories. Therefore, quantitative assessment produces a lot of numerical relationships, 
mathematical equations and utilises statistical techniques in the analysis procedures, which include the 
Single Loss Expectancy (SLE), Exposure Factor (EF), Annualized Rate of Occurrence (ARO), 
Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE), and the safeguard cost or benefit analysis (Blakley et al., 2001; 
Munteanu, 2006). Furthermore, Butler (2002) and Ekelhart et al. (2007) discussed the relationship 
between the results of a quantitative risk assessment and a cost-sensitive or cost-benefit analysis. 
Interestingly, the cost-benefit ratio of individual safeguards discussed there is similar to a study 
involving the cost-sensitive modelling of intrusion responses conducted by Lee et al. (2002). 
 
Alternatively, instead of having numbers and equations like the quantitative risk assessment, the 
qualitative risk assessment takes a scenario-based approach (Munteanu, 2006), where the scenario is 
examined and assessed for each critical or major threat to an asset (Gregg and Kim, 2005). The 
qualitative risk assessment requires the calculation of intangible factors (i.e. factor that does not 
having a physical substance or an intrinsic productive value), such as impact (i.e. asset criticality) and 
subjective attack probability (whether there is a high, medium or low level of threat and 
vulnerability). In this approach, intangible factors and subjective probability need to be measured so 
that the value is quantifiable and easy to evaluate and compute. The purpose of a qualitative risk 
assessment is to provide a consistent and subjective assessment of the risk (Gregg and Kim, 2005). In 
order to estimate risk, the qualitative risk assessment uses some transition tables such as a qualitative 
scale, the probability and impact matrix, and risk matrix summary table. These tables and scales are 
important to the qualitative risk assessment as they can be used to transform numerical values such as 












Both approaches offer promising results in valuing threats, assets and vulnerabilities. However, both 
approaches also give similar degrees in terms of the advantages and disadvantages. It is thus 
important to address these strengths and limitations. 
 
The adoption of risk assessment in the incident prioritisation process has both advantages and 
disadvantages. Therefore, in order to reduce the disadvantages while at the same time promoting the 
advantages, the following suggestions should be considered when combining the use of both types of 
assessment. 
 
(a) Input to the decision factors. In order to support the decision factors of the incident prioritisation 
process, different types of input should be properly considered in order to obtain the best input, 
whether qualitative or quantitative, to support the assessment. The use of quantitative data is 
always better than qualitative data (Munteanu, 2006). Additionally, quantitative data is more 
precise than qualitative data (Houmb et al., 2009). Unlike qualitative data, quantitative data is 
objectively measurable because it uses numbers for values. As there is no translation from a 
numerical value to a different qualitative scale (such as high, low or medium), it represents a more 
accurate value.  
 
However, the process of obtaining quantitative data is not an easy process. The collection of 
quantitative data requires many procedures; therefore, it needs an appropriate tool to synchronise 
the data or else the final results will not be reliable enough. However this limitation can be 
reduced by using automatic tools to collect the data. 
 
As the use of quantitative data gives advantages in terms of its usability and results, this type of 
information is preferable. However, if there are difficulties in obtaining quantitative data, 
qualitative data should be considered. The use of qualitative data should involve their 
transformation to numerical values to facilitate the estimation process. However, the process of 
transforming or rescaling subjective data is not easy to be achieved. 
 
(b) Risk estimation process. Both approaches use mathematical functions to estimate risk, but the 
qualitative assessment uses less complex functions compared to the quantitative assessment due to 
its characteristics, such as having less numerical values and adopting matrix tables such as the raw 
risk ratings matrix and the impact and probability matrix. The adoption of sophisticated 
mathematical formulae in the quantitative assessment increases the use of numerical values, and 
often requires more processing power and this overhead for the processing power might be a 
disadvantage for real-time systems. Therefore, reducing the overhead should be one of the 




considerations. In addition, arithmetic operations could be reduced by applying simple 
mathematical functions, as one of the advantages of adopting a quantitative assessment is that it 
provides a measurement of the magnitude of the impact, which can then be used in the cost-
benefit analysis (Stoneburner et al., 2002). In previous works on response selection (Carver, 
2001; Lee et al., 2002; Papadaki, 2004), quantitative assessment is generally preferred to 
qualitative assessment due to its characteristics such as decision factors (e.g. objective data and 
numerical values), the adoptability of the assessment and the usability of results. 
 
(c) Output – result representations. As both types of assessments have many advantages in terms of 
their representation of results, it is suggested that both should be considered. The combination of 
both qualitative and quantitative results benefits the interpretation of the incident prioritisation 
results, as the variety of result representations helps improve understanding at different levels of 
management. However, using a suitable scale to transform numerical results to verbal results is 
another challenge. In terms of the level of efficiency, the adoption of quantitative assessment 
provides more efficient results than qualitative due to the implementation of mathematical 
functions and statistical models. As such, it provides a credible set of results which remain the 
same even if the process is run in different environments and at different times. The usability of 
results in a quantitative assessment is better than in a qualitative assessment, and in most cases 
they can also be used again in different environments. Although the usability of results is better in 
the quantitative assessment, high-level management who are not directly engaged with the 
assessment process may have different understandings of certain types of mathematical functions 
and graphs. Sometimes, therefore, the numerical results need to be interpreted in a qualitative 
manner (Stoneburner et al., 2002). Some results might need to be expressed in a management 
language in order to increase the level of understanding. However, the process of changing the 
original expression reduces the precision of the result and may differ from the original objectives. 
Furthermore, qualitative assessments often produce hypotheses and provide a broad view of 
understanding that can be linguistically understood by most non-technical people. However, in 
such a subjective representation, this can be hard to measure. In addition, the results of a 
qualitative assessment process cannot be easily tracked because of their subjective nature and the 
difficulty in evaluating them (Hamdi and Boudriga, 2005). 
  




3.2.2 Ranking incidents 
Although the prioritisation process can be achieved strategically using risk assessment, understanding 
the risk itself is not sufficient to allow incidents to be prioritised. There are other issues inherent in the 
rating procedures, such as the selection of a suitable approach to facilitate the assessment process and 
how to represent the final result; particularly whether the results are ranked in qualitative or 
quantitative manners. Thus, this section will establish the general issues pertaining to the process, 
including the decision theory and the theory of measurement.  
 
In addressing some of the limitations of the previous approaches, this section will focus upon the 
rating and ranking issues by looking at the most suitable method for making a systematic decision. 
When selecting a methodical approach for prioritising incidents, there are many approaches that can 
be used. On top of risk assessment, this study explores the possibility of using other methods, 
particularly common and well-known approaches from the decision making studies but which are not 
currently being adopted and applied in the incident prioritisation process. 
 
Since many approaches can be used in prioritisation, there is confusion amongst decision makers on 
selecting which method is the best. Therefore, to reduce the confusion, the specific type of the 
prioritisation method can be explained by giving the scale used in the result representation. For 
example, Forman and Gass (2001) discussed the importance of the scale in relation to the result of the 
decision-making process. With appropriate scales, the results from the prioritisation process can be 
arranged either as a list or as a group of incidents, based upon their numerical (e.g. 1, 2 and 3) or 
verbal (e.g. low, medium and high) values. Therefore, it is important to explain the scale first. 
 
In the theory of scales, Stevens (1946) introduces four different types of scales that can be used for 
measurement: nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio. However, in the prioritisation process, only two 
main scales are widely adopted, a ratio scale and an ordinal scale.  
 
(a) Ratio scale. This not only provides ordering of results and relative distance between them, but 
also considers their importance (Karlsson et al., 2006). Using a ratio scale, the differences 
between results can be measured statistically where the distance is clearly defined. For example, if 
the scale uses 1, 2, 3 and 4 to differentiate between results, the scale value of two means the value 
2 is twice that of one, while if a scale value of four is used, then the result is four times better to 
the scale of 1 and two times better than scale of 2. For example, Hierarchical Cumulative Voting 
(Berander and Jönsson, 2006), Analytic Hierarchical Process (AHP) (Saaty, 2008a, 2008b), 
Paired Comparison Analysis (Thurstone, 1927) and Grid Analysis (Manktelow, 2003) use this 
type of scale. 





(b) Ordinal scale. Alternatively, an ordinal scale uses a scale either using numbers like 1, 2, 3, and 4 
or qualitative groups, like high, medium and low, which denote whether one result is higher or 
lower than another.  For example, to illustrate the use of this scale, unlike in the ratio scale, a 
result with a scale of ‘4’ does not imply a value that is double that of ‘2’, and a result with a scale 
of ‘2’ does not indicate a value worth twice that scale of ‘1’. The ordinal scale illustrates the rank 
of qualitative and uncertain value by indicating that ‘2’ is ‘more’ than ‘1’, and that ‘3’ is ‘more’ 
than ‘1’ and ‘2’, and so on. Originally, an ordinal scale arose from the operation of rank-ordering, 
and this scale is widely and effectively used by psychologists (Stevens, 1946). Some well-known 
methods use this type of scale, such as Cumulative Voting (Bhagat and Brickley, 1984), Multi-
Voting, Binary Search Tree (BST), Covey's Quadrants (Covey, 2004), Planning Game 
Partitioning (Karlsson et al., 2007), and ABC Analysis (Chu et al., 2008). 
 
Thus, in order to facilitate the result representation and the risk assessment approaches, it is important 
to consider an appropriate scale for the proposed framework. As one of the important characteristics 
of the proposed framework is to have a relative distance between incidents’ priorities, the ratio scale is 
most applicable. 
 
To extend the incident prioritisation approached considered for adoption and to overcome some of the 
limitations of the existing approaches, this study will now explore the Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP).  
 
One popular prioritisation method is the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) which has already been 
successfully applied in several non-security contexts (Zahedi, 1986; Forman and Gass, 2001; Saaty, 
2008a). AHP is a theory of measurement through pair-wise comparisons and relies upon the 
judgement of experts to derive priority scales (Saaty, 2008a). Over the last decade, AHP has been 
used as a method for decision makers in solving complicated problems and also as a methodology for 
structuring complexity (Forman and Gass, 2001). AHP uses a ratio scale and it has the ability to 
facilitate a synthesised process as well (Forman and Gass, 2001). In addition to prioritisation, AHP 
also has been applied in many decision situations in both research and the real-world, including 
making a choice, resource allocation, benchmarking, quality management and strategic planning. 
According to Karlsson et al. (1998), in an evaluation of six different prioritisation approaches (i.e. 
analytic hierarchy process (AHP), hierarchy AHP, spanning tree matrix, bubble sort, binary search 
tree and priority groups), they found AHP to be the most promising method, although it may be 
problematic to scale up. 
 




AHP is a practical methodical approach to making decisions and the use of the method could help 
security analysts to identify which incidents are important and which are trivial. It consists of three 
main basic principles: decomposition, comparative judgement and hierarchic composition or synthesis 
of priorities. Compared with other methods, AHP has several advantages in the incident prioritisation 
process; for example, it: 
 
(a) Allows for a multiple-criteria environment and multi decision factors. The primary use of AHP is 
to make a choice in a multiple-criteria environment; it also allows multiple factors to support the 
decision-making process. Its decomposition principle allows a complex problem to be structured 
into a hierarchy of clusters or sub-clusters. 
 
(b) Uses different weightings of criteria. AHP uses different weightings of criteria and sub-criteria in 
prioritising options. For instance, in this study, the term ‘options’ is similar to incidents. 
 
(c) Homogeneous clusters. AHP provides a simple way to deal with complexity by allowing 
homogeneous clusters of factors (Forman and Gass, 2001).  
 
(d) Simple and improved way. AHP allows a simple and improved way to measure objective and 
subjective factors (Forman and Gass, 2001).  
 
(e) Ratio scale as a result. AHP produces a ratio scale as a result of the estimation process and 
therefore allows decision makers to differentiate between results in a statistical manner as well as 
consistent between them. In addition, it has been shown that the ratio scale priorities produced by 
AHP are more powerful than other theories that rely upon ordinal or internal scales (Forman and 
Gass, 2001). 
 
(f) Synthesis process. AHP facilitates analysis of the decision goals as well as allowing a synthesis 
process upon the decision process where it allows the decision factors to be combined to produce 
a complex result (Forman and Gass, 2001). 
 
In addition to having these advantages, AHP has the ability to reduce some limitations of the post-
incident prioritisation approach discussed in Section 3.1, specifically as follows: 
 
(a) Different weightings. AHP allows different weightings based upon the importance of different 
decision factors. As such, the important indicator can be addressed differently than other less 
important indicators. The use of different weightings could provide more flexibility and also 
allow the incident prioritisation process to reflect different organisational policies. 





(b) Multiple decision factors. AHP also allows multiple decision factors and, with different levels of 
decision-making and with the decomposition principle, the basic components in the incident 
prioritisation process can be determined with less complexity. 
 
(c) Practical, simple, flexible and systematic. AHP provides a practical, simple, flexible and 
systematic approach in rating and ranking incidents. As such, it is very useful as an alternative 
approach to rate, rank and prioritise incidents in real-world applications. 
 
(d) Accurate, reliable, mathematically proven and easy to understand results. AHP provides 
accurate, reliable, mathematically proven and easy to understand results; as such, this could 
increase their confidence, understanding and consistency level (Forman and Gass, 2001; Saaty, 
2008b). 
 
Recently, Saaty (2008a) discussed two modes of AHP in making decisions and prioritising 
alternatives: a relative and rating mode. Although the common relative mode is more accurate for 
comparison of alternatives, the rating mode has an advantage in rating a large number of alternatives. 
Therefore, in this particular case, since incidents involve many alternatives (e.g. more than 1,000 
incidents), the rating mode can be considered as a preferred approach. In terms of the result of the 
priorities, although both methods do not deliver similar results, they are adequately close (Saaty, 
2008a). 
 
As an alternative to AHP, in the multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) study, there are many well-
proven and documented decision methods that can be used to prioritise alternatives. These include the 
elimination and choice expressing reality (ELECTRE) (Roy, 1991), superiority and inferiority ranking 
(SIR) (Xu, 2001) and grey relational analysis (GRA) (Chan and Tong, 2007). Although the 
aforementioned methods use multiple-criteria in making decisions and prioritising results, the reason 
behind exploring AHP with rating mode is simply because it performs faster at rating a large number 
of alternatives (Saaty, 2008a) and has a huge potential to prioritise incidents. Similarly, there are also 
other prioritisation methods, such as Weiger’s Method (Wiegers, 1999), Grounded Theory (Herrmann 
and Daneva, 2008), Binary Search Tree (BST) (Karlsson et al., 1998), Priority Group (Karlsson et al., 
1998; Karlsson et al., 2007), Theory-W (Boehm and Ross, 1989), voting schemes (e.g. Cumulative 
Voting or Weighted Voting (Ayad and Kamel, 2008), and 100-Point Method (Leffingwell and 
Widrig, 2003). These are also limited to a small number of criteria and alternatives and hence they 
are not suitable for rating and ranking incidents. Furthermore, AHP is the most popular, approachable, 
and practical, as well as being a well-proven method used in decision-making, and it has been 
validated in many real and hypothetical examples (Saaty, 2008b).  





Although there are some criticisms of AHP, Zahedi (1986), Forman and Gass (2001) and Saaty 
(2008a) reported that many applications apply AHP in making decisions. The criticisms that exist are 
mainly focused upon the theoretical and technical aspects of AHP, such as rank reversal, inconsistent 
judgement on priorities, fundamental scales used in AHP and the pair-wise comparison method. 
However, these issues are not a big problem because AHP provides a way to make a complex 
decision and has been used in many studies and has also been validated in many examples, both real 
and hypothetical (Saaty, 2008b). In detail, some of the interesting criticisms are as follows: 
 
(a) Rank reversal. Risk reversal is concerned with the illegitimate changes in the rank of results (e.g. 
alternatives) upon changing the structure of the decision, such as i) add or delete new input  (e.g. 
alternatives) and ii) add and delete new decision factors (e.g. criteria). This, however, has been 
addressed by other studies (Forman and Gass, 2001; Saaty, 2008b) and it is important to know 
that it can be reduced in some specific cases, such as i) only in an ideal mode can the rating be 
made where the decision factors or input (e.g. alternatives) have been decided first before it can 
be used (i.e. known as a closed system). Other detailed explanation can be found in Forman and 
Gass (2001). 
 
(b) Inconsistent judgement on priorities. The second problem is related to inconsistent verbal 
judgments (e.g. low, medium and high) and their effect on aggregating such judgments or on 
deriving priorities from them. This, however, has been proven by other empirical studies and as a 
result the judgement priorities can be tested using Random Index (RI), consistency index (CI) and 
consistency ratio (CR) formulas (Saaty, 2008b). 
 
(c) Fundamental scales used in AHP. The third criticism is related to the fundamental scales used in 
AHP. Fundamentally, the scales are originally proposed in the earlier studies of AHP using verbal 
judgements (e.g. equal, weak, strong, etc). However, the modern trend of AHP has adopted a 
numerical scale where an ordinal scale is transformed into a ratio scale, and this scenario has 
created scientific arguments amongst analysts. This criticism has been addressed using a similar 
answer to the previous one. In addition, the fundamental scales have been proven acceptable and 
are widely used by other studies. 
 
(d) Pair-wise comparison method. The last criticism is concerned with the limitation upon the pair-
wise comparison method used in determining the priorities in AHP. This limitation addressed the 
theoretical and technical aspects of the method and it has been discussed in many studies (Harker, 
1987; Forman and Gass, 2001; Saaty, 2008b). 
 




Furthermore, one such example, where AHP has been used in a security context, was proposed  by 
Wu et al. (2008). AHP was used to generate weights for factors in the response selection process of an 
automated IRS. They utilised factors such as attack restraint, service maintenance, time spending and 
resource consumption. More recently, Xi et al. (2009) used AHP to evaluate computer network 
information security, based upon several decision factors such as environment safety, hardware and 
software safety, and data security. In addition, following a similar approach, Wu et al. (2009) 
improved information system security risk assessment using fuzzy AHP. Although these studies have 
adopted AHP, little attention has been given to focusing upon the incident prioritisation and response 
selection process. In addition, there is no evidence to demonstrate an investigation upon any dataset to 
support such a claim.  
  




3.2.3 Measuring Incidents with Threats, Vulnerabilities and Impacts 
From several seminal works in the response selection studies (Carver, 2001; Foo et al., 2005; 
Papadaki and Furnell, 2005; Stakhanova et al., 2007a; Mu and Li, 2010), the key decision factors are 
mainly focused upon threats, vulnerabilities and asset characteristics which are not limited to 
workstations and personal computers but also include network assets (e.g. routers and servers) as well 
as security appliances (e.g. firewalls). As these factors are similar to the general decision factors in 
risk assessment, the main question is how to measure these and secondly, how to make the result 
quantifiable so that it can be sorted according to its priority. 
 
Since an incident is associated with an event, particularly in an intrusion scenario, this study 
establishes indicators that support the decision making upon the two aforementioned decision factors 
(i.e. impact on asset and likelihood of threat and vulnerability). These indicators were determined by 
reviewing the existing literature. In order to reduce the uncertainty within the factors, this study uses a 
decomposition approach which has been applied in other security metrics studies (Wang and Wulf, 
1997; Heyman et al., 2008) and has proven useful in identifying basic components from higher level 
requirements (Savola and Abie, 2009); it is also one of the main principles in AHP. For instance, the 
basic components in the model refer to the elements that contribute input into the decision factors, 
also called indicators, such as type of incidents, time of incidents, cost of maintenance, replacement 
and other related data. 
 
There are two well-known methods to measure the impact upon a specific asset, namely the 
qualitative and quantitative approaches (Hamdi and Boudriga, 2005). Fundamentally, the impact is 
measured using the value of the asset (Dondo, 2008). The usage of both types of data, either 
qualitative or quantitative, has been discussed in the previous section (see Section 3.2.1). The 
quantitative data is preferable. However, there is a limitation in making a precise and quantified value 
of the relevant factors that influence the assets, such as misleading results in identifying the monetary 
costs. Thus, in order to measure the relative magnitude of cost factors, an informal or incomplete 
qualitative approach has been considered in the cost-sensitive studies (Lee et al., 2002; Stakhanova et 
al., 2007a).  
 
To determine the precise state of assets is often impossible, but it can be characterised using unique 
qualitative costs, in order to establish a state where one factor is independent of the others. 
Furthermore, the process of gathering the values that influence the decision factors is often impossible 
to obtain and hard to measure. Therefore, these limitations have to be considered first. 
 




Extrapolating from the response selection studies (Lee et al., 2002; Porras et al., 2002; Lee and Qin, 
2003; Munteanu, 2006; Stakhanova et al., 2007a; Zhang et al., 2007; Dondo, 2008; Mu et al., 2008; 
Pak and Cannady, 2009; Strasburg et al., 2009b; Zhang et al., 2009; Kheir et al., 2010), several terms 
have been used to draw the uniqueness of those factors, such as maintainability, criticality (i.e. 
confidentiality, availability and integrity), replaceability, response, failure, control and dependability 
cost. Since the risk assessments are done on site based (i.e. based upon organisations), there is no 
specific guideline or best selection because they are often selected to fit with an organisation’s 
policies. However, to assist the selection of the best decision factors there are two considerations. 
Firstly, by identifying the decision factors that were actively used by the previous response selection 
studies, and secondly by considering the most recently used and flagged by more recent studies. 
 
Besides the asset characteristic factors in risk assessment, the decision factors that influence the 
incident characteristics are important too. Extrapolating from similar studies with asset related factors, 
in order to measure incidents, there are several attributes which are directly carried by the detected 
events, including their severity, targets or victim, sources or attacker, and the time of the incident. On 
top of that, there are other decision factors which are indirectly carried by incidents, such as their 
frequency and similarity, as well as where they are detected (e.g. the placement or sensitivity of 
sensors). These factors are important too and they could be used to show the levels of confidence or 
suspicious of attacks; a higher degree contributes more value to the decision factors.  
 
By extension, with a new exploration in security metrics in industries such as Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (CVSS) (Mell et al., 2006; Mell et al., 2009), Cisco Risk Rating (Cisco Systems Inc, 
2011) and CIS Consensus Security Metrics (CIS, 2010), where quantified values like vulnerabilities’ 
severity could be gathered practically using an industrial standard, these could be useful as decision 
factors. 
 
Furthermore, there is a dominant factor in many response selection assessments that enables the cost-
sensitive approach – the effect of implementing a certain type of response as one of the decision 
factors. This factor has been used to measure the effectiveness of the previous response and its 
negative impacts. In order to define an accurate measurement of this factor, this factor has emerged 
with a combination of various factors, such as asset or service dependencies (Toth and Kruegel, 2002; 
Balepin et al., 2003; Kheir et al., 2010) and the importance of system resources (Stakhanova et al., 
2008; Strasburg et al., 2009a).  
 
It is important to understand that the process of obtaining the aforementioned information is not an 
easy task. Table 2 and Table 3 show the unique indicators to support the risk estimation process, and 
to indirectly facilitate the incident prioritisation and response selection processes as well. The decision 




factors are separated into two tables. The first table tabulates the related indicators that support the 
impact on asset decision factors or related to asset values, and the other one tabulates indicators that 
support the likelihood of threat and vulnerability decision factors. There are four columns in each 
table and the first column presents the indicator followed by its type in the second column. The third 
column describes the indicator and the last column lists the most significant references on which each 
indicator is based.  
 
There are two main categories in differentiating the indicators: essential and desirable. An essential 
indicator (labelled ‘E’ in the tables) is a main indicator and it has been applied in many previous 
frameworks and is actively flagged by more recent studies. On the other hand, desirable indicators 
(labelled ‘D’ in the tables) are categorised as secondary indicators, only previously used by a few 
studies. In order to reflect this difference, essential indicators are given a higher priority in terms of 









Table 2. Indicators for Impact on asset 
Indicator Type Description References 
Criticality E Criticality estimates the importance and value of 
the asset. Criticality is based on three main and 
common attributes in security, such as 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Criticality also uses an asset value in estimating 
the final rating. Generally, the higher the 
criticality, the higher the impact on the asset.  
Lee et al. (2002) 
Porras et al. (2002) 
Gregg and Kim (2005) 
Rogers et al. (2005) 
Davis et al. (2007) 
Zhang et al. (2007) 
Dondo (2008) 
Fenz and Neubauer 
(2009) 
Mu et al. (2008) 
Zhang et al. (2009) 
 
Maintainability D Maintainability measures the cost of maintaining 
assets and is based on monetary value. 
Maintainability is similar to operational costs 
where it is used in maintaining the operation of 
the assets as well as the setup cost to protect 
them. For example, the cost of maintenance is 
measured by calculating the average cost in 
maintaining and protecting assets annually. 
Generally, the higher the maintainability, the 
higher the impact on the asset. 
 
Lee et al. (2002) 
Munteanu (2006) 
Zhang et al. (2009) 
Strasburg et al. (2009b) 
 
Replaceability D Replaceability refers to the ability to replace an 
asset in terms of cost and time. There is a trade-
off between replaceability and asset criticality. 
Unlike the asset criticality, the higher the asset 
replaceability, the lower the impact on the asset.  
For example, the rating of the replaceability can 
be estimated using the cost of replacement and 
mean time to replace. By extension, cost of 
replacement can be estimated using the total of 
replacement cost for a specific asset within a 
year. Furthermore, the mean time to replace 
measures the effectiveness of the asset to be 
replaced from any incidents’ impact. The sooner 
the replacement is placed, the less impact on the 
asset.  
 
Lee et al. (2002) 
Munteanu (2006) 
Haslum et al. (2007) 
Pak and Cannady (2009) 
Zhang et al. (2009) 
Strasburg et al. (2009b) 
 
 
Dependability D Dependability determines whether the asset is 
operated alone or if it depends on other assets or 
applications or services. The more connections 
an asset has with other assets, the higher its 
dependability is. In other words, the more 
connections between assets and applications, the 
higher the impact on the asset. 
 
Porras et al. (2002) 
Toth and Kruegel (2002) 
Lee and Qin (2003) 
Nicole et al. (2004) 
Kheir et al. (2010) 
Control D This measures the control factors that are 
implemented by an asset or application. Controls 
are used to mitigate potential vulnerability and 
threat. For example, the Center for Internet 
Security proposed three metrics to measure 
Lee et al.(2002) 
Lee and Qin (2003) 
Dondo (2008) 
Ekelhart et al. (2009) 
 




security metric related to control, such as 
Percent of Changes with Security Review, 
Percent of Changes with Security Exceptions 
and Percentage of Incident Detected by Internal 
Control (CIS, 2009). Generally, the higher rating 








Table 3. Indicators for likelihood of threat and vulnerability 
Indicator Type Description References 
Severity E Severity refers to the severity of the 
potential incidents and the estimation of it 
may relate to the extent of vulnerability. As 
such, the extent of vulnerability can be 
obtained from other sources such as the 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS). Generally, the higher the likely 




Abedin et al. (2006) 
Lai and Hsia (2007) 
Alsubhi et al. (2008) 
Ahmed et al. (2008) 
Ausibal and Gallon (2008) 
Lin et al. (2008) 
Dondo (2008) 
Mu et al. (2008) 
Houmb and  Franqueira 
(2009) 
Subramanian et al. (2009) 
Zhang et al. (2009) 
Fenz and Neubauer (2009) 
 
Exploitability D Exploitability measures the general level of 
exploitability of incidents at a specific time. 
It shows the current state of the related 
vulnerability and verifies the impact to a 
specific asset at any specific time. 
Generally, the higher the status of the 
incident’s exploitability, the higher the risk. 
 
Mell et al. (2006) 
Dondo (2008) 
Houmb and  Franqueira 
(2009) 
Hausrath (2011) 
Clark and Stavrou (2011) 
 
 
Sensitivity D Sensitivity measures the initial priority of 
incidents. The sensitivity shows the 
seriousness of the incident which is 
detected by certain detectors or appliances 
and the efficiency of detecting incidents. 
Sensitivity can be measured using sensor 
sensitivity where it indicates the current 
state of the incident based on the appliance 
and detector state. Generally, the higher the 
rating of the incident’s sensitivity, the 
higher the risk. 
 
Årnes et al. (2005) 
Årnes et al. (2006) 
Haslum and Årnes (2007) 
Alsubhi et al. (2008) 
Noel and Jajodia (2008) 
Zhang et al. (2009) 
Similarity D Similarity represents the similarity between 
incidents’ attributes within a particular 
period of time.  The attributes are obtained 
from the detail between attacker and victim 
and they are the IP address, protocol, 
services and time of occurrence. In some 
cases, an attacker creates a scenario of 
incident where the process of attacking 
starts with scanning or reconnaissance 
before the real attack is done. Therefore, the 
similarity between incidents’ attributes can 
be used to estimate the seriousness of the 
incident. Generally, the higher the incident 
similarity, the higher the risk. 
 
Valdes and Skinner (2001) 
Xu and Ning (2005) 
Alsubhi et al. (2008) 
Xiao et al. (2008) 
Yu and Rubo (2008) 
 
Frequency D Frequency represents the frequency of the 
similar incidents that occurred within a 
particular period of time. Unlike the 
Ning et al. (2004) 
Haslum and Årnes (2007) 
Alsubhi et al. (2008) 




similarity indicator, the frequency identifies 
the similarity between vulnerabilities in 
terms of number of occurrences within a 
particular period of time. Frequency can be 
measured using incident frequency scoring 
where it measures the percentages of 
similar types of vulnerability between 
incidents within a certain period of time. 
There are several attributes which can be 
used to measure the frequency, including 
the number of alerts, number of 
vulnerabilities, and type of vulnerability. 
Generally, the higher the incident 
frequency, the higher the risk. 
 
Yu and Rubo (2008) 









So far, this study has presented issues related to the key areas applied in the rating and ranking 
procedures. The other challenge before a novel framework can be proposed are issues related to the 
strategy used to respond to incidents. The response strategy is an important issue in order to establish 
a proper method to establish a relationship between incidents and how to respond to them (i.e. 
response options). As the one of the key findings in Chapter 2, there are different types of responses 
and they may need to be mapped with incidents based upon different level of priorities.  
 
To satisfy the latter claim, there are two types of mapping approaches in the response selection 
process: static and dynamic mapping (Mu and Li, 2010).  
 
(a) Static mapping models. To mitigate incidents, static mapping models map incidents to predefined 
responses. Snort (1998) uses a static notification system to react to specific types of incidents by 
using a simple decision and predefine table. Although the static model is easy to define, it inherits 
some weaknesses. Specifically, it is possible for an attacker to predict the predefined responses. 
Also it does not consider the context of an incident, and it cannot be deployed in large scale 
systems (Mu and Li, 2010).  
 
(b) Dynamic response mapping models. In contrast, dynamic response mapping models use more 
sophisticated methods of mapping incidents with response options, by adopting a dynamic 
decision making approach where responses are selected dynamically based upon the context of an 
incident (Mu and Li, 2010), for example, the AAIRS (Carver, 2001) and EMERALD (Porras and 
Neumann, 1997) systems. Several factors are used to make a systematic decision and they include 
attack metrics (e.g. attack confidence and severity of incident), system states (e.g. existing 
vulnerability and service implication) and the will of security analysts such as response goals and 
security policy constraint (Mu and Li, 2010). This approach has been adopted in many studies 
(Lee et al., 2002; Stakhanova et al., 2007a; Wang et al., 2007).  
 
In addition to the dynamic response model, different response strategies are adopted, such as response 
goal strategy (Carver, 2001; Mu and Li, 2010), response stopping power (Papadaki and Furnell, 2005) 
and adaptive response strategy (Foo et al., 2005; Stakhanova et al., 2007a).  
 
(a) Response goal strategy. Carver (2001) proposed a response goal strategy where a sequence of 
actions (also called subtasks) is arranged to achieve a specific goal. The approach uses a prototype 
master analysis using fuzzy rule based on making decisions upon incidents. The study has listed 
several possible response goals, including analysing the attack, catching the attack, masking the 




attack, maximising confidentiality, maximising data integrity, minimising cost, recovering 
gracefully, and sustaining service. One or multiple goals need to be selected from the list and 
normally the selection of them is done manually by security analysts. Similarly with Carver 
(2001), Mu and Li (2010) developed an automated intrusion response system by adopting the 
hierarchical task network planning approach in their response decision-making model. In 
addition, they addressed the importance of response time in mapping response options and 
suggested that in response time decision-making, an intrusion response system can apply different 
response strategies to achieve a different set of response goals. 
 
(b) Response Stopping Power. Papadaki and Furnell (2005) used a rule based module to identify the 
most appropriate response characteristics based on a Response Policy. The policy aimed to 
determine the most appropriate Response Phases and it is similar to the response goals used by 
Carver (2001). In particular, one of the characteristics to determine the policy is Response 
Stopping Power, where the maximum level of it reflects the strength of a response. The maximum 
level of Stopping Power is determined by considering factors such as responder efficiency, alert 
status, urgency and target importance. An advantage compared to the previous strategy is that 
their model considers urgency (i.e. related to response time) and target importance (i.e. asset 
criticality) as decision factors.  
 
(c) Adaptive response strategy. This cost-sensitive model proposed by Stakhanova et al. (2007a) 
applied an adaptive response strategy and updated response options based upon the status of the 
previous triggered response and the value of cost as a decision factor. Their approach closely 
follows the approach proposed by Foo et al. (2005) in ADEPTS. 
 
Although they introduced different ways to respond to incidents, they inherited some limitations as 
follows: 
 
(a) Response goal strategy. Although the response goal strategy approach improves response 
performances, it is insufficient to address the urgency and importance of response time because 
responses are launched in sequences. In addition, since the selection of the goals is made 
manually, several goals need to be planned first before they can be used; hence this needs security 
analysts’ experience. 
 
(b) Response Stopping Power. The strategy relies upon inflexible and complex policies. Although it 
applies a customisable policy, the changes and modification to it require experts and experienced 




security analysts. As such, in order to reduce misconfiguration and errors in the policies, more 
time needs to be spent on the process of configuring the policy. 
 
(c) Adaptive response strategy. There are two immediate limitations. Firstly, when dealing with an 
immediate response, the strategy is not very robust, mainly because it needs extra time in 
estimating the relative difference between the cost of damage and the cost of response. Secondly, 
if the first response were not effective, there would be considerable delay before another effective 
response could be triggered again. 
 
Although the response selection process can be achieved using a different approach of strategies, they 
may share some of the following objectives. 
 
(a) Autonomous modes. The dynamism of the strategy in the selection process aims to map incidents 
and responses automatically. This means that, instead of selecting response manually, the 
operation is run in an autonomous mode by initiating the appropriate response to respond to 
incidents based upon the assessment results. Furthermore, a serious limitation of a manual 
selection lies in the fact that it will only be effective with human availability, meaning a large 
disadvantage in case of unavailability. 
 
(b) Response Time. To illustrate the importance of timely response, Cohen (1999) highlights that the 
longer the delay between detection and response, the higher the attack success rate is. Therefore, a 
fast response is important. Although the autonomous mode has indirectly improved the response 
time, other factors need to be considered in achieving this objective, such as assessments, its 
formulation and calculation, and the information gathering process, which may induce an 
overhead in the performance of the entire process.   
 
(c) False responses. In order to increase the reliability of an automated response system, a system 
needs to consider false incidents. Papadaki (2004) identified this as one of the challenges in 
establishing an automated response system. Although the case of having false incidents is hard to 
identify, a proper mapping approach should consider this too. For example, a false incident should 
be mapped with a passive response, as opposed to a true one. 
 
(d) Online assessment. In order to support real time processing, there are many factors that need to be 
considered, such as hardware, algorithms, codes optimisation, processor utilisation and also 
communication between systems (Stankovic, 1988). Although providing an online assessment 
system may induce an overhead in terms of its processing and performance, it benefits security 




analysts and automated systems to respond fast. Furthermore, although this objective is hard to 
achieve, Stakhanova et al. (2007a) identified this as a direction for their future studies. 
 
In conclusion, the proposed framework adopts the dynamic model in its response model, as this 
provides some flexibility in selecting an appropriate response. In addition, in order to demonstrate the 
feasibility of adopting the prioritisation process in facilitating the response selection process, the 
aforementioned objectives have also been considered in the evaluation study for the proposed 
framework. 
  





The main focus of this chapter was to establish the main challenges facing the incident prioritisation 
process as follows. 
 
(a) Incident Prioritisation. The discussion started with the comparison of the incident prioritisation 
process. In order to facilitate the autonomous mode in the response selection process, the post-
incident prioritisation is taken into consideration as it inherits advantages from other approaches 
together with other new advantages. Besides, it also reduces some of the limitations of the static 
prioritisation and vulnerabilities pre-prioritisation. 
 
(b) The rating procedures. The main challenge in the rating procedures is to determine the suitable 
approach to adopt in a risk assessment process, either to apply a qualitative or a quantitative 
approach. Several other issues have been discussed in order to reduce the complexity of the 
adoption of risk assessment in the incident prioritisation process. These can be seen by 
categorising the general issues in the input, process and output of the procedures.  
 
(c) The ranking procedures. In addition to the previous challenge in the rating process, the ranking 
procedures have contributed some degree of solutions in the input, process and output of the 
incident prioritisation process. However, there are other specific challenges in the ranking 
procedures. To reduce the complexity of input, there are two lists of independent indicators to 
support the decision factors in the risk assessment. Furthermore, in order to address the limitation 
of the previous approaches in the incident prioritisation process, this section discussed the 
advantages of considering the AHP approach. Finally, to rank incidents based upon their results, 
this chapter discussed the usage of two different types of scale, ordinal and ratio scale. 
 
(d) The respond strategy. Along with methodical procedures in the rating and ranking procedures, the 
need of a systematic strategy to respond to incidents is important too. In order to propose a 
response model to map with the incident priority, this chapter discussed the major approaches 
adopted in the previous response selection studies and focused upon the dynamic mapping 
models. In addition, in order to demonstrate the feasibility of the prioritisation process in 
facilitating the selection process, there are four objectives which need to be considered. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter intensively highlighted some related and important issues as well as some 
strategies to reduce the limitations upon them. Thus, it is important to address the limitations and 
inherit their advantages so they can be used as a guideline to build a useful and dynamic framework or 
enhance the current approaches, or even to improve the prioritisation process in general. 
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4 Incident Prioritisation for Intrusion Response Systems: The 
Framework 
Having identified the literature and studies on the incident prioritisation process, this chapter details 
the proposed framework. The aim of the framework is to prioritise incidents based upon the identified 
decision factors together with the selected methods and models. The prioritisation process in the 
proposed framework is important as it facilitates the autonomous mode in the response selection 
process in IRSs. To support the process, this chapter details the procedures in the rating, ranking and 
response process as well as the rationale behind their implementation. The discussion continues with a 
detailed description of the main and sub-models that support the proposed framework. 
 
The proposed framework attempts to identify the importance and urgency of incidents, by using a 
priority model called Intrinsic Importance. This model is based on similar work by Yoo (2010), who 
proposed an email prioritisation study. Choosing appropriate strategies to adopt in the framework is 
very important, especially when dealing with the technical aspects in the selected approach. 
 
The proposed framework is established with the combination of two main models: Risk Index Model 
(RIM) and Response Strategy Model (RSM). With the aid of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), 
decision factors and a list of unique indicators identified in the previous chapters, RIM is a model to 
support the procedures in the rating and ranking process, which aims to prioritise incidents. 
Furthermore, RSM is a model to offer a methodical approach to a strategy for responding to incidents. 
The model maps different types of response options with different levels of incident based upon their 
priority.  
 
Finally, in order to establish the relationship between RIM and RSM, a Multi-Strategy Incident 
Prioritisation Framework is proposed. As a first attempt to directly combine the prioritisation and 
response selection process, the framework combines both models together with other modules, such 
as web modules, in order to satisfy the objectives of this study. Furthermore, in addition to the main 
objective to prioritise incidents and facilitate the autonomous mode, the framework also address the 
limitation of the prioritisation process, which was identified in previous chapters. 
 
  




4.1 Risk Index Model (RIM) 
To address the issues in the rating and ranking process, this study adopts an AHP approach by 
establishing a new risk estimation model, which has been termed the Risk Index Model (RIM). The 
model estimates the risk index for every single incident based upon indicators and input obtained from 
asset environments and other significant attributes within the incidents (e.g. IP addresses). Based upon 
the strengths of the post-incident prioritisation, the Risk Index Model inherits them by rating each of 
the incidents to produce a risk index value. Based on the value of the risk index, incidents are ranked 
quantitatively from the highest to the lowest index. 
 
The model uses a combination of two decision factors, impact on asset and likelihood of threat and 
vulnerability. In addition, the aforementioned factors use several other indicators such as criticality, 
maintainability, replaceability, etc., as listed in the previous chapters (see Table 2 and Table 3; pp. 
49). 
4.1.1 Decision Factors for Risk Index Model 
Figure 7 depicts a block diagram with the indicators that are used to estimate the risk index. Although 
there are other indicators, which are closely related to the factors that influence an asset’s impact and 
the likelihood of incidents, this study limits them to only ten indicators. The rationale behind this 
decision was to allow the proposed framework to work flawlessly in facilitating the autonomous mode 
in the response selection process. This is also important in order to operate the framework to run in a 
live traffic network and have the ability to perform in online assessment mode; the smaller the number 
of indicators the easier they are to measure, obtain and process.  
 
Figure 7 depicts three levels of decision hierarchy structure for RIM. The decision hierarchy structure 
contains: 
 
(a) Level 1 is the goal of the model. In this particular context, the model aims to rate, quantify and 
estimate the risk index for incidents. 
 
(b) Level 2 includes the decision attributes of the model. These are the factors that influence the goal 
(e.g. the consequence, in terms of the impact on the asset, and likelihood of event, based in turn 
upon the likelihood of associated threats and vulnerabilities).  
 
(c) Level 3 details the decision attributes defined in the 2nd level. Five indicators influence the impact 
on asset and a further five inform the likelihood of threat and vulnerability. Each indicator uses 




quantitative values obtained from information metrics (e.g. incident information, criticality, 




























Figure 7. Decision Hierarchy for Risk Index Model 
  




4.1.2 The aid of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
This study combines all the indicators in the model and estimates the incident risk indexes using RIM 
with the aid of AHP. In order to differentiate the importance of the indicators, the model adopts the 
fundamental scale proposed by Saaty (2008a). The scale was chosen because it provides a clear 
distinction between indicators and also has been used in the most recent studies relating to AHP 
(Barker and Zabinsky, 2011; Huang et al., 2011). Table 4 describes the fundamental scale used for the 
analysis in weighting the indicators. For example, if the criticality indicator is moderately important 
compared to maintainability, value 4 is assigned in the criticality-maintainability comparison matrix 
and reciprocal value (1/4) is assigned to the maintainability-criticality comparison matrix (see Table 
5). In the process of comparing indicators, each indicator will be compared with another indicator by 
choosing which is the most important and which gives the greatest advantage between two pairs. The 
process is continued with the other two pairs until all indicators are compared. 




1 Equal Importance Two indicators contribute equally to the objective
2 Weak or slight
3 Moderate Importance








Very Strong or demonstrated 
Importance
An indicator is favoured very strongly over another; its 
dominance demonstrated in practice
8 Very, very strong
9 Extreme Importance
The evidence favouring one indicator over another is of the 
highest possible order of affirmation
Reciprocals of 
above
If indicator i  has one of the 
above non-zero numbers 
assigned to it when compared 
with indicator j , then j  has the 
reciprocal value when 
compared with i
A reasonable assumption
1.1 - 1.9 If indicators are very close
May be difficult to assign the best value but when compared 
with other contrasting indicators the size of the small numbers 
would not be too noticeable, yet they can still indicate the 
relative importance of the activities  
  




This study satisfies the first need of AHP using the fundamental scale by producing a judgement 
matrix for the indicators. Consider n number of indicators, where A represents the indicators 
themselves; therefore, with n indicators, the reciprocal matrix emerges as follows: 
 









































Since there are two types of indicators (i.e. essential and desirable), this study controls the essential 
indicators by giving a slightly higher value compared to the desirable indicator values. The valuation 
of the indicator is easy because the essential indicator for both decision factors always becomes a 
higher priority. For example, Table 5 shows the example of the judgement matrix for the indicators 
that influence the impact on the asset. The table is not complete because there is no priority and 
weight assigned for each indicator yet. The complete result is shown in the next section. In a normal 
case, the judgement matrix is assigned manually by security analysts and the priority can change from 
time to time. 
Table 5. Example of the reciprocal matrix for the indicators 
Impact on an Asset Criticality Maintainability Replaceability Dependability Control
Criticality 1 5 3 2 2
Maintainability 1/5 1 1/2 1/4 1/3
Replaceability 1/3 2 1 2 2.2
Dependability 1/2 4 1/2 1 1.5
Control 1/2 3 1/2.2 1/1.5 1  
 
In extending the weighted process, this study applies an approach similar to that used by Saaty 
(2008a) to calculate the indicator priorities. This study uses the Eigenvalue Method (EM) in giving an 
appropriate priority for each indicator. Other than EM, the Row Geometric Mean Method (RGMM) is 
one of the common methods in estimating priority (Crawford and Williams, 1985). According to 
Dong et al. (2008) and Herman and Koczkodaj (1996), with regard to the result, both methods (i.e. 
EM and RGMM) show almost the same priority results and are accurate enough to be used for 
practical applications. With the EM, the matrix satisfies the following formula in (1) (Saaty, 2008b). 
 




          (1) 
 
In making a judgement for matrix    with       matrix, λmax is the largest Eigenvalue of    and  is 
the right Eigenvector. With regard to the formula, λmax is always greater than or equal to  . Precisely, 
the closer value of λmax is to the  , the more consistent are the values in the judgement matrix   . In 
order to calculate λmax and Eigenvector,  , this study uses a matrix calculator (e.g. a function in 
Matlab). The matrix calculator will produce several values for λmax and Eigenvector,  . The largest 
λmax and its Eigenvector,   will be used for the priority calculation. Furthermore, the judgement 
matrix of the influence factor in Table 7 is to consider for an example. The priorities values in Table 7 
(i.e. 0.4444 and 0.5556) are calculated by normalising the Eigenvector,    {
      
      
}. To ask if 
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} is the right Eigenvector corresponding to the Eigenvalue, λmax = 2.000 for    
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Therefore, λmax = 2.000 and    {
      
      
} are an Eigenvalue and an Eigenvector, respectively, for 
   {
            
            
}. 
In order to extend the different weightings upon the indicators, three judgement matrices can be 
established with the model: the judgement matrix of the influence factor (i.e. as can be seen in Table 
7), judgement matrix of the main indicator for consequence of event (i.e. impact on asset - Table 8) 
and the judgement matrix of the main indicator for likelihood of event (i.e. likelihood of threat and 
vulnerability - Table 9). The judgement matrices were used to evaluate the different results of the risk 
index. Generally, the judgement matrices are manually configured and Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9 
show examples of the judgement matrices for the decision factors and indicators used in RIM. Having 
identified the drawbacks of the previous study in the post-incident prioritisation, in particular with the 
lack of different weight in the decision factors, the consideration of adopting these judgement 
matrices is significant. 
 
Although the judgement matrices were manually configured, they need to evaluate in order to 
maintain their consistency. To evaluate the consistency within the indicators, Random Index (RI) 
(Saaty, 2008b) is introduced (as tabulated in Table 6) with the consistency index (CI) and consistency 
ratio (CR) formulas.  




Table 6. Random Index (RI) (Saaty, 2008b) 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
RI 0 0 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.49 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.58 1.59 
 




         
       
   
 (3) 
 
To look at them closer, on the bottom of the tables there are three variables which are λmax, 
consistency index and consistency ratio. The λmax is obtained from the largest value of the Eigen value 
and is used to estimate the consistency index (CI). With the consistency index (CI) formula and 
Random Index (RI) in Table 6, the consistency ratio (CR) is estimated using the given formula. 
According to Zahedi (1986) and Saaty (2008b), if the consistency ratio value is less than 10%, then 
the value can be considered as a reasonable and acceptable judgement or otherwise the judgement 
matrix is not consistent. Based on the value of the consistency index and consistency ratio, all the 
assessment and values for the indicators’ weight in the judgement matrices in the tables are 
considered consistent.  
Table 7. Judgement Matrix of the Influence Factor 
Consequence of Event Likelihood of Event Priorities
Consequence of Event 1.0000 0.8000 0.4444
Likelihood of Event 1.2500 1.0000 0.5556
λmax = 2.0000; Consistency Index= 0.0000; Consistency Ratio = undefined  
Table 8. Judgement Matrix of the main Indicator for Impact on Asset 
Criticality Maintainability Replaceability Dependability Control Priorities
Criticality 1.0000 5.0000 3.0000 2.0000 2.0000 0.3859
Maintainability 0.2000 1.0000 0.5000 0.2500 0.3333 0.0659
Replaceability 0.3333 2.0000 1.0000 2.0000 2.2000 0.2210
Dependability 0.5000 4.0000 0.5000 1.0000 1.5000 0.1834
Control 0.5000 3.0000 0.4545 0.6667 1.0000 0.1437
λmax = 5.2684; Consistency Index= 0.0671; Consistency Ratio = 6.05%  
Table 9. Judgement Matrix of the main Indicator for Likelihood of Threat and Vulnerability 
Severity Exploitability Sensitivity Similarity Frequency Priorities
Severity 1.0000 6.0000 7.0000 3.0000 4.0000 0.4954
Exploitability 0.1667 1.0000 2.0000 0.3333 0.3333 0.0716
Sensitivity 0.1429 0.5000 1.0000 0.1667 0.2000 0.0426
Similarity 0.3333 3.0000 6.0000 1.0000 2.0000 0.2300
Frequency 0.2500 3.0000 5.0000 0.5000 1.0000 0.1604
λmax = 5.1574; Consistency Index = 0.0394; Consistency Ratio = 3.55%
 




As can be seen from the three tables of the judgement matrices above, the priorities of the indicator in 
each table refer to the weights of the indicator. These values will be used as a key to rate the incident 
risk indexes. As noted, the total of the priority in indicators is equal to 1 where each priority for each 
indicator must be equal to or greater than 0. 
 
With the result of the weight for each indicator, this study rates an incident using the rating mode, 
with one modification - the rating category has been modified to a fixed rating for each incident. This 
consideration has been identified in the previous chapter, where the rating mode gives advantage in 
terms of rating a higher number of incidents. As a result, with the modification each incident has a 
specific value for each indicator and this value is then used to produce the rating of the overall value. 
The rationale behind this change is that the rating category limits the selection of criteria into several 
appropriate qualitative categories (e.g. high, low, medium) and using pair-wise comparison, each 
category has its quantitative value. Modifying the rating category allows the model to produce a clear 
distance value between incidents as well as results in a variance rating of the overall value. 
4.1.3 Rating and Ranking Strategy in Risk Index Model  
The establishment of RIM shows the general view of the model. This section discusses the detail of 
the algorithms and strategies used to estimate the risk index.  
 
There are ten indicators used to rate and estimate the incident risk index and they comprise the 
following elements: 
 
(a) All the indicators related to assets (i.e. criticality, maintainability, replaceability, dependability 
and control) are estimated quantitatively by giving a numerical value between 0 and 10, where 0 
represents the lowest value or non-critical. The highest value gives a higher contribution to the 
risk index value.  
 
(b) Severity and Exploitability. The rating for the severity and exploitability indicator is obtained 
directly from the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) (NIST, 2011). In case the value 
is unavailable, then 0 will be used as the contribution value. 
 
(c) Sensitivity. The sensitivity indicator is based upon the sensitivity of sensors and it is manually 
provided by security analysts. The sensitivity of sensor is identified quantitatively by giving a 
numerical value between 0 and 10. The highest value gives a higher contribution to the risk index 
value and 0 as the lowest value to represent a non-sensitive sensor. 
 




(d) Similarity. This study adopted the similarity concept using a hierarchy-based approach and 
probabilistic alert correlation. Organised as a tree, the hierarchy based approach consists of a set 
of specific-general relations, where leaf nodes denote the most specific concepts (original 
attributes value) and the root represents the most general concept in the hierarchy (Xu and Ning, 
2005). For example, the hierarchy based approach has been used in many alert correlation studies 
in correlating alerts using IP address such as Xiao et al. (2008) and Yu and Rubo (2008). In this 
study, the similarity indicator calculates its value using IP addresses and port similarity. The 
contribution value for port similarity was based on functions used by Xiao et al. (2008) (i.e. 
equations (6) and (7)). In addition, the value for IP address similarity was based on Yu and Rubo 
(2008) (i.e. equation (5)). Thus, this study combined both functions and used it as a function to 
rate the similarity indicator (i.e. equation (4)). The study also used the probabilistic alert 
correlation proposed by Valdes and Skinner (2001) where the similarity function returns a number 
between 0 and 1. This indicator calculates the percentage of incidents’ similarity based on 
conditions which look into incidents’ attributes and whether they use specific types of protocol 
(e.g. UDP or TCP). If they use a specific type of protocol like TCP, the similarity indicator 
calculates the average between incidents’ ports similarity and IP addresses similarity. The IP 
address similarity is calculated based on the comparison between incidents’ IP addresses (e.g. in 
equation (5), IP1 is compared with IP2; both are two different IP addresses) and uses three 
conditions: if they are similar then value 1 is returned, if they are not similar but with a similar 
subnet based on standard network classes (e.g. Class A, B and C network) then a value 0.5 is 
returned and if they are not under any previous conditions then a value 0 is returned. Furthermore, 
the ports similarity is calculated based on the comparison between incidents’ ports (e.g. in 
equation (6) and (7), Port1 is compared with Port2; both are two different incidents) and it uses 
two conditions. If they are equal, then value 1 is returned or otherwise, the second condition in the 
equation will be used where the difference between them is calculated. To estimate similarity 
between ports, the second condition applies three hierarchies of ports and they are divided into 
ports below 1024 (i.e. well-known server ports), ports between 1024 and 49151 (i.e. registered 
ports and assigned by Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) for specific services) and 
ports between 49152 and 65535 (i.e. dynamic or private ports that cannot be registered with 
IANA). The value returned by the second condition is between 0 and 1. However, this indicator 
may be degraded since there are limitations in calculating the incident risk index. For example, 
the problem of the implementation of CIDR (i.e. Classless Inter-Domain Routing) and when there 
are DDoS attacks. The implementation of CIDR dismisses the need of subnet in a network and the 
DDoS attacks decreases the similarity values between IP addresses and ports (e.g. when attackers 
use random IP addresses and ports). 
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(e) Frequency. This indicator calculates the similarity of incidents using signature and signature class 
attributes within a particular period of time. The frequency calculates the average between the 
percentage of the similar signature and signature class between incidents. The percentage of the 
similar signature is calculated by dividing the summation of incidents with similar signatures by 
the total of incidents. A similar calculation is applied to incidents with similar signature classes, in 
order to obtain the percentage of the similar signature class. 
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In order to compile the indicators, there are other intangible factors that influence the decision in the 
process and they should be considered before any assessment is put in place. These factors are 
considered as technical factors because their involvement is only required when the assessment is 
performed. For example, in the cost-sensitive modelling, the changes of the information related to 
asset and security policies are taken into the consideration. Lee et al. (2002) suggested that the 
process to estimate the cost metric must be done periodically. To extend this consideration, the study 
considers three factors based upon the characteristic of input. Firstly, the characteristic of those 
factors, whether they are independent input or not. Secondly, the nature of the factors whether they 
are dynamically changed. Thirdly, the importance of factors where some factors are important and 
others may be less so. The main implication of considering these factors is that they are able to 
improve the rating process besides controlling the input of the factors. The third factor has been 
considered in the adoption of AHP in the prioritisation process. The other considerations are described 
using the following descriptions (See Table 10).  
 
(a) Type of input. For each indicator, the input can be divided into two types: dependent and 
independent input. In considering the characteristic of input, an independent input is obtained 




directly from sources with no immediate modification made to it (e.g. CVSS v2 as the severity 
indicator). As opposed to the independent input, a dependent input is obtained indirectly from 
sources whereby it needs to be modified before it can be used by any indicator. For example, the 
dependent input, such as frequency and similarity, needs to go through a computing and reasoning 
process, using one or a combination of more input from different sources. 
 
(b) Update Frequency. There are two types of update frequencies that can be considered in updating 
indicators namely, the on-demand and delay frequencies. An on-demand frequency updates the 
indicator when an incident is detected by IDSs or when the indicator values are needed (e.g. the 
similarity indicator). In contrast, a delay frequency updates indicators based on a fixed or timed 
schedule which is configured manually by security analysts (e.g. the criticality indicator). 
Table 10. Characteristic of input for each indicator 
independent dependent on-demand delay












type of input update frequency
 
In extension, to estimate the incident risk indexes, the proposed framework considered the following 
strategies in the rating and ranking process: 
 
(a) Rating Strategy. Based upon the input characteristics, there are two modes in the rating strategy 
used to rate and update the incident risk indexes. The first strategy in the rating process uses a 
static mode where the incident risk indexes are updated and rated once only at the time when 
incidents are detected. As for following the second characteristic, the second strategy in the rating 
process uses an on-demand mode which updates the incident risk indexes dynamically each time a 
new incident detected but limited within a certain period of time which can be configured 
manually by security analysts (e.g. one hour after detection). This limitation is important because 
the consideration of adopting the on-demand mode induces an overhead on the prioritisation 
process.   
 
(b) Ranking Strategy. Based upon the strategy used in the rating process, this study establishes one 
important strategy which aims to reduce the number of incidents that need to be ranked. The 
strategy ranks incidents based upon the advantage of time interval, as it is similar to the on-




demand mode strategy in the rating process. In addition to reducing the number of incidents to be 
ranked, this is also important for security analysts to identify which incidents are really critical in 
a certain period of time. For example, if the strategy is configured to limit the ranking process to 1 
hour, only incidents which have been detected in the last 60 minutes will be ranked and the rest 
will be dropped and excluded from the ranking process.  
 
Table 11 and Table 12 illustrate the difference between two strategies in the rating process. Although 
the static mode can be applied in the rating process in order to rate incidents, the adoption of the on-
demand mode is significant to improve the results. However, the adoption of the on-demand mode 
influences the performance of the rating process.  
 
In order to show a significant improvement in the adopted strategy, Table 11 and Table 12 tabulate 
the output of two indicators. The illustration in the tables uses the example of the real incidents which 
can later be found in the experiment conducted in this study. Table 11 shows a partial result of the 
frequency indicator and Table 12 shows an identical result for the similarity indicator. Both tables 
tabulate results for the first 10 incidents and Table 11 displays the results based on event ID, signature 
name, timestamp, local signature ID, local class ID and values for the frequency indicator. The local 
signature ID links to a specific type of incident and local class ID refers to a group or classtype which 
is assigned and defined by Snort automatically. The last column shows 10 different intervals where 
one interval is considered as the time of the incidents detected. It contains a specific value for the 
frequency indicator and is updated dynamically using on-demand mode which produces a new value 
each time a new incident is detected. 
Table 11. Example for the frequency indicator 
Event ID Signature name Timestamp Local Signature ID Local Class ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 09:29:20 55 19 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8750 0.8000 0.6667 0.6429 0.5625 0.5556 0.5000
2 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 09:29:23 55 19 - 1.0000 1.0000 0.8750 0.8000 0.6667 0.6429 0.5625 0.5556 0.5000
3 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 09:29:24 55 19 - - 1.0000 0.8750 0.8000 0.6667 0.6429 0.5625 0.5556 0.5000
4 FTP Bad login 09:32:34 56 19 - - - 0.6250 0.6000 0.5000 0.5000 0.4375 0.4445 0.4000
5 TELNET login incorrect 09:32:34 57 19 - - - - 0.6000 0.5000 0.5714 0.5000 0.5556 0.5000
6 ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 09:37:05 58 20 - - - - - 0.1667 0.1429 0.1875 0.1667 0.1500
7 TELNET login incorrect 09:44:51 57 19 - - - - - - 0.5714 0.5000 0.5556 0.5000
8 ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 09:45:34 59 20 - - - - - - - 0.1875 0.1667 0.1500
9 TELNET login incorrect 09:45:36 57 19 - - - - - - - - 0.5556 0.5000
10 ICMP PING 09:45:37 60 21 - - - - - - - - - 0.1000
Frequency Indicator
 
With the on-demand mode strategy in the rating process, the value of the frequency indicator is 
changing from one interval to another. As opposed to the static mode strategy where the indicator 
value is marked only at the time of incidents detected, the on-demand mode strategy updates the value 
dynamically. To illustrate the improvement with the on-demand mode strategy, two different events, 
namely the 3
rd
 and the 6
th
 event, are compared. Using the static mode strategy, the value of the 
frequency indicator is computed at the time of the correspondent incident detected as tabulated as the 
first value of the indicator in every row in the table, which is 1.0000 for the 3
rd
 event and 0.1667 for 
the 6
th
 event. In considering the static mode strategy, the value is unchanged and therefore no 




estimation will be made again after that. However, with the on-demand mode strategy, the value for 
the 3rd event is dynamically decreased from 1.0000 to 0.5000 and the value for the 6
th
 event is 
changed from 0.1667 to 0.1500. The change of the values is because one of attributes in the 
estimation formula has significantly changed, particularly in the total number of incidents detected. A 
similar result can be seen in the similarity indicator, as shown in Table 12. 
 
The similarity indicator in Table 12 shows significant improvement, particularly in updating the value 
of the risk index in each interval. Table 12 tabulates the result for the similarity indicator. Using a 
similar example, like the frequency indicator, the table figures the similarity indicator value based 
upon source and destination IP address, as well as source and destination ports. For example, in Table 
12, the value for the 1
st
 event is changed from 1.0000 to 0.6862 when it reaches the last interval. The 
changes improve the accuracy of the similarity indicator because it uses a new input from the rating 
process. To illustrate the accuracy, in the 4
th
 interval, the value for the 1
st
 event was changed from 
1.0000 to 0.9061 because a new incident was detected. The new value was updated because the total 
number of incidents detected at that time was increased from three incidents to four incidents. As 
opposed to that scenario, with the static mode strategy the value remains static where the 1
st
 event is 
holding 1.0000 as the indicator value at every single interval until the end of the process. Therefore, 
the changes of the similarity indicator according to total number of incidents are more accurate 
compared to a static value applied in the static mode. 
Table 12. Example for the similarity indicator 
Event ID Signature name Timestamp Source Destination Source Port Destination Port 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 09:29:20 172.16.112.100 172.16.112.194 23 25625 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9061 0.8313 0.7907 0.7849 0.7480 0.7346 0.6862
2 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 09:29:23 172.16.112.100 172.16.112.194 23 25625 - 1.0000 1.0000 0.9061 0.8313 0.7907 0.7849 0.7480 0.7346 0.6862
3 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 09:29:24 172.16.112.100 172.16.112.194 23 25625 - - 1.0000 0.9061 0.8313 0.7907 0.7849 0.7480 0.7346 0.6862
4 FTP Bad login 09:32:34 172.16.115.20 172.16.113.50 21 1045 - - - 0.7184 0.6560 0.6237 0.6387 0.6148 0.6149 0.5785
5 TELNET login incorrect 09:32:34 172.16.113.50 195.115.218.108 23 43886 - - - - 0.6006 0.5699 0.5467 0.5123 0.5009 0.4759
6 ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 09:37:05 207.200.75.201 172.16.113.148 80 30239 - - - - - 0.6069 0.5864 0.5731 0.5611 0.5050
7 TELNET login incorrect 09:44:51 172.16.114.50 172.16.112.194 23 1130 - - - - - - 0.6929 0.6649 0.6618 0.6206
8 ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 09:45:34 137.245.85.134 172.16.113.204 80 1714 - - - - - - - 0.5169 0.5241 0.4717
9 TELNET login incorrect 09:45:36 172.16.112.50 172.16.113.84 23 1591 - - - - - - - - 0.6214 0.5843




Although the consideration of adopting the on-demand mode strategy improves the value upon the 
indicators, it induces an overhead in the prioritisation process. Thus, in order to investigate the 








4.2 Response Strategy 
To address the response strategy used in the proposed framework, this section presents the Response 
Strategy Model (RSM) which can be applied as part of the dynamic response mapping model. As 
identified in the previous chapter in Section 3.2.4, the dynamic response mapping model gives more 
advantages compared to the static mapping. 
 
The model creates a relationship between incidents and different types of response option with 
different levels of priority. Based upon attack metrics and system states as decision factors, this study 
uses an alternative approach in exclusively mapping an appropriate response option with an 
appropriate incident by considering risk assessments as decision factors, risk response planning as 
well as a time management concept in addressing the importance of response time. In addition, this 
study proposes the response strategy by grouping incidents into a similar group based on their priority 
and it also allows for a simultaneous response.  
 
Using a simple and static policy with dynamic decision-making, the proposed model aims to reduce 
the delay problem upon making an appropriate decision and response; hence, it is suitable to be 
applied in a live traffic network in order to facilitate a fast response in a real time system. 
4.2.1 Time Management Concept 
The time management concept applied in RSM aims to create effective responses to critical incidents. 
In time management concepts, Covey (2004) presents four categories of tasks which are mapped onto 
four different quadrants; Q1: important and urgent, Q2: important but not urgent, Q3: not important 
but urgent, and Q4: not important and not urgent. Fundamentally known as the Eisenhower priority 
matrix, the quadrant is widely used by many studies particularly in the prioritising studies and related 
to time management; for example, in email prioritisation (Yoo, 2010), risk management (Haimes, 
2001) and time management (Gonzalez et al., 2008).  
 
However, in order to fit with the proposed framework, this study modifies the quadrant to address the 
time management in responding to incidents. Instead of using “important”, this study uses “critical” to 
show the relationship between time and impacts; therefore, the new quadrants consider the 
combination between urgent and critical incidents. The quadrants for the time management concept 
contain four different levels and Figure 8 shows the criticality and urgency quadrants.  
 
The four quadrants are divided into: 
 




(a) 1st Quadrant: Urgent incident and for a critical asset. This quadrant is for the top and high 
priority incidents. This category allocates immediate response options, which aim to minimise and 
prevent adverse impacts from any future incidents. For example, an incident with a high severity 
score (e.g. 10 score in CVSS v2) detected in a very critical asset such as server or firewall can be 
classed with this category. 
 
(b) 2nd Quadrant: Not an urgent incident but for a critical asset. This quadrant is less urgent 
compared to the 1
st
 quadrant but still considered as the top priority quadrant. It allocates any 
planned response options where a proper action is confidently taken to minimise the incident’s 
impact. For example, an incident with a low severity score (e.g. 2 score in CVSS v2) and detected 
in a similar asset to the previous quadrants. 
 
(c) 3rd Quadrant: Urgent incident but for a noncritical asset. This quadrant is the third priority and 
considered a low priority quadrant and it allocates any action that needs additional time to analyse 
incidents in order to increase the confidence level of the planned responses. Almost the same as 
the 2
nd
 quadrant in minimising incidents’ impact, this quadrant slowly collects information about 
incidents as well as minimising the future impacts of incidents, for example a similar incident to 
the first quadrant, but detected in a noncritical asset such as a personal computer. 
 
(d) 4th Quadrant: Not an urgent incident and for a noncritical asset. This quadrant is the lowest 
priority and for a non-urgent incident and noncritical asset. This category includes passive 
responses. For example, a similar incident to the second quadrant, but detected in a similar asset 






























Figure 8. Urgency and Criticality Quadrants 




4.2.2 Risk Response Planning 
In order to establish a strategic RSM, this study uses the risk response planning concept. It contains 
four different strategies: avoidance, transfer, mitigation and acceptance. According to Hillson (1999), 
the risk response planning can be prioritised where avoidance can be the first option followed by 
transfer, mitigation and acceptance. This study chooses risk response planning simply because it is 
one of the risk assessment phases and allocates specific responses by offering an appropriate, 
achievable and affordable to identify risks (Hillson, 2002). Although there are other methods available 
to respond to risk, like the possible techniques in Baker et al. (1999) (i.e. risk elimination, risk 
transfer, risk retention and risk reduction) and other approaches summarised in Ben-David and Raz 
(2001) (such as risk absorption, prevention and contingency), the response planning proposed in 
(Hillson, 1999, 2002) is more suitable to this study because it is limited to only four strategies which 
literally appropriate four different levels of quadrant, besides avoiding any trade-off between 
achievability and complexity in having too many quadrants. Below are their descriptions. 
 
(a) As the highest priority, a risk avoidance response is a strategy to eliminate uncertainties. In the 
model, an avoidance strategy eliminates risks by reducing factors that have direct influences on 
uncertainties. For example, the response options such as blocking and adjusting the related events 
are significant with the strategy. These options can be applied to users, processes as well as 
network traffic, and they aim to minimise the impact on future intrusions too. Fundamentally, 
there are two types of incidents which can be classed under this category. Firstly, incidents which 
are already predicted to be high risk and have serious impacts. Secondly, incidents which are 
identified as similar to previous high risk incidents historically.  
 
(b) A risk mitigation response is an alternative strategy between two strategies: avoidance and 
transfer. Mitigation strategy deals with incidents that cannot be addressed by avoidance and 
transfer strategies. It deals with incidents above the transfer threshold but below the avoidance 
threshold and it aims to reduce the “size” of the risk exposures to the lowest risk. For example, 
terminating network traffic using security appliances like a firewall can be used as one of the 
response options. It terminates suspected traffic which related to incidents, rather than blocking 
all the communications. 
 
(c) A risk transfer response aims to pass ownership and/or liability of any particular risk from one 
party (i.e. security device) to other third parties. By transferring risks to a new party, it allows 
victims to reduce its impact. One example of the third party appliances associated with this 
strategy is the honeypot and this handles any suspected network traffic by redirecting it from the 
original victims to a dummy system in order to collect information about the attackers. 





(d) Finally, the lowest strategy is a risk acceptance response and this addresses an incident with a low 
risk and low impact upon victims or one which is considered as acceptable by most victims’ 
systems. Considered as a very cost-effective strategy, it requires far less expense in order to repair 
a victim’s system if anything happens. In order to respond to incidents, a passive response like 
system of notification is one of the response options classed under this strategy. 
4.2.3 Response Strategy Model 
Having presented the latter concepts, Figure 9 shows a block diagram for RSM and contains four 
blocks of quadrants which come from a combination of the risk response planning and time 


























Figure 9. Risk Response Planning with time management concept in Response Strategy Planning 
 
Table 13 shows the relationship map between them and their correspondent quadrants as well as some 
related examples for their response options. 
 




With different levels of the response strategies, incidents are mapped with response options using four 
different levels based upon their urgency and criticality. Since there is no significant study relating to 
the arrangements of the quadrants, the response strategies listed in the table are considered an 
appropriate arrangement; however it is not definitive and is subject to other appropriate modification 





quadrants are interchangeable; for instance, in case of incidents being more important compared to 




Table 13. Response Strategy Planning with Response options 
Risk Response 
Planning 
Quadrants Response options 
Avoidance 1
st
 Quadrant: Urgent 
incident and for a 
critical asset 
 
 Block users, processes or network traffic in 
preventing future attacks. 
 Adjust users, processes or network traffic 





 Quadrant: Not an 
urgent incident but for 
a critical asset 
 
 Collaborate with other appliances by limiting 
users, processes or network traffic for delaying the 
process of attacks (Example: using access control, 
firewall, enabling other countermeasures or 
antivirus). 
 Terminate users, processes or network traffic in 
preventing continuous attacks (Example: locking 





 Quadrant: Urgent 
incident but for a 
noncritical asset 
 
 Collect information about incidents for passive 
responses, proactive responses as well as forensic 
evidence (Example: trace connections, decoy 
systems, honeypots, forensic evidence, recovery, 
incidents’ blacklisting and white listing). 
 Escalate to administrator for a further investigation 





 Quadrant: Not an 
urgent incident and not 
for a critical asset 
 
 Establish passive responses like enabling a 
notification via syslog, console alert, email, pager, 
PDA or mobile.  
 
Furthermore, the quadrants in the table are identical with the response options described in the 
response model proposed in Chapter 2. In particular, the 1
st





 quadrants with reactive responses and 4
th
 quadrants with passive responses.  
 




As shown in the table, the 1
st
 quadrant is mapped with the avoidance strategy where all related 
response options are used to eliminate uncertainties between incidents. One of the best response 
options for this category is a proactive response option, such as blocking suspicious network traffic, 
and it is suggested there are two ways to establish the response options: either to have a prediction 






 quadrants are mapped with the mitigation and transfer strategy and they 
aim to counter incidents by facing them directly or transferring them actively. Both strategies operate 
in an active environment and a reactive response is the best and preferable for mapping with them. 
There are two different stages of reactive response: a) issuing confident responses immediately after 
an incident is detected, and b) investigating and learning about the uncertain incident before further 
responses can be applied. In particular, the 2
nd
 quadrant is suitable for the first stage of reactive 
responses where incidents are mitigated immediately in order to reduce their risks. Furthermore, the 
3
rd
 quadrant is appropriately mapped with the second stage of reactive responses where incidents are 





 quadrant also reduces an incident’s impacts, risks to victims, and at the same time 
allows third party appliances to investigate and learn about the source of incidents (i.e. attackers). 
 
The last quadrant is suitable for the acceptance strategy where the lowest risk is mapped with a cost-
effective response option which is likely to incur a very low cost in establishing responses. For 
example, since incidents’ risks are low and considered as not meriting the launch of a high budget 
response option, a passive response like system notification (e.g. email, mobile, pager, etc.) is the best 
solution. Although the quadrant is categorised as low priority and accepts any possible risks, it needs 
to be monitored closely. In addition, information gathered from low risk incidents can be used as a 
sample in analysing high impact risks for future prediction. For example in multi-stage attacks, 
normally a low risk incident like “ICMP PING” is established first before a serious attack is launched. 
Therefore, information and detail like the source of attackers can be obtained from the first attack and 
this helps security analysts to efficiently analyse and predict future incidents. 
  




4.2.4 Rating Thresholds 
To map risk indexes onto appropriate response strategies, this study considers rating thresholds as 
illustrated in Figure 10 and they can be used to determine and differentiate between non-critical and 
critical incidents.  
  
Rating
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Figure 10. Example of Rating Threshold 
 
In addressing the threshold rating in mapping between incidents and quadrants, with regards to the 
mapping model, this study compares with other scoring techniques such as CVSS v2 (Mell et al., 
2006; Mell et al., 2009), Symantec (2006), US-CERT (2011) and Secunia (2011). Although the latter 
scoring systems have been widely used, the selection of it may be different from this study because 
those systems consider a different set of indicators and decision factors to determine the final scores 
and their priority.  
 
Based upon the Base, Temporal and Environmental metrics, CVSS v2 scores between 0-10. With the 
score, CVSS v2 maps incidents into three different group of priority: high, medium and low. The 
thresholds between the groups are clearly defined in the CVSS v2 documentation. Symantec 
Corporation uses CVSS v2 as their method to identify the threat level of identified vulnerabilities 
(Symantec, 2010). However, in 2006 Symantec deployed their own rating system and the legacy 
DeepSight rating system uses 3 differences categories: Risk Rating, Severity Rating and Impact 
Rating. Each rating has its priority categories. For instance, in risk rating Symantec uses 5 categories, 
very low, low, moderate, severe and very severe (Symantec, 2006). 
 
US-CERT applies a scoring system based on rating between 0-180 and it is calculated based upon 
several questions (US-CERT, 2011). Their scoring system is not a linear scoring system and therefore 
they not apply any categorisation but highlight any vulnerability with a metric greater than 40, which 
are then candidates for US-CERT Technical Alerts (i.e. a system used to provide timely information 
about current security issues, vulnerabilities and exploits by Technical Cyber Security Alerts). Finally, 
using a scale of 5, Secunia applies five levels of categorisation in defining incidents’ criticality: 
extremely criticality (5), highly criticality (4), moderately criticality (3), less critical (2) and not 
critical (1) (Secunia, 2011).  





There is no specific guideline to determine the best threshold between critical or non-critical 
incidents. However, the proposed framework needs it and therefore it is appropriate to this study to 
apply suitable rating thresholds. In order to investigate the suitability of the thresholds, the next 
chapter evaluates the distribution results in comparison with other approaches, such as CVSS v2 and 
Snort Priority. 
  




4.3 Multi-strategy Incident Prioritisation Framework 
To facilitate the response selection process in IRSs, the framework aims to prioritise incidents based 
upon several strategies together with some relevant decision factors, which were identified earlier in 
the previous section. Thus, in order to combine them interactively, Figure 11 shows the active 




















Figure 11. Multi-strategy Incident Prioritisation Framework 
 




The framework comprises three main elements as follows: 
 
(a) External Systems. This is the first part of the proposed framework and it aims to create a 
relationship between the main systems and other systems externally. The external systems adopt 
other systems and mostly use open source systems. In addition to the proposed framework, there 
are two main components as follows: 
 
(i) IDS Sensors. They are security appliances used to monitor network traffic, detect 
suspicious activities and store them in an appropriate storage system like a centralised 
database; normally they are called Intrusion Detection Systems. In the case of this study, 
the Snort IDS was used. 
 
(ii) Response Agents. They are also security appliances, but they operate to respond to specific 
incidents with a specific type of response option based upon results produced by the 
prioritisation systems in the second part of the framework. For example, security 
appliances such as firewall, access control systems and honeypots can be used to help to 
respond to the incidents appropriately. 
 
(b) Prioritisation Systems. As the main elements in the proposed framework, these provide the main 
core system by organising several modules in the prioritisation process as follows: 
 
(i) Rating Strategy Modules. With Risk Index Model (RIM) and the aid of the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP), the module aims to rate incidents using specific modes selected 
by security analysts in the rating process. In order to rate and estimate quantitative risk 
indexes for incidents, there are two modes which can be applied in strategies in the rating 
process, namely on-demand and static mode. With methodical and approachable decision 
making, a result of numerical values for each incident is produced. AHP aids the 
estimation process by giving weighting for each decision factor and the indicators used in 
RIM. Finally, the output of the estimation process produces a series of numerical values 
that have been calculated automatically and changed periodically based upon the 
framework configurations. 
 
(ii) Ranking Strategy Modules. Aiming to rank incidents, these modules rank incidents 
quantitatively based upon their risk index values which are taken from the result of the 
earlier module. With the rating strategy modules, a higher value refers to a higher priority 
risk which can potentially be considered as a critical incident. Similar to the rating strategy 
modules, this module updates the ranking between incidents based upon their risk indexes 




but limited to the strategies planned and configuration configured in the previous 
procedure. 
 
(iii) Response Strategy Modules. The third module in the prioritisation systems aims to create a 
relationship between incidents and response options. The quantitative results obtained 
from the previous modules together with the rating thresholds are used to map onto 
appropriate quadrants in RSM (i.e. avoidance, mitigation, transfer and acceptance); 
specifically, a mapping of qualitative results into a quantitative group of priorities. The 
different levels in RSM allow security analysts or automated security appliances (e.g. 
response agents) to act fast to respond only to true and critical incidents. With this module, 
incidents are distributed and grouped into several groups immediately and appropriate 
responses can be launched simultaneously within a similar group. As an implication from 
that, it allows an easy management (via a monitoring system) and additional advantages to 
security analysts in making a prompt and manual decision where each quadrant has its own 
type of response options to be selected.   
 
(c) Administration. As the third element in the proposed framework, it provides functions to interact 
with end-users and enables Security Incident Prioritisation Modules. The module aims to provide 
a monitoring system based upon results produced by the previous parts. It provides a graphical 
user interface to security analysts to monitor and configure the proposed framework as well as 
summarising the results from the other parts of the framework. With this module, security 
analysts are able to configure as well as monitor the results from the prioritisation systems using 
friendly interfaces. Some of the sub modules are event monitoring, assets management, event 
query, searching and the detail of the results of the prioritisation process for every single 
incident, such as its priority with risk index values and its quadrants. 
 
  




4.3.1 Operational Characteristics 
The proposed framework offers the following operational characteristics: 
 
(i) Multiple strategies. The proposed framework applies multiple strategies in optimising the 
incident prioritisation process and incorporating other indicators in making appropriate 
decisions as well as responding to critical incidents based upon their priority. By implication, 
different modes in different strategies allow a customisable result. 
 
(ii) Robust and methodical approaches. The used of methodical approaches like AHP in estimating 
the incident risk indexes allows the estimation process to produce a good risk index. The 
proposed framework estimates the level of their criticality based upon two main decision 
factors, like the asset criticality and other attributes which relate to incidents. In addition, its 
robustness allows the estimation process to operate normally in any scenario even with 
unavailable information for some indicators.  
 
(iii) Flexible risk scoring. The estimation of the incident risk indexes covers internal factors such as 
the criticality of assets and extends its coverage over external factors, such as CVSS and 
vulnerability risks. This flexibility allows the scoring of the incident risk indexes to be wider 
than the current scoring systems (e.g. CVSS). 
 
(iv) Prioritisation of incidents. Using the ranking strategy modules, the proposed framework has the 
ability to prioritise incidents based upon their risk indexes. The priority results can be classified 
into two different types of priorities: a list of incidents with their risk indexes as well as the 
quadrant group of priorities depending on the rating thresholds.  
 
(v) Flexible and practical. The proposed framework allows a flexible configuration and applies a 
practical strategy in the prioritising and monitoring process. With this operational characteristic 
it can, potentially, work in a live traffic network with online assessment as well as in a real time 
environment.  
 
(vi) User friendly interfaces. With customisable web modules, the proposed framework allows a 
simple administration of the summarisation of the results of the framework by providing a 
friendly graphical user interface system. The web modules also allow security analysts to 
exhaustively evaluate and examine the incident results from a more comprehensible statistical 
viewpoint. 





This chapter has focused upon the conceptual framework for the incident prioritisation process, in 
order to provide a flawless framework to facilitate the autonomous mode in the response selection 
process. Its description has included an introduction of the main models, strategies, frameworks and 
the rationale behind their implementation, as well as their operational characteristics. In conclusion, 
this chapter highlighted the main point of this study and gave the detail of the framework, as well as 
discussing how they can be combined as one significant framework. It is important to understand the 
interrelationship between those strategies and the model in compiling the overall process in 
prioritising incidents in order to get a useful result from the incident prioritisation process. 
 
Having established the proposed framework using multiple strategies and models, the next chapter 
presents several evaluations of the framework and is followed by a detailed discussion of them. It is 
important to understand that the results provide a verification of the usefulness and suitability of the 
framework in facilitating the autonomous mode in the response selection process. The evaluation 
study also investigates the feasibility of the proposed framework to operate an online assessment, 
besides evaluating its flexibility, performance and practicality. 
  
5 Evaluation of the Multi-strategy Incident Prioritisation 
Framework 
The novelty of this study is to propose a framework to conduct a prioritisation process on different 
types of incident, in order to identify their priority and respond to them appropriately. The aim is to 
facilitate the autonomous mode in the response selection process. Thus, in order to highlight the 
feasibility and suitability of the framework, this evaluation study is significant.  
 
Having proposed the Multi-strategy Incident Prioritisation Framework, it is important to design a 
systematic evaluation phase in order to provide a verification of its feasibility and suitability, in 
particular for the second part of the framework, which is the prioritisation system.  
 
This chapter presents four evaluation stages based upon the proposed framework which aim to 
evaluate it in terms of its effectiveness and performances in relation to the models and strategies 
selected. It is important to this evaluation study to investigate the effectiveness and performance of 
the proposed framework in order to satisfy its feasibility and suitability, in particular the ability of the 
framework to facilitate the autonomous mode. Besides, operating with a reasonable processing time in 
the prioritisation process, reduces false responses to false incidents and applies online assessment 
capabilities. 
 
The first stage investigates the feasibility of the Risk Index Model (RIM) operation. To make 
evaluation and comparisons with the results from other studies, the first stage analyses the 
effectiveness of the rating and ranking process. With the first stage results, the second stage extends 
the evaluation study by analysing the effect of using different strategies in the rating and ranking 
process, in order to satisfy process enhancement. In particular, the second stage applies the on-
demand mode strategy, as opposed to the static mode strategy applied in the first stage. Furthermore, 
the third stage evaluates the suitability of using the Response Strategy Model (RSM) as the response 
strategy in the framework. The third stage also evaluates the relationship between incidents’ priority 
and the incident classification (e.g. false/true incidents). Finally, the fourth stage investigates the 
performance of the proposed framework by measuring the processing time in the rating and ranking 
process. The chapter ends with a summary. 
 
 




5.1 General Description 
There are four stages of the evaluation study in this chapter and each of them has its unique objectives 
with different results, discussion and conclusion. However, they also share a similar requirement in 
their experimental procedures. This section discusses the similarities in order to avoid any repetition 
in the introduction of each evaluation stage, in particular the datasets, tools and experimental 
assumptions.  
 
In conducting experiments, each stage uses one or two types of dataset, either the MIT 2000 DARPA 
or Plymouth dataset, and each of them contains a unique characteristic. Their descriptions are as 
follows: 
5.1.1 Dataset 1: MIT DARPA LLDOS 1.0  
The main dataset used in this study uses one of the MIT 2000 DARPA data sets; specifically, LLDOS 
1.0 with some modification. In addition to the most well-known dataset used in many security studies 
(Alsubhi et al., 2008; Alserhani et al., 2010), the rationale behind the selection of this specific dataset 
is due to the multi-stage attacks it contains. This is important as it allows this study to evaluate and 
analyse the effectiveness of ranking and prioritising incidents over different phases of attacks. 
Table 14. Attack Phases 
Phase Attacker Schemes Description
Phase 1 IPsweep Sending ICMP echo-request for live hosts
Phase 2 Probe Probe of live IP's to look for the sadmind daemon running on Solaris Hosts
Phase 3 Break-in Break-ins via the sadmind vulnerability, both successful and unsuccessful on those hosts
Phase 4 Install Virus Installation of the Trojan mstream DDoS software on three hosts using telnet
Phase 5 DDos Launching the DDoS attacks  
Table 15. Attack Phases Detail 
Phase Time Duration (sec) No. of Packets Total Incidents
Pre 1 09:21:36 - 09:51:35 1800 154886 25
1 IPsweep 09:51:36 - 09:52:00 25 1371 40
Pre 2 09:52:01 - 10:08:06 966 30368 21
2 Probe 10:08:07 - 10:18:05 599 34092 243
Pre 3 10:18:06 - 10:33:09 904 43869 4
3 Break-in 10:33:10 - 10:35:01 112 4528 64
Pre 4 10:35:02 - 10:50:00 899 40289 28
4 Install Virus 10:50:01 - 10:50:54 54 2266 10
Pre 5 10:50:55 - 11:26:14 2120 87564 12
5 DDos 11:26:15 - 11:34.21 487 96242 579
Post 5 11:34:22 - 12:35:48 3687 154312 42
Total 09:21:36 - 12:35:48 11653 649787 1068
 
 




Fundamentally, the simulation of the intrusion detection data set is simulated using three segments of 
an Air Force base network: inside, DMZ and outside network (DARPA, 2011). The simulation 
contains a series of attacks launched by a novice attacker and is divided into five phases. As tabulated 
in Table 15, this study defined 6 additional phases in the scenario which are pre and post the main 
phase. To provide simplicity in the phases, Table 14 describes the main attack phase where most of 
the incidents detected in that phase are considered as true and critical incidents. 
 
The detail of the phases is tabulated in Table 16. Unlike the phase’s description from the original 
dataset, Table 16 extends the dataset into several phases and categorises them into pre-phase, post-
phase and critical phase. This categorisation allows a proper evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
model based on the transition of the rating and ranking process of incidents. The three phases are as 
follows: 
 
(a) Pre-Phase. This is a phase where no critical incident happens before the main phase.  
 
(b) Critical phase. This contains a critical incident as well as the other non-critical incidents in the 
main phase and is highlighted in bold in the table. 
 
(c) Post-phase. The post-phase is a phase where no critical incident is detected but which happens 
after the last main phase.  
 
With a total of 649,787 packets, the study detected 1,068 incidents, which can be found mainly in the 
main attack phases. The detail for the main phases is similar to a recent study by Alserhani et al. 
(2010) except in their study they were unable to detect incidents in the last main phase (i.e. DDoS 
attack). 
  




Table 16. Attack Phases Detail 
Phase Time Duration (sec) No. of Packets Total Incidents Signature Name No. of Incidents
Pre 1 09:21:36 - 09:51:35 1800 154886 25 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 3
FTP Bad login 1
TELNET login incorrect 3
ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 1
ICMP Echo Reply 8
ICMP PING 8
1 09:51:36 - 09:52:00 25 1371 40 ICMP Echo Reply 20
ICMP PING 20
Pre 2 09:52:01 - 10:08:06 966 30368 21 ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2
ICMP Echo Reply 9
ICMP PING 9
2 10:08:07 - 10:18:05 599 34092 243 ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 72
RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 76
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request 76
ICMP Echo Reply 8
ICMP PING 8
TELNET login incorrect 3
 
Pre 3 10:18:06 - 10:33:09 904 43869 4 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 4
3 10:33:10 - 10:35:01 112 4528 64 RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 14
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp portmapper sadmin port query attempt 14
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request 14
RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP 14
TELNET login incorrect 4
ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 3
SQL version overflow attempt 1
Pre 4 10:35:02 - 10:50:00 899 40289 28 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 6
TELNET login incorrect 2
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2
ICMP Echo Reply 9
ICMP PING 9
4 10:50:01 - 10:50:54 54 2266 10 RSERVICES rsh root 8
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2
Pre 5 10:50:55 - 11:26:14 2120 87564 12 ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2
TELNET login incorrect 1
ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 4
ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 4
ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1
5 11:26:15 - 11:34.21 487 96242 579 (snort decoder) Bad Traffic Loopback IP 572
SNMP AgentX/tcp request 3
ICMP Echo Reply 1
ICMP PING 1
ICMP PING *NIX 1
ICMP PING BSDtype 1
Post 5 11:34:22 - 12:35:48 3687 154312 42 TELNET login incorrect 4
ICMP Echo Reply 17
ICMP PING 17
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 3
ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1
Total 11653 649787 1068 1068  
  




Based on the information given in the dataset, the study considers the categories of assets tabulated in 
Table 17. There are three sub networks in the scenario, but to focus on the analysis of the assets 
included in the dataset, the study examined only the hosts in the inside network. It is important to the 
study to consider this category as it provides a useful categorisation of the assets’ values. 
Table 17. Asset Categorisation 
Category Asset IP Address Hostname Operating System




Category 2 Host with services 172.16.112.20 hobbes.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.115.20 mill.eyrie.af.mil Solaris 2.7
Category 3 Host with non-windows Operating System 172.16.112.10 locke.eyrie.af.mil Solaris 2.6
172.16.112.50 pascal.eyrie.af.mil Solaris 2.5.1
172.16.112.149 eagle.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.112.194 falcon.eyrie.af.mil Solaris 2.5.1
172.16.112.207 robin.eyrie.af.mil SunOS 4.1.4
172.16.113.50 zeno.eyrie.af.mil SunOS 4.1.4
172.16.113.84 duck.eyrie.af.mil SunOS 4.1.4
172.16.113.105 goose.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.113.204 goose.eyrie.af.mil Solaris 2.5.1
172.16.113.148 crow.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.113.168 finch.eyrie.af.mil SunOS 4.1.4
172.16.113.169 swan.eyrie.af.mil Solaris 2.5.1
172.16.113.207 pigeon.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.117.103 pc9.eyrie.af.mil MacOS
172.16.117.111 pc8.eyrie.af.mil MacOS
172.16.118.10 linux1.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.2
172.16.118.20 linux2.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.118.30 linux3.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.118.40 linux4.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.118.50 linux5.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.118.60 linux6.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.118.70 linux7.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.118.80 linux8.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.118.90 linux9.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
172.16.118.100 linux10.eyrie.af.mil Linux Redhat 5.0
Category 4 Host with any Windows Operating System 172.16.112.100 hume.eyrie.af.mil Windows NT 4.0
172.16.115.5 pc1.eyrie.af.mil Windows 95
172.16.115.87 pc2.eyrie.af.mil Windows 95
172.16.115.234 pc0.eyrie.af.mil Window NT 4.0
172.16.116.44 pc5.eyrie.af.mil Windows 3.1
172.16.116.194 pc3.eyrie.af.mil Windows 95
172.16.116.201 pc4.eyrie.af.mil Windows 95
172.16.117.52 pc7.eyrie.af.mil Windows 3.1
172.16.117.132 pc6.eyrie.af.mil Windows 3.1  
  




5.1.2 Dataset 2: Plymouth University Dataset 
Although DARPA allows a significant comparison with the results of other studies, it is important to 
evaluate the proposed framework with a bigger and more recent dataset. As such, this study uses a 
private dataset, the Plymouth University dataset. The traffic of the dataset was collected on a public 
network (100-150 Mbps) over a period of 40 days (i.e. starting from 17
th
 May 2007 to 25
th
 June 2007). 
With a conventional network sniffer tool like tcpdump, the dataset is a collection of real and public 
traffic flowing into a web server on port 80 within the University extranet. The dataset has been 
previously used in several studies (Tjhai et al., 2008a; Tjhai et al., 2010; Tjhai, 2011), particularly in 
the alert correlations and studies on the identification of false incidents. The purpose of using the 
private dataset as an addition to the DARPA dataset is to evaluate the framework with a more recent 
and live traffic data set. In fact, the evaluation of the synthetic, data such as the DARPA dataset is 
inadequate for providing a practical evaluation and implementation in a real life environment.  
Table 18. The Plymouth University Dataset 
Signature First Detected Last Detected Total False Alarm True Alarm
WEB-MISC robots.txt access 17-05-2007 00:04:29 25-06-2007 23:57:08 26971 58.39% -
(http_inspect) BARE BYTE UNICODE ENCODING 17-05-2007 00:26:26 25-06-2007 21:53:56 6613 14.32% -
POLICY Google Desktop activity 17-05-2007 00:51:51 25-06-2007 23:59:23 3364 7.28% -
ICMP L3retriever Ping 17-05-2007 03:07:13 25-06-2007 22:53:40 1143 2.47% -
SPYWARE-PUT Trackware funwebproducts mywebsearchtoolbar-funtools runtime detection 17-05-2007 03:16:50 25-06-2007 23:43:11 1922 4.16% -
WEB-CGI calendar access 17-05-2007 04:48:47 17-06-2007 07:18:40 11 0.02% -
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 17-05-2007 06:12:42 25-06-2007 21:23:23 745 1.61% -
(http_inspect) DOUBLE DECODING ATTACK 17-05-2007 06:32:58 25-06-2007 22:36:37 520 1.13% -
SPYWARE-PUT Hijacker searchmiracle-elitebar runtime detection 17-05-2007 08:50:51 25-06-2007 14:06:48 81 - 0.18%
WEB-IIS view source via translate header 17-05-2007 11:22:12 25-06-2007 09:41:30 3463 7.50% -
(portscan) TCP Portsweep 17-05-2007 11:58:41 25-06-2007 18:16:41 128 0.28% -
ICMP Source Quench 17-05-2007 16:22:49 30-05-2007 16:57:05 2 0.00% -
ICMP Destination Unreachable Communication Administratively Prohibited 17-05-2007 17:25:33 25-06-2007 19:14:12 158 0.34% -
(http_inspect) WEBROOT DIRECTORY TRAVERSAL 17-05-2007 20:31:25 24-06-2007 15:54:18 37 0.08% -
WEB-MISC .DS_Store access 18-05-2007 08:03:08 21-06-2007 08:22:09 62 0.13% -
(http_inspect) IIS UNICODE CODEPOINT ENCODING 18-05-2007 08:31:07 25-06-2007 22:56:40 51 0.11% -
(portscan) TCP Portscan 18-05-2007 09:36:35 21-06-2007 13:22:33 19 0.04% -
ICMP redirect host 18-05-2007 11:46:58 16-06-2007 20:57:35 8 0.02% -
ICMP PING CyberKit 2.2 Windows 18-05-2007 16:16:14 25-06-2007 19:06:03 690 - 1.49%
SPYWARE-PUT Hijacker marketscore runtime detection 18-05-2007 21:43:28 25-06-2007 18:22:30 7 - 0.02%
SPYWARE-PUT Adware hotbar runtime detection - hotbar user-agent 18-05-2007 23:18:58 21-06-2007 11:13:53 29 - 0.06%
ICMP PING NMAP 20-05-2007 05:00:58 20-06-2007 18:24:05 17 0.04% -
WEB-PHP xmlrpc.php post attempt 20-05-2007 13:54:03 21-06-2007 16:06:17 2 0.00% -
ICMP Destination Unreachable Communication with Destination Host is Administratively Prohibited 21-05-2007 08:44:44 14-06-2007 12:10:06 13 0.03% -
WEB-PHP remote include path 22-05-2007 06:52:06 24-06-2007 09:27:38 4 0.01% -
SPYWARE-PUT Trackware alexa runtime detection 22-05-2007 10:13:22 23-06-2007 04:38:49 21 - 0.05%
MULTIMEDIA Quicktime User Agent access 24-05-2007 23:03:32 21-06-2007 16:15:55 11 0.02% -
WEB-MISC WebDAV search access 25-05-2007 09:00:23 25-05-2007 09:01:32 5 0.01% -
(portscan) Open Port 25-05-2007 16:16:49 18-06-2007 16:52:36 5 0.01% -
(snort_decoder) WARNING: ICMP Original IP Fragmented and Offset Not 0! 28-05-2007 12:21:15 08-06-2007 20:08:56 6 0.01% -
WEB-PHP test.php access 28-05-2007 18:45:01 22-06-2007 15:32:46 2 0.00% -
WEB-CGI formmail access 28-05-2007 23:14:44 02-06-2007 15:12:45 3 - 0.01%
WEB-PHP calendar.php access 29-05-2007 00:22:49 29-05-2007 00:22:49 1 0.00% -
WEB-MISC Domino webadmin.nsf access 29-05-2007 06:08:55 29-05-2007 06:08:58 2 - 0.00%
WEB-FRONTPAGE /_vti_bin/ access 29-05-2007 11:36:05 05-06-2007 00:41:57 5 0.01% -
WEB-IIS asp-dot attempt 30-05-2007 21:51:49 25-06-2007 21:44:06 27 0.06% -
SPYWARE-PUT Trickler teomasearchbar runtime detection 31-05-2007 15:31:58 18-06-2007 19:20:12 2 0.00% -
WEB-PHP IGeneric Free Shopping Cart page.php access 01-06-2007 05:49:27 21-06-2007 12:56:40 17 0.04% -
WEB-CLIENT Microsoft wmf metafile access 05-06-2007 15:36:17 21-06-2007 13:47:47 3 0.01% -
(http_inspect) OVERSIZE CHUNK ENCODING 08-06-2007 11:09:25 08-06-2007 11:10:47 2 0.00% -
ICMP PING speedera 08-06-2007 14:46:55 08-06-2007 14:47:18 7 0.02% -
WEB-MISC encoded cross site scripting attempt 12-06-2007 04:02:27 12-06-2007 04:02:27 1 0.00% -
WEB-MISC cross site scripting attempt 12-06-2007 04:02:27 12-06-2007 04:02:27 1 0.00% -
WEB-MISC intranet access 19-06-2007 00:48:59 19-06-2007 00:49:10 8 0.02% -
WEB-FRONTPAGE _vti_inf.html access 21-06-2007 12:13:59 22-06-2007 16:30:27 3 0.01% -
WEB-PHP admin.php access 22-06-2007 09:05:01 22-06-2007 09:05:01 1 0.00% -
Grand Total 46193 98.20% 1.80%
 
 
With a fine-tuned signature rule-set, Table 18 shows the distribution of the related incidents and 
classifies them into true or false incidents. The classification of the false and true incidents is made 




manually and supervised by a GCIA Certified Intrusion Analyst (GCIA, 2011). Approximately 
98.20% of the incidents (i.e. 45,360) detected are asserted as false positives, while 1.80% of the total 
incidents (i.e. 833) are affirmed to be irrelevant positives. The classification of these is important as 








5.1.3 General Tools  
To carry out the experiments in the different evaluation stages, this study applied several types of 
open source software, namely Snort (network intrusion detection), MySQL (database), Apache 
(HTTP server), PHP (Server-side HTML embedded scripting language) and Tcpreplay. The reasons 
for utilising these applications were their openness and public availability, as well as being free to use. 
The descriptions of the applications are briefly explained as follows: 
 
(a) Snort. The software is a free and lightweight network-based IDS created by Caswell and Roesch 
(1998). To monitor network traffic and detect harmful payload or suspicious incidents, such as 
signature-based IDSs, Snort uses a set of pre-defined rules written in text files. However, to 
improve the detection mode, security analysts are free to edit and create new rules or even 
disable built-in rules. This study deployed Snort version 2.8.5.1 to detect incidents based upon 
the snortrules-snapshot-2853 rules set and default configurations.  
 
(b) MySQL. Originally found by David Axmark, Allan Larsson and Michael "Monty" Widenius, 
MySQL is quoted as the most popular open source database software (MySQL, 2011). As open 
source software, in addition to being the most affordable software, it also provides a superior 
speed, security, reliability, ease of use and active improvements by other developers to make sure 
it is free from bugs. This study used MySQL 5.1.37 as the database to store incidents that were 
detected by Snort.  
 
(c) Apache. Deployed as a web-server, Apache was originally founded in April 1996 and provides a 
secure, efficient and extensible server to support the current HTTP standards (Apache, 2011). In 
an effort to develop and maintain the current standards, Apache continues to support various 
platforms, including operating systems from UNIX and the Windows family. In this study, the 
Apache web-server is used as a tool to serve HTTP requests and display the experimental result 
using web browsers, and this study deployed Apache 2.2.13 for that purpose. 
 
(d) PHP. Originally created by Rasmus Lerdorf in 1995, PHP is a server-side HTML embedded 
scripting language, widely-used and designed to support active web development to produce 
dynamic web pages (PHP, 2011). In addition, it has evolved to include a command-line interface 
capability and this allows this study to use it as a standalone application which has an ability to 
run specific functions independently. An advantage is that PHP also can be deployed on most 
web servers currently freely available in the public domain. This study applied PHP version 
5.2.10 running with Apache 2.2.13 for the web server and used it as tool to examine, analyse, 
estimate, rate, rank and prioritise incidents based upon their risk indexes.  




(e) Tcpreplay. A tool gives the ability to re-generate network traffic in a simulation mode, using any 
traffic which was previously captured using a libpcap format. The tool is written by Aaron 
Turner and has been utilised by many vendors, enterprises, universities, labs and open source 
projects in order to re-play network traffic (Tcpreplay, 2011). This evaluation study utilised the 
tool to re-play the captured traffic in the selected datasets, in order to simulate them as live 
traffic. 
  




5.1.4 Design Assumptions and Rationale 
To facilitate and conduct experiments in this study properly, along with the specific model and 
strategies planned in the proposed framework, some modifications and assumptions were made. 
Specifically, given the lack of specific information on assets, some assumptions had to be made on the 
values of assets that related to the incident scenario in the dataset.  
 
Using the category given for the assets, the experiment in this study made an assumption of the 
indicators’ value, particularly for assets; as such information is not available directly from the dataset. 
The assumption is only to quantify the value of the incident risk index and is exclusively used for the 
experiment in this study, so the value does not necessarily reflect the actual value of assets in the 
original dataset. As a simple basis, this study adopted similar values to those given by Lee et al. 
(2002) and the assumed values are based upon the asset’s functional role. The criticality, 
maintainability, replaceability and dependability values are shown in Table 19. In addition, the 
experiment applied zero values for the control indicator for all assets. This assumption stems from the 
DARPA dataset itself, which assumes a naïve defender.   
Table 19. Assumed Asset Value 
Category Criticality Maintainability Replaceability Dependability
Category 1 10 10 5 5
Category 2 8 8 5 5
Category 3 4 2 5 0
Category 4 2 2 5 0  
 
Furthermore, the experiment used five different indicators in evaluating the value for the likelihood of 
threat and vulnerability. As such, their values are obtained with specific guidelines and a similar 
description, as described in Section 4.1.3. 
 
To facilitate the requirement of the judgement matrices for the decision factors and indicators, this 
study uses the values tabulated in Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9 (see Section 4.1.2, pp. 63). Based on 
the value of the consistency index and consistency ratio, all the assessments and values for the 
indicators’ weight in this assumption are considered consistent. 
 
The other requirements and assumptions used in specific stages are discussed separately.   




5.2 Risk Index Model Evaluation  
The first stage of the evaluation study investigates the use of AHP as a method of prioritising 
incidents in the Rating Strategy Modules (see Figure 11) and aims to satisfy two objectives:  
 
(a) To propose a new Risk Index Model (RIM) as a method of rating, ranking and prioritising 
incidents, particularly with the aid of the Analytic Hierarchy Process;  
 
(b) To validate the result of RIM, they are compared to existing approaches used as the industry 
standards, namely CVSS v2 and Snort Priority. 
5.2.1 Experiment and Procedure Description 
This stage performed two main experiments, based on whether different weightings for indicators are 
applied. The description of the experiments is as follows: 
 
(a) Experiment 1. Using AHP as the model to estimate risk indexes, the first experiment uses same 
value for all indicators leading to equal weights when calculating risk indexes. This experiment 
is a control experiment and its results will be used to compare with the Experiment 2 results. 
 
(b) Experiment 2. The second experiment uses different weights of indicators and is used to identify 
the effect different weightings can have on the incident risk indexes. The used of different 
weightings of indicators in this experiment is an improvement made in order to address one the 
post-incident prioritisation drawbacks which identified in Section 3.1.3. 
 
Since this is a preliminary evaluation, the experiment was conducted using the DARPA dataset only. 
The experiment inherited all the dataset descriptions as well as experimental assumptions made in the 
previous section (i.e. Section 5.1.4) for the experiment input. 
 
Furthermore, in order to calculate the incident risk indexes, both experiments applied the static mode 
strategy in the rating process and they rated incidents only once, when the incidents are detected. 
Essentially, the rating for the risk index for each incident is unchanged and remains static until the end 
of the evaluation phases. Theoretically, the periodic changes of the risk index could give another 
implication, such as it would affect the performance of the estimation process but perhaps give more 
accurate risk indexes. However, this first stage would not consider the effect of the changes. 
 
In order to compare the results, and validate the RIM, the experiment was based on some 
assumptions. In particular, with the DARPA 2000 LLDOS 1.0 dataset, there are different attacks in 




different phases of attacks, as shown in Table 16. Thus, to analyse the dataset, this study made 
assumptions as follows: 
 
(a) A true incident in any phase is assumed as a critical incident in that particular phase. 
 
(b) Due to the multi-staged attack in the dataset, true incidents in the latest phase are assumed as 
more critical incidents compared to incidents in other previous phases.  
 
In analysing the ranking of the incident, the experiment ranked each one according to its detection 
time. All incidents are ranked and no incident was excluded until the end of the phases. In addition, 
the different weights for the indicators used in Experiment 2 was obtained using estimation in three 
judgement matrices (see Section 4.1.2, pp. 63): the judgement matrix of the influence factor, the 
judgement matrix of the main indicator for impact on asset and the judgement matrix of the main 
indicator for likelihood of threat and vulnerability. The judgement matrices were used to evaluate the 
different results of the incident risk index. In this particular experiment, the judgement matrices were 
just an assumption made to manually fit with Risk Index Model. Generally, the judgement matrices 
can be altered, and the assumption in this particular experiment is not definitive and may be subject to 
reassessment.  
  






Figure 12. Graph for the distribution of incidents (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) 
 
Figure 12 shows the results of the two experiments. As can be seen in the graph, Experiment 2 plots 
higher risk indexes in comparison to Experiment 1. Generally, the distribution of incidents in both 
experiments was different and it shows significant results. To look at them closer, Table 20 and Table 
21 tabulate the selected incidents. 



















































































Pre 1 FTP Bad login 1 09:32:34 09:32:34 0.3142 0.3142 1 1 4 4 4 4 114 114 114 114 149 149 149 149 149 149 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
1 ICMP Echo Reply 20 09:51:36 09:52:00 0.0939 0.3542 65 2 86 2 317 66 321 66 385 95 413 95 423 95 435 99 1014 99 1042 99 1056 99
ICMP PING 20 09:51:36 09:52:00 0.0942 0.3542 64 1 85 1 316 65 320 65 384 94 412 94 422 94 434 98 1013 98 1041 98 1055 98
Pre 2 ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1 09:52:10 09:52:10 0.1135 0.1135 84 84 315 315 315 315 376 376 398 398 408 408 415 415 422 422 450 450 464 464
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 09:54:45 09:58:36 0.1345 0.1345 83 82 311 310 311 310 372 371 392 391 396 395 401 400 408 407 412 411 414 413
2 RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 76 10:08:07 10:18:05 0.0802 0.3412 329 68 333 68 397 103 425 103 435 103 447 107 1026 107 1054 107 1068 107
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request 76 10:08:07 10:18:05 0.2802 0.5412 141 1 141 1 184 7 184 7 188 7 192 7 196 7 196 7 196 7
 
Pre 3 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 4 10:22:43 10:31:30 0.1061 0.1061 319 316 380 377 408 405 418 415 430 427 437 434 465 462 479 476
3 RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.1959 0.3462 267 97 267 97 271 97 275 101 282 101 282 101 282 101
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.3959 0.5462 22 1 22 1 22 1 26 1 26 1 26 1 26 1
RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.1573 0.3076 357 150 357 150 361 150 365 154 372 154 374 154 376 154
Pre 4 TELNET login incorrect 2 10:36:34 10:46:04 0.1361 0.1362 390 389 394 393 398 397 405 404 409 408 411 410
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 10:46:28 10:46:28 0.1315 0.1315 394 393 404 403 411 410 418 417 434 433 441 440
4 RSERVICES rsh root 8 10:50:02 10:50:38 0.1334 0.2835 400 173 405 177 412 179 416 179 418 179
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 10:50:15 10:50:54 0.1318 0.1323 402 401 409 408 416 415 420 419 427 426
Pre 5 TELNET login incorrect 1 11:00:11 11:00:11 0.1355 0.1355 399 399 406 406 410 410 412 412
ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1 11:05:11 11:05:11 0.1116 0.1116 416 416 423 423 451 451 465 465
5 (snort decoder) Bad Traffic Loopback IP 572 11:27:51 11:27:56 0.0984 0.1027 1012 441 1040 469 1054 483















































































































To show the simplicity and difference of the results, Table 20 tabulates selected incidents detected in 
Experiment 1 by Snort IDSs and stored in the MySQL database, and most of them are considered as 





















Experiment 1 Experiment 2




There were 1,068 incidents detected and the critical incidents are highlighted in bold. Table 20 and 
Table 21 show the incidents tabulated into several phases, groups, number of alerts, time, risk index 
and the priority of the incident ranked at the specific time. The first column on the left of the table 
refers to the phases of the dataset and is followed by the incidents, grouped into similar incident types. 
The number of similar incidents is presented in the third column. In order to analyse the ranking of 
similar incidents, this study summarises the time detected and the risk index according to two 
different values (high/max and low/min). The min and max timestamps in the time column refer to the 
first and last timestamp of the incident detected. The low and high values in the risk index column 
indicate the lowest and highest values of the incident risk index. The ranking process was ranked at 12 
different periods started from 09:51:35 and ended at 12:35:48. To give a simple view, the incidents 
are grouped into similar types of signature and ranked based on the highest and lowest risk indexes.  
 
The incidents were ranked separately in the experiment as a single event and the total number of 
incidents increased over time. The lowest rank was at position number 1 at the beginning and 1068 in 
the end. As tabulated, most of true and critical incidents (except in the last phase) were ranked at the 
top priority ranking. For example, in the 1
st
 phase at 09:52:00, the critical incident with the signature 
“ICMP PING” and “ICMP Echo Reply” were ranked at first and second place. After about 30 
minutes, new incidents were detected and the position was changed again. Since the new incidents 
were considered more critical compared to the previous incidents, the top priority was given to the 
new incident which was the “RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request”. Continuously, a 
similar scenario happened at 10:35:01, where the new incidents were ranked as top priority compared 
to the previous incident. This trend is consistent with the assumption made earlier whereby a new 
critical incident in a new phase is considered more critical to the incident in the previous phases. 



















































































Pre 1 FTP Bad login 1 09:32:34 09:32:34 0.3135 0.3135 1 1 4 4 4 4 141 141 141 141 176 176 176 176 176 176 180 180 183 183 183 183 183 183
1 ICMP Echo Reply 20 09:51:36 09:52:00 0.0950 0.3459 65 2 86 2 317 123 321 123 385 158 413 158 423 158 435 162 1014 165 1042 165 1056 165
ICMP PING 20 09:51:36 09:52:00 0.0955 0.3459 64 1 85 1 316 122 320 122 384 157 412 157 422 157 434 161 1013 164 1041 164 1055 164
Pre 2 ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1 09:52:10 09:52:10 0.1177 0.1177 84 84 315 315 315 315 376 376 398 398 408 408 415 415 422 422 450 450 464 464
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 09:54:45 09:58:36 0.1531 0.1531 83 82 311 310 311 310 372 371 392 391 396 395 401 400 408 407 412 411 414 413
2 RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 76 10:08:07 10:18:05 0.0891 0.3408 329 125 333 125 397 160 425 160 435 160 447 164 1026 167 1054 167 1068 167
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request 76 10:08:07 10:18:05 0.4041 0.6558 76 1 76 1 105 7 105 7 105 7 109 7 109 7 109 7 109 7
 
Pre 3 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 4 10:22:43 10:31:30 0.1086 0.1086 319 316 380 377 408 405 418 415 430 427 484 481 512 509 526 523
3 RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.2195 0.3469 220 151 220 151 224 151 228 155 235 158 235 158 235 158
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.5345 0.6619 22 1 22 1 22 1 22 1 22 1 22 1 22 1
RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.1826 0.3100 325 177 325 177 329 177 333 181 340 184 342 184 342 184
Pre 4 TELNET login incorrect 2 10:36:34 10:46:04 0.1550 0.1552 390 389 394 393 398 397 405 404 409 408 411 410
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 10:46:28 10:46:28 0.1505 0.1505 394 393 404 403 411 410 418 417 422 421 424 423
4 RSERVICES rsh root 8 10:50:02 10:50:38 0.1526 0.2797 400 185 405 189 412 192 416 192 418 194
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 10:50:15 10:50:54 0.1507 0.1514 402 401 409 408 416 415 420 419 422 384
Pre 5 TELNET login incorrect 1 11:00:11 11:00:11 0.1540 0.1540 399 399 406 406 410 410 412 412
ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1 11:05:11 11:05:11 0.1161 0.1161 416 416 423 423 451 451 465 465
5 (snort decoder) Bad Traffic Loopback IP 572 11:27:51 11:27:56 0.1036 0.1090 1012 434 1040 462 1054 476



















































































































In contrast to the previous example, incidents detected in the 3
rd
 phase were ranked at the top priority 
until the end of the scenario. Although there were new critical incidents (i.e. Bad Traffic Loopback 
IP) detected in the 5
th
 phase, it was ranked lower than the critical incident in the 3
rd
 Phase because it 
was considered as not critical enough in comparison. In this particular scenario, the result is consistent 
with the dataset because the incidents were considered failed (DARPA, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, Table 21 shows partial results of Experiment 2 and some significant changes compared 
to the results of Experiment 1. The results are slightly different because the experiment was 
performed with weighted indicators. In general, Experiment 2 has shown some significant changes in 
the risk index value as well as the top priority ranking. In order to show the changes, Table 22 shows 
the percentage of unchanged rank position between both experiments. 
Table 22. The percentage of unchanged rank position between both experiments 
Time Total Total Top 10 Top 25 Top 50 Top 100 Top 250
2000-03-07 09:51:35 25 100.00 100.00 100.00 - - -
2000-03-07 09:52:00 65 66.15 100.00 100.00 76.00 - -
2000-03-07 10:08:06 86 44.19 100.00 100.00 60.00 - -
2000-03-07 10:18:06 329 54.10 100.00 100.00 96.00 62.00 53.60
2000-03-07 10:33:09 333 54.65 100.00 100.00 96.00 62.00 53.60
2000-03-07 10:35:01 397 45.59 10.00 52.00 72.00 79.00 41.60
2000-03-07 10:50:00 425 46.35 10.00 52.00 72.00 79.00 41.60
2000-03-07 10:50:54 435 45.75 10.00 52.00 72.00 79.00 41.60
2000-03-07 11:26:14 447 41.61 10.00 4.00 26.00 58.00 33.20
2000-03-07 11:34:21 1026 26.71 10.00 4.00 26.00 58.00 33.20
2000-03-07 12:23:39 1054 26.76 10.00 4.00 26.00 58.00 33.20
2000-03-07 12:35:48 1068 26.59 10.00 4.00 26.00 58.00 33.20




Table 22 shows the percentage of the unchanged rank position for all incidents, top 10, top 25, top 50, 
top 100 and top 250 incidents in 12 different timestamps. As can be seen when considering all 
incidents, 73.41% of the incidents or the majority of the rank positions was changed. There were on 
average only 26.59% of the total incidents that remained unchanged. Interestingly for the top priority 
incident, the average is quite significant where 47.50% for the top 10 and 56.00% and top 25 incidents 
remained unchanged. For example, at 10:35:01, the total number of incidents was 397 and only 
45.59% (181 incidents) of rank positions had remained unchanged; other incidents changed their 
position. To show some changes in the top priority incidents, 10% of the incidents in the top 10 
priority rank remained unchanged and the majority of them were changed; 9 out of 10 incidents. A 
similar percentage can be seen in the other timestamp where some of the top priority incidents were 
changed. 





In the majority of cases, the change of the risk index affects the ranking of incidents; it represents 
73.41% of them. For example, the highest rating for the “ICMP Echo Reply” incident in Experiment 1 
was 0.3542, but it significantly decreased to 0.3459 in Experiment 2. At the same time, the ranking 
for a similar signature was different where the highest position was at the 99
th 
position in Experiment 
1 and the 165
th
 position in Experiment 2. However, in a few cases which represent 26.59% of 
incidents, the use of different weightings had no effect upon the ranking. For example, the risk index 
for the “RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request” incident was changed from 0.5462 to 
0.6619 without modifying its rank.  
Table 23. Risk Index and Ranking Comparison 
Incidents' Signature Name No. of Incidents
Min Max
E1 E2 E1 E2 E1 E2 E1 E2
ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 20 09:29:20 11:03:33 0.1061 0.1083 0.1725 0.1956 482 573 329 323
FTP Bad login 1 09:32:34 09:32:34 0.3142 0.3135 0.3142 0.3135 153 183 153 183
TELNET login incorrect 17 09:32:34 12:33:25 0.1302 0.1484 0.2865 0.2828 447 427 175 190
ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 4 09:37:05 12:23:39 0.1116 0.1161 0.1442 0.1650 465 465 404 401
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 12 09:45:34 12:31:13 0.1186 0.1252 0.1429 0.1633 463 463 405 403
ICMP Echo Reply 72 09:45:37 12:26:16 0.0939 0.0950 0.3542 0.3459 1056 1056 99 165
ICMP PING 72 09:45:37 12:26:16 0.0942 0.0955 0.3542 0.3459 1055 1055 98 164
ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 76 10:08:07 11:04:13 0.2100 0.2402 0.5067 0.5292 211 211 14 35
RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 90 10:08:07 10:34:59 0.0802 0.0891 0.3462 0.3469 1068 1068 101 158
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request 90 10:08:07 10:34:59 0.2802 0.4041 0.5462 0.6619 196 109 1 1
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp portmapper sadmin port query attempt 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.3799 0.5178 0.5303 0.6452 73 73 8 8
RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.1573 0.1826 0.3076 0.3100 376 342 154 184
SQL version overflow attempt 1 10:34:57 10:34:57 0.4679 0.5386 0.4679 0.5386 18 14 18 14
RSERVICES rsh root 8 10:50:02 10:50:38 0.1334 0.1526 0.2835 0.2797 418 418 179 192
(snort decoder) Bad Traffic Loopback IP 572 11:27:51 11:27:56 0.0984 0.1036 0.1027 0.1090 1054 1054 483 476
SNMP AgentX/tcp request 3 11:27:54 11:27:55 0.2349 0.3592 0.2366 0.3614 199 157 197 155
ICMP PING *NIX 1 11:28:18 11:28:18 0.2811 0.2739 0.2811 0.2739 184 199 184 199
ICMP PING BSDtype 1 11:28:18 11:28:18 0.2811 0.2739 0.2811 0.2739 183 198 183 198
Time Risk Index Ranking
Low High Low High
 
In comparing the experimental results between the similar and different weights of indicators, Table 
23 summarises the comparison between the two experiments. The table summarises the incidents by 
grouping them into similar type of signatures with the number of incidents, time when the incident 
was detected (i.e. min and max), risk indexes and ranking of the related incidents. For the risk index 
and ranking, the table only shows the lowest and highest values for both experiments; E1 represents 
Experiment 1 and E2 represents Experiment 2. As mentioned earlier, there were some significant 
changes in the risk index value as well as some of the top priority ranking. For example, the top 
priority incidents for both experiments were still in the same position. This scenario can be seen in the 
“RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request” and the “RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port 
query udpportmappersadmin port query attempt” incidents. 
  





The experimental results, presented in the previous section, are encouraging as all the true and critical 
incidents received appropriate ranking, except the last true incidents. The proposed method was 
further validated by comparing the experimental results with the industry standards, like Snort priority 
and the CVSS v2 Base Score. 
Table 24. Snort Priority, CVSS v2 Base Score and Exploitability Subscore and Risk Index 
Incidents' Signature Name Snort Priority CVE ID CVSS v2 Base Score Exploitability Subscore No. of Incidents E1 E2 E1 E2
ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 2 - - - 20 0.1061 0.1083 0.1725 0.1956
FTP Bad login 2 - - - 1 0.3142 0.3135 0.3142 0.3135
TELNET login incorrect 2 - - - 17 0.1302 0.1484 0.2865 0.2828
ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 2 - - - 4 0.1116 0.1161 0.1442 0.1650
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 - - - 12 0.1186 0.1252 0.1429 0.1633
ICMP Echo Reply 3 - - - 72 0.0939 0.0950 0.3542 0.3459
ICMP PING 3 - - - 72 0.0942 0.0955 0.3542 0.3459
ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 3 CVE-2005-0068 5 10 76 0.2100 0.2402 0.5067 0.5292
RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 2 - - - 90 0.0802 0.0891 0.3462 0.3469
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request 2 CVE-2003-0722 10 10 90 0.2802 0.4041 0.5462 0.6619
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp portmapper sadmin port query attempt 2 CVE-2003-0722 10 10 14 0.3799 0.5178 0.5303 0.6452
RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP 2 - - - 14 0.1573 0.1826 0.3076 0.3100
SQL version overflow attempt 1 CVE-2002-0649 8 10 1 0.4679 0.5386 0.4679 0.5386
RSERVICES rsh root 1 - - - 8 0.1334 0.1526 0.2835 0.2797
(snort decoder) Bad Traffic Loopback IP 2 - - - 572 0.0984 0.1036 0.1027 0.1090
SNMP AgentX/tcp request 2 CVE-2002-0013 10 10 3 0.2349 0.3592 0.2366 0.3614
ICMP PING *NIX 3 - - - 1 0.2811 0.2739 0.2811 0.2739





Table 24 shows the outcome of this comparison. The first column in the table is the type of incident, 
which is followed by the Snort Priority, as obtained directly by Snort IDS. The next three columns are 
the CVE-ID, CVSS v2 Base Score and exploitability sub score which were taken directly from 
National Vulnerability Database (NIST, 2011). The last four columns show the risk indexes that were 
directly taken from the experimental results. 
 
The experimental results show that the approach in this study is better than the Snort Priority and 
CVSS v2 Base Score in terms of ranking and prioritising incidents. Based on the experimental result, 
all incidents were rated and produced risk indexes between 0 and 1. It seems that the results show a 
significant improvement in terms of the number of the incident rating because the CVSS v2 Base 
Score can rate only 17.23% or 184 out of 1,068 incidents. The low percentage is because only 5 out of 
18 types of incidents have the CVE-ID and CVSS v2 Base Score, the rest have no significant values. 
This study has identified this as a serious limitation when the CVSS v2 Base Score is used as an 
approach in ranking incidents; only incidents with a signature that has the CVSS and CVE-ID can be 
ranked, all others will be excluded. 
 
Furthermore, the ranking approach performed in this study is better than the Snort Priority because the 
latter prioritises incidents only into several groups, specifically three. With the limitation of the group 
priority, security analysts will face difficulty in differentiating which incidents are urgent and 
important. To look at them closer, Figure 13 plots the distribution of incidents using the incident risk 
index and Snort Priority. As can be seen, the distribution of incidents is limited to only three groups, 
as opposed to RIM with risk indexes between 0 and 1. For example, there were 72 incidents for the 




“ICMP Echo reply” and the Snort Priority labelled all of them as a low priority or 3 within the same 
groups. However, in this study, with the similar incidents in Experiment 1, the risk indexes given 
were between 0.0939 and 0.3542. The different risk indexes between the incidents allow security 
analysts to rank and prioritise incidents more effectively. This limitation of the group priority can also 
be seen with the CVSS because it groups incidents with a similar type of incident and not according to 
the incidents’ urgency or risk indexes. 
 
Figure 13. Graph for Experiment 1, Experiment 2 and Snort Priority 
 
In comparison, the position of the ranking in Table 23 is better compared to the prioritising result in 
Table 24 because the incidents were prioritised according to their risk indexes and not into a similar 
group. Although the rating of the risk index and the ranking of the critical incidents cannot be 
validated with other studies, the result from the Snort Priority can be considered as an appropriate 
comparison reference because it is a standard priority which is practically produced by Snort IDS. In 
particular, the experimental results give a better output in terms of an incident’s ranking because each 
incident can be ranked separately and clearly has a specific position for every single incident. With 
the identification of the specific position, it helps security analysts to respond only to an appropriate 
incident; hence it could save time and resources.  
 
Furthermore, using the Snort Priority some of the false incidents were rated as high priority incidents, 
but using the approach in this study those incidents were rated with a low risk index and a low 
ranking. To look at them closer, the incident with the “(snort decoder) – Bad Traffic Loopback IP” 
signatures were prioritised as medium in the Snort Priority, but the ranking approach in this study 
ranked it with a low position of 1,054 in both experiments. Furthermore, the DARPA 2000 LLDOS 
1.0 dataset is known as a scenario of multi-stage attack where a series of attacks were launched over a 
period of time and different stages (as shown in Table 15). As expected, the result of the experiment 
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assumption made. The experiments were fairly rated and ranked the critical incidents as the top 
priority incidents in each stage except the two last stages. They were rated and ranked like that 
because the incidents in the last two stages were considered as failed attacks. 
 
In comparing the experimental results in this study with other results, this study has shown some 
improvement in rating as well as ranking and prioritising incidents. In comparison, the model in this 
study rated incidents at the 5
th
 phase with a low rating and the same time ranked it at a suitable 
position and placed it better compared to Alsubhi et al. (2008) . In contrast, the approach in Alsubhi et 
al. (2008) gave a very high score for similar incidents in the 5
th
 phase, although the incidents were 
considered as failed incidents. Furthermore, this study is unable to compare the experimental results 
with others since there is not another recent study in incident prioritisation that uses the same or a 
similar dataset. 
  




5.2.4 Conclusion and Limitation 
The first stage of the evaluation study has shown the integration of risk assessment and AHP in 
prioritising incidents. The model was introduced as a means to estimate the rating of incidents based 
on ten indicators derived from two main decision factors: likelihood of event and consequence of 
event. With a combination of the risk assessment and the aid of AHP, the risk index for each incident 
is sorted and ranked quantitatively.  
 
A model to rate and rank incident is the Risk Index Model (RIM), which has already been used 
successfully in this evaluation study. The study also validated the feasibility of the model by using the 
standard DARPA 2000 LLDOS 1.0 dataset (DARPA, 2011). The investigation of the effectiveness of 
the model was completed by looking at three aspects:  
 
(a) Different weightings for indicators. The straightforward analysis of the result between the two 
experiments reveals that both are different in terms of valuing risk indexes as well as the position 
of the non-top priority incidents. To summarise, the use of the different weightings for indicators 
has shown significant changes only in risk index values and not in the top priority ranking. In 
particular, when considering all incidents, 73.41% of the incidents or the majority of the rank 
positions was changed. There were on average only 26.59% of the total incidents which remained 
unchanged. Interestingly for the top priority incident, the average is quite significant where 
47.50% of the top 10 incidents and 56.00% of the top 25 incidents remained unchanged. The 
experimental result in this stage also showed a reasonable case where incidents can be ranked 
dynamically using a different or similar weight of indicators. This stage is unable to determine 
which experiment could produce better results because there are no significant and correct 
reference results to compare. However, the comparison between the experimental results 
indicated that the result in Experiment 2 is better than Experiment 1 in terms of their risk indexes. 
 
(b) Comparison study with other approaches like the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 
(NIST, 2011) and Snort Priority (Caswell and Roesch, 1998). To reduce the limitation of the 
unavailability of other studies to compare with the results, this study made an evaluation study 
based on two industry standards: Snort Priority and the CVSS. In comparing with the outcomes 
from them, the model has significantly improved the incident prioritisation by rating and ranking 
all incidents detected in the dataset. In terms of experimental results, the model rated 100% of the 
number of incidents compared to only 17.23% of incidents with the CVSS. In addition, the model 
improves the limitation of group priority in the Snort Priority (e.g. high, medium and low priority) 
by quantitatively ranking, sorting and listing incidents according to their risk indexes.   
 




(c) Feasibility of Risk Index Model. The preliminary results of the experiment demonstrated and 
validated the feasibility of the model in rating as well as ranking incidents. The preliminary 
results of the experiment also demonstrated and validated the feasibility of the approach in this 
study in rating and quantifying incidents using similar and different weights of indicators. 
 
In addition to the main aspects above, the experiment also clearly demonstrated that the approach is 
practical and can conveniently be used as an alternative approach to rating, ranking and prioritising 
incidents. Furthermore, the proposed model is suitable to be applied in real life to rank and prioritise 
incidents.  
 
The model uses selected indicators and they are easy to measure and obtain as well as requiring less 
computational process. In terms of its configuration, this model has shown that the judgement 
matrices used are efficient enough for rating, ranking as well as prioritising true and critical incidents. 
However, the judgement matrices used for full practical use must be configured correctly because it 
would affect the output of the ranking. For instance, the priority value for the consequence of an event 
or factor related to an asset could be a small index value when it involves only one asset, for example 
prioritising incidents in one web server.    
 
In conducting the experiment, this study has found some limitations with regards to the practical 
aspects. Below are some of the limitations and suggestions for reducing them. 
 
(a) Quantitative Input. All inputs in the experiments are quantitative. However, in a practical 
situation it is difficult to establish such quantitative measures, particularly with asset values. 
Arguably, therefore, a qualitative input which has a different group of rating (e.g. high, medium 
and low) would be more meaningful. This study used quantitative values because the model 
allows incidents to be differentiated among others. It is suggested that a qualitative input needs to 
be changed to a quantitative input in order to calculate a risk index. 
 
(b) Reasonable Assumptions. At present, the experiment has used assumptions to derive the values in 
estimating risk index, particularly in rating the value of an asset. To reduce this limitation, the 
future work should focus on strengthening the estimation process for rating every indicator which 
is involved in the model. It is suggested to extend the indicator by giving a precise and detailed 
metric for measuring incidents, especially in reducing uncertainty amongst indicators. 
 
(c) Strategies Performances. In the experiment, the ranking was based on a small number of incidents 
(i.e. 1,068 in total). The performance cost of rating and ranking incidents on a larger scale has not 
been adequately studied, but based on the preliminary results which can be simulated within a few 




seconds, it is estimated that the effect will be less. In order to evaluate this potential demand, this 
study has conducted an additional experiment in identifying a better strategy in ranking incidents 
in the later stages. Although the result of this experiment is convincing in terms of the 
prioritisation strategy, technically the involvement of a few million incidents may slow the rating 
and ranking process. Therefore, the fourth stage investigates the processing time between 
different rating and ranking strategies to compare the performance effectiveness. 
 
(d) Responses. The result also provides a clear distinction between the ways incidents are rated, 
ranked and prioritised. However, the experiments in this stage do not consider any 
countermeasures or response to control the critical incident. With the promising result in this 
stage, the third stage in this study also investigated a response strategy which can be used to work 
with RIM in selecting appropriate responses for incidents with different priorities. An important 
question for future studies is to determine better strategies if there is another countermeasure or 
response applied to stop the critical incident.  
  
  




5.3 Evaluation of the Effect of Using Different Strategies in Ranking and Rating 
The first stage highlighted the feasibility of RIM, particularly in the rating and ranking process in 
order to estimate risk indexes and rank incidents. However, the first stage has not considered the 
effect of the changes in risk indexes and this second stage extends the evaluation study of the effect of 
the changes over time. 
 
Therefore, in order to scale down the consideration, this second stage investigates the effect of 
applying several strategies in the rating and ranking process and also aims to satisfy two objectives:  
 
(a) To investigate the effect of applying a different strategy in the rating process as it offers changes 
of the incident risk indexes over time. 
 
(b) To investigate the effect of applying a different strategy in the ranking process by using the 
advantages of time interval.  
 
It is important to understand that the improvement made by applying a different strategy in the rating 
and ranking process has the potential to improve the prioritisation process, in particular with a new 
formulation made from some of the indicators used in the proposed framework. This stage is 
predicted to create an improvement of risk indexes in rating incidents and facilitate a better approach 
in ranking as well as positioning a critical incident. As mentioned in the previous chapters (see 
Section 4.2.3), the rating and ranking process are the two main modules in the framework and they 
help to identify the urgency and criticality of incidents. With the identification, they help a security 
analyst to respond only to an appropriate incident, hence they could save time and avoid a waste of 
effort. 
5.3.1 Experiment and Procedure Description 
In order to investigate the effect of the changes made on the strategy planned in the rating and ranking 
process, this stage considers the following criteria: 
 
(a) The rating process adopts the on-demand mode as its strategy, where the incident risk index is 
updated each time a new incident is detected. 
 
(b) Since the DARPA dataset simulates less than three hours network traffic, the changes of the 
incident risk indexes are configured to be restricted to three different time intervals: 1 hour, 2 
hours and without limitation. The different time intervals are important to demonstrate the 
different results in different set of configurations. 





(c) In the ranking process, the positions of incidents are also ranked dynamically according to the 
changes of their risk index. 
 
As discussed in Section 4.1.3, the changes are predicted to improve the Risk Index Model from two 
different perspectives: firstly, the use of the on-demand mode as the rating strategy will produce a 
more accurate incidents risk index compared to the previous one, and secondly, the changes of the 
strategy in the ranking process will eliminate the limitation of ranking too many incidents in one time.  
 
This stage extends the experiments in the first stage; therefore it applies a similar Risk Index Model as 
well as its descriptions, assumptions, the matrix judgements and models. 
 
  




5.3.2 Results and Discussion 
As expected, the experimental results at this stage were consistent with the results from the first stage 
in terms of the number of outputs. There were 1,068 incidents detected by the sensor and again all the 
incidents were rated and ranked. To extend the discussion on the experimental results, this section 
discusses them in two parts. 
 
(a) The first part discusses the effect of the changes of the incident risk indexes due to the selection 
mode in the rating strategy. 
 
(b) The second part discusses the effect of the ranking strategy due to the changes of the incident risk 
indexes in terms of their number, as well as the position of critical incidents.  
 
To show the effect of the changes, Figure 14 and Figure 15 plot the distribution of incidents by 
plotting the lowest, the highest and the average of their risk indexes. As can be seen in Figure 15, 
incidents were plotted with higher risk indexes in comparison to incidents in Figure 14. For example, 
this trend can be seen in between incidents with CID 100 to 450. The distribution is identical with the 
first stage results except the new graphs contain a range of risk index for each incident. The range is a 
result of the changes of risk index over time. 
 
 
Figure 14. A new graph for Experiment 1 
 

















































To look at the effect closer, Table 25 shows some of the selected incidents. In order to show the 
comparison results and their trend, a selection of the incidents was made based upon their detection 
time as well as the top incidents in different attack phases. 
Table 25. A partial result of the Risk Index upon selected incidents 
09:51:35 09:52:00 10:08:06 10:18:06 10:33:09 10:35:01 10:50:00 10:50:54 11:26:14 11:34:21 12:23:39 12:35:48
Incident Detected 25 40 21 243 4 64 28 10 12 579 28 14
 Total 25 65 86 329 333 397 425 436 447 1026 1054 1068
Time Detected Incident ID
09:32:34 CID 4 0.3142 0.2970 0.2951 0.2885 0.2892 0.2898 0.2910 0.2911 0.2920 0.3193 0.3186 0.3183
09:51:36 CID 28 0.3542 0.3504 0.3339 0.3330 0.3334 0.3325 0.3309 0.3301 0.2910 0.2922 0.2926
09:51:56 CID 52 0.3542 0.3504 0.3337 0.3329 0.3318 0.3310 0.3295 0.3285 0.2902 0.2915 0.2919
10:08:07 CID 88 0.5412 0.5402 0.5460 0.5411 0.5393 0.5379 0.4941 0.4936 0.4933
10:33:27 CID 353 0.5462 0.5413 0.5396 0.5381 0.4942 0.4937 0.4934
10:50:03 CID 428 0.2835 0.2834 0.2878 0.2874 0.2872
11:27:52 CID 575 0.1026 0.1002 0.0991
Time Detected Incident ID
09:32:34 CID 4 0.3135 0.2954 0.2935 0.2862 0.2869 0.2875 0.2886 0.2888 0.2899 0.3147 0.3140 0.3139
09:51:36 CID 28 0.3459 0.341 0.3327 0.3317 0.3341 0.3325 0.3306 0.3298 0.2854 0.2865 0.2869
09:51:56 CID 52 0.3459 0.3410 0.3325 0.3315 0.3320 0.3305 0.3287 0.3276 0.2844 0.2855 0.2859
10:08:07 CID 88 0.6558 0.6547 0.6615 0.6562 0.6542 0.6527 0.6037 0.6031 0.6028
10:33:27 CID 353 0.6619 0.6565 0.6546 0.6531 0.6038 0.6032 0.6029
10:50:03 CID 428 0.2797 0.2796 0.2856 0.2851 0.2849








The experimental results are tabulated into three main tables: the first table on the top tabulates the 
number of incidents detected and the other two tables show the incident risk indexes based upon two 
different experiments. In the risk index table, the first column on the left of the table refers the time of 
the incident detected followed by its ID. In order to analyse the effect of the strategy used in the rating 
process, the incident risk index was ranked at 12 different periods starting from 09:51:35 and ending 
at 12:35:48. In a practical situation, they are rated dynamically when a new incident is detected.  
 
With the implementation of the on-demand mode in the rating process, the experimental result shows 
significant changes in the incident risk indexes where all incidents were affected. For example, in 
following the consideration of the criteria in the rating process, the risk index for “FTP Bad login” 
with CID 4 was rated at 09:32:34 with 0.3142 for the first time in Experiment 1. The trend for the 
similar incidents also can be seen in Experiment 2. The risk index was updated from one period to 
another until the end of the phase. A similar trend can be seen in the other incidents. The changes of 
the risk indexes are consistent with the claim made earlier in Section 4.1.3 due to the changes of the 
formulation in the frequency and similarity indicator. 
 
In order to show the effect on the implementation of the second criteria of different time limitations 
(e.g. 1 hour, 2 hours and none), Table 26 shows the different trend compared to the previous results in 
Table 25 using the results of Experiment 2. In particular, a different trend can be seen in incidents 
with CID 353, 428 and 575. For example, with the 1 hour limitation, the incident with CID 353 was 




detected at 10:33:27 and at the time rated (i.e. 10:35:01), only incidents detected in between 10:35:01 
and 09:35:01 were counted to estimate its risk index. Furthermore, the incident risk index was rated 
differently with the implementation of two hours limitation. A similar trend can be seen on incidents 
with CID 428 and 575.  
Table 26. The incident risk indexes based upon different time interval limitations 
09:51:35 09:52:00 10:08:06 10:18:06 10:33:09 10:35:01 10:50:00 10:50:54 11:26:14 11:34:21 12:23:39 12:35:48
Time Detected Incident ID Limitation
09:32:34 CID 4 None 0.3135 0.2954 0.2935 0.2862 0.2869 0.2875 0.2886 0.2888 0.2899 0.3147 0.3140 0.3139
1 hour 0.3135 0.2954 0.2935 0.2862 0.2869
2 hours 0.3135 0.2954 0.2935 0.2862 0.2869 0.2875 0.2886 0.2888 0.2899 0.3147
09:51:36 CID 28 None 0.3459 0.341 0.3327 0.3317 0.3341 0.3325 0.3306 0.3298 0.2854 0.2865 0.2869
1 hour 0.3459 0.341 0.3327 0.3317 0.3341 0.3325 0.3306
2 hours 0.3459 0.341 0.3327 0.3317 0.3341 0.3325 0.3306 0.3298 0.2854
09:51:56 CID 52 None 0.3459 0.3410 0.3325 0.3315 0.3320 0.3305 0.3287 0.3276 0.2844 0.2855 0.2859
1 hour 0.3459 0.3410 0.3325 0.3315 0.3320 0.3305 0.3287
2 hours 0.3459 0.3410 0.3325 0.3315 0.3320 0.3305 0.3287 0.3276 0.2844
10:08:07 CID 88 None 0.6558 0.6547 0.6615 0.6562 0.6542 0.6527 0.6037 0.6031 0.6028
1 hour 0.6558 0.6547 0.6615 0.6562 0.6542 0.6527
2 hours 0.6558 0.6547 0.6615 0.6562 0.6542 0.6527 0.6037
10:33:27 CID 353 None 0.6619 0.6565 0.6546 0.6531 0.6038 0.6032 0.6029
1 hour 0.6628 0.6572 0.6553 0.6537 0.6038
2 hours 0.6619 0.6565 0.6546 0.6531 0.6038 0.6032 0.6029
10:50:03 CID 428 None 0.2797 0.2796 0.2856 0.2851 0.2849
1 hour 0.2802 0.2800 0.2859
2 hours 0.2797 0.2796 0.2856 0.2851 0.2849
11:27:52 CID 575 None 0.1090 0.1063 0.1052
1 hour 0.1590 0.1532




According to the experimental results, the changes of the incident risk index can be seen only on the 
incident which was detected after 10:33:00. This is because the restriction was made in the second 
criteria where the effect can only be seen after 10:29:20, which is one hour after the first incident 
detected (i.e. 09:29:20).  
 
The changes of the risk indexes over time give additional implications. In particular, the 
implementation of the different mode and strategies in the processes has made some improvement in 
two aspects, firstly the position of the critical incidents, and secondly the total number of incidents 
that need to be ranked.  
 
In order to show the implication for the position of the critical incidents, Table 27 tabulates the 
comparison results between the experimental outputs in the first stage. Using Experiment 2 as the 
reference results for the comparison study, Table 27 shows the example of some selected incidents 
using two different studies and the first column lists those incidents. Each incident has three rows; the 
first row details the risk index of the correspondence incident, the second row shows its position and 
the last row tabulates its old position which is taken from the experimental results in the first stage. 
The list contains the critical and non-critical incidents taken from different phases. Similar to the first 
stage, in order to evaluate the experimental results, the ranking process was ranked at 12 different 
periods starting from 09:51:35 and ending at 12:35:48. 
 




In general, the changes of risk indexes over time have changed some of the positions of incidents. In 
comparing the position of incidents, the majority of them were influenced. For example, the position 
for the CID 4 incident has changed from the old position at 183
rd
 to the new position at 158
th
 due to 
the changes of the risk index (i.e. 0.3135 to 0.3139); this trend is consistent with the other incidents. 
The changes of risk indexes have less significant effect on some of the top priority incidents. For 
instance, the CID 88 incident has no effect on the changes and a similar trend can be seen with the 
CID 353 incident. 
Table 27. Position for critical incidents between two different studies 
Incident ID 09:51:35 09:52:00 10:08:06 10:18:06 10:33:09 10:35:01 10:50:00 10:50:54 11:26:14 11:34:21 12:23:39 12:35:48
CID 4 Risk Index 0.3135 0.2954 0.2935 0.2862 0.2869 0.2875 0.2886 0.2888 0.2899 0.3147 0.3140 0.3139
New Position 1 4 4 141 141 182 182 182 186 158 158 158
Old Position 1 4 4 141 141 176 176 176 180 183 183 183
CID 52 Risk Index  0.3459 0.3410 0.3325 0.3315 0.3320 0.3305 0.3287 0.3276 0.2844 0.2855 0.2859
New Position  1 2 124 124 159 159 159 163 188 184 184
Old Position  3 3 124 124 159 159 159 163 166 166 166
CID 88 Risk Index    0.6558 0.6547 0.6615 0.6562 0.6542 0.6527 0.6037 0.6031 0.6028
New Position    1 1 7 7 7 7 5 7 7
Old Position    1 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
CID 353 Risk Index      0.6619 0.6565 0.6546 0.6531 0.6038 0.6032 0.6029
New Position      1 1 2 1 3 5 5
Old Position      1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CID 428 Risk Index        0.2797 0.2796 0.2856 0.2851 0.2849
New Position        188 191 185 187 187
Old Position        187 191 194 194 194
*The new position is based upon the Section 5.3 experiment and the old position is based on the Section 5.2 experimental results.
Time Interval
 
In order to show the effect upon the changes of the time limitation upon the incident rank, Table 28 
shows the different trend compared to the results in Table 27. As similar to the risk index results in 
Table 26, the different trend can be seen in incidents with CID 353 and 428. For example, with the 
implementation of a 1 hour limitation, the incident with CID 353 was detected at 10:33:27 and at the 
time rated (i.e. 10:35:01) it was ranked in 1
st
 position. The position changed to 4
th
 position as opposed 
to the implementation of 2 hours limitation which showed a similar position to the previous one. This 
trend has been predicted in the first place because the experimental results in the first stage indicated 
that only a certain percentage of incidents will be affected in terms of their positions. The changes of 
the incident position are not too significant because the changes only affect not more than ±10 
movements. 
 
In addition, as in Table 28, there are a few rows which show some empty spaces. The empty space 
means some of the incidents have been dropped from being ranked at that specific period. This is 
consistent with the third criterion mentioned earlier where incidents are ranked only for a few hours; 
therefore only incidents that have a lifetime less than the configured hours will be ranked, otherwise 
they will be dropped. For example, the “FTP Bad Login” with CID 4 was ranked only in 5 different 
periods until 10:33:09 and after that it was dropped from being ranked. Similar trends can also be seen 
with the other incidents. In contrast, without the limitation applied, all the incidents will be ranked 
until the end of the ranking process. With the improvement, the implementation of the third criterion 
in the ranking strategy is potentially helpful in assisting security analysts to focus and analyse only a 




small number of critical incidents, instead of having unnecessary incidents. In addition, since the total 
number of the incidents changes from time to time, the position of the incident is also improved. For 
example, at the 11:34:21, instead of having position at 185
th
 for the incident with CID 428, it was 
located at the position 45
th
 with the 1 hour limitation.  
Table 28. The incident ranks based upon different time interval limitations 
Time Detected Incident ID 09:51:35 09:52:00 10:08:06 10:18:06 10:33:09 10:35:01 10:50:00 10:50:54 11:26:14 11:34:21 12:23:39 12:35:48
09:32:34 CID 4 Risk Index 0.3135 0.2954 0.2935 0.2862 0.2869 0.2875 0.2886 0.2888 0.2899 0.3147 0.3140 0.3139
Position (None) 1 4 4 141 141 182 182 182 186 158 158 158
Position (1 Hour) 1 4 4 141 141
Position (2 Hour) 1 4 4 141 141 182 182 182 186 158
09:51:56 CID 52 Risk Index  0.3459 0.3410 0.3325 0.3315 0.3320 0.3305 0.3287 0.3276 0.2844 0.2855 0.2859
Position (None)  1 2 124 124 159 159 159 163 188 184 184
Position (1 Hour) 2 1 123 123 158 158 158
Position (2 Hour) 2 1 123 123 158 158 158 162 187
10:08:07 CID 88 Risk Index    0.6558 0.6547 0.6615 0.6562 0.6542 0.6527 0.6037 0.6031 0.6028
Position (None)    1 1 7 7 7 7 5 7 7
Position (1 Hour) 1 1 7 7 7 7
Position (2 Hour) 1 1 7 7 7 7 5
10:33:27 CID 353 Risk Index      0.6619 0.6565 0.6546 0.6531 0.6038 0.6032 0.6029
Position (None)      1 1 2 1 3 5 5
Position (1 Hour) 1 4 3 1 4
Position (2 Hour) 1 1 2 1 3 1 2
10:50:03 CID 428 Risk Index        0.2797 0.2796 0.2856 0.2851 0.2849
Position (None)        188 191 185 187 187
Position (1 Hour)        184 188 45




Figure 16. The number of incidents using two ranking strategies 
 
In terms of the number of incidents, the total number of incidents rated was dissimilar from the 
experimental result in the first stage. The graph in Figure 16 shows the difference between those 
implementations. The number of incidents rated and ranked was similar only for the first hour 
(09:29:20 – 10:29:20) and two hours (09:29:20 – 11:29:20), but it was changed after that. As 
illustrated in Figure 16, the number of incidents rated and ranked between 1 hour and without 
limitation was different starting in the period 10:33:09. The total number of incidents without 
limitation was increased up to 1,068 incidents at the end of the period but this would be different from 
the 1 hour limitation results. The total number of incidents that need to be ranked is fluctuating and 
varies. For example, at 10:35:01 there were 392 incidents that needed to be ranked; this number 
increased at 10:50:54 to 410 incidents and decreased back at 11:26:14 to 361 incidents. A similar 
trend can be seen with the implementation of a 2 hour limitation. 
09:51:35 09:52:00 10:08:06 10:18:06 10:33:09 10:35:01 10:50:00 10:50:54 11:26:14 11:34:21 12:23:39 12:35:48
None 25 65 86 329 333 397 425 435 447 1026 1054 1068
1 hour 25 65 86 329 330 392 400 410 361 695 607 42



















Total number of incidents 




The changes in the number of incidents have additional implications. In general, the total number of 
incidents that need to be ranked is similar to the number that need to be rated. Therefore, if the 
number of incidents is increased each time the incident is detected, the total number of incidents that 
need to be ranked is indirectly increased too. As can be seen, the total number of incidents was 
increased dramatically using the first stage criteria and had the potential to become infinite if there 
had been other incidents detected after the last period. In some circumstances, arguably the 
incremental of the number will increase computational processes. It is logical that a high number of 
incidents use a high processing power; therefore, it is impractical and time-consuming for a huge 
number of incidents. The implementation of those criteria as a strategy in the rating process to rate 
incidents as well as in the ranking process to rank them has significantly reduced some of the latter 
problem. As a result, the total number of incidents that need to be ranked was fairly reduced in the 
experiment. As noted, the highest number of incidents recorded was only 695 incidents at 11:34:21, 
which is less 331 incidents if using the first stage criteria.  
 
The investigation into the processing time of the rating and ranking process is discussed in the fourth 
stage of the evaluation study. 
  





The evaluation study in the second stage highlights some interesting findings as follows:  
 
(a) Changes of the incident risk index over time. With the implementation of the on-demand mode as 
a strategy in the rating process, the incident risk indexes change periodically when a new incident 
is detected and they will be updated as long as they satisfy the conditions in the criteria. As a key 
to ranking incidents, the changes of the incident risk index are constantly followed by the changes 
in its position. The study also highlights the effect of the changes over time and the position 
where the majority of incidents were influenced. The comparison results showed that the change 
of risk indexes has a small degree of effect upon the position of the incidents. In conclusion, the 
on-demand mode strategy is better than the static mode strategy in prioritising incidents, although 
it may induce an overhead in the processes. 
 
(b) Different weightings of indicators. Consistent with the first stage, the experimental result has 
identified the different value of the risk index between similar and different weights of indicators. 
The different weights used by the indicators have shown some significant changes in rating and 
ranking incidents.  
 
(c) Improve the analysis results. With the implementation of different modes and strategies in the 
rating and ranking process, some improvements have been made. In particular, a better position 
for critical incidents can be produced compared to the strategy used in the first stage. Plus, there is 
a reduction in terms of the total number of incidents that need to be ranked. This reduction allows 
security analysts to focus on a small number of incidents and helps to respond only to an 
appropriate incident; hence it could save time and resources. 
 
(d) A practical and convenient approach. As similar to the first stage, the experiment in this study 
clearly stated that the implementation of different strategies is practical and can conveniently be 
used as an alternative approach to rate, rank and prioritise incidents.  
 
In improving the strategy, this stage still inherits some limitations similar to the first stage, 
particularly with the input, response selections and dataset. 
 
  




5.4 Response Strategy Model Evaluation 
The evaluation studies in the first and second stage evaluated the feasibility of RIM as well as the 
effect of using different strategies in the rating and ranking process. Although both studies have 
shown significant results in prioritising incidents, they share a similar limitation upon the response 
selection process. Thus, this stage extends the evaluation study by investigating the suitability of 
considering the Response Strategy Model (RSM) in the framework. 
 
The third stage aims to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed model as a strategy in the 
response selection process. One of the criteria to support the response selection process is to consider 
the ability to distribute incidents into appropriate responses. For example, a serious incident should be 
mapped with an active response in order to minimise its impact, as opposed to an incident of less 
impact which it may be appropriate to map with a passive one. This mapping process is important to 
the proposed framework, as a good mapping strategy increases the reliability of the model in 
facilitating the autonomous mode. Therefore, in order to satisfy such claims, this stage investigates the 
ability of the proposed framework to distribute incidents. 
 
Furthermore, this stage also investigates the relationship between the distribution of incidents and 
their classification (e.g. false/true incidents), as one of the important objectives supporting the 
response selection process is the consideration of reducing false responses to false incidents.  
5.4.1 Experiment and Procedure Description 
In order to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed model, this stage discusses two case studies 
and aims to satisfy three goals.  
 
(a) Firstly, the case studies investigate the distribution of incidents in comparison with other 
industrial tools like CVSS v2 (Mell et al., 2006; Mell et al., 2009) and Snort Priority (Caswell and 
Roesch, 1998).  
 
(b) Secondly, the case studies investigate the relationship between the distribution and their ability to 
classify incidents between true and false incidents.   
 
(c) Thirdly, the case studies extend the investigation into the effect of applying the different weights 
of the decision factors in the rating and ranking process as well as its relationship with incident 
classification. 
 




There are two case studies in this stage. The first case study was conducted using the DARPA dataset 
and the second case study was conducted using the Plymouth University datasets. 
 
The case studies were based upon the results from the first and second stage; therefore they applied a 
similar Risk Index Model as well as their descriptions, assumptions, the matrix judgements, criteria 
and models. 
 
To facilitate the distribution of incidents and its mapping process, the case studies consider the 
following rating threshold, as in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17. Rating Threshold 
 
Furthermore, the second goal is predicted to satisfy two types of relationship. Firstly, the true positive 
incidents are likely to be prioritised as high priority incidents and secondly, the false incidents are 
likely to be prioritised as low priority incidents. 
 
To facilitate the third goal, in order to show different scenarios in the study, this stage applies the 
following weights for the decision factors. There were five scenarios in the evaluation studies and 
each scenario has different weights of decision factors, which manually generated in order to simulate 
different scenarios. 
Table 29. Scenario - different weights of decision factors 
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Table 30 shows the distribution of incidents using the DARPA dataset. It contains 1,068 incidents. 
The first column on the left refers to the phases of the dataset and is followed by the total of incidents. 
The incidents are divided into two classes of incidents: true and false incidents. The other columns 
summarise the percentage of incidents with regards to specific rows; either they are true or false 
incidents. The distribution is separated between Snort Priority, CVSS v2 and the Response Strategy 
Model. The Snort Priority is divided into 3 different priorities which are high, medium and low. With 
CVSS v2, there are three main categories and there are high, medium and low. However, Table 30 
tabulates 4 columns for CVSS v2 and the last column is an additional column and it refers to incidents 
without priority. With the proposed framework, the Response Strategy Model (RSM) divides its 
priority into four quadrants, including avoidance, mitigation, transfer and acceptance. 
Table 30. With the DARPA datasets 
Phase Time No. of Incidents Type No. of Incidents
High Medium Low High Medium Low None Avoidance Mitigation Transfer Acceptance
Pre 1 09:21:36 - 09:51:35 25 TRUE - - - - - - - - - - - -
FALSE 25 - 36.00% 64.00% - - - 100.00% - - 4.00% 96.00%
1 09:51:36 - 09:52:00 40 TRUE 40 - - 100.00% - - - 100.00% - - 7.50% 92.50%
FALSE - - - - - - - - - - - -
Pre 2 09:52:01 - 10:08:06 21 TRUE - - - - - - - - - - - -
FALSE 21 - 14.29% 85.71% - - - 100.00% - - - 100.00%
2 10:08:07 - 10:18:05 243 TRUE 224 - 67.86% 32.14% 33.93% 32.14% - 33.93% - 17.86% 43.30% 38.84%
FALSE 19 - 15.79% 84.21% - - - 100.00% - - - 100.00%
Pre 3 10:18:06 - 10:33:09 4 FALSE 4 - 100.00% - - - - 100.00% - - - 100.00%
3 10:33:10 - 10:35:01 64 TRUE 60 - 100.00% - 46.67% - - 53.33% - 46.67% 23.33% 30.00%
FALSE 4 25.00% 75.00% - 25.00% - - 75.00% - - - 100.00%
Pre 4 10:35:02 - 10:50:00 28 TRUE - - - - - - - - - - - -
FALSE 28 - 35.71% 64.29% - - - 100.00% - - - 100.00%
4 10:50:01 - 10:50:54 10 TRUE 8 100.00% - - - - - 100.00% - - 50.00% 50.00%
FALSE 2 - 100.00% - - - - 100.00% - - - 100.00%
Pre 5 10:50:55 - 11:26:14 12 TRUE - - - - - - - - - - - -
FALSE 12 - 66.67% 33.33% - 33.33% - 66.67% - - 33.33% 66.67%
5 11:26:15 - 11:34.21 579 TRUE 572 - 100.00% - - - - 100.00% - - - 100.00%
FALSE 7 - 42.86% 57.14% 42.86% - - 57.14% - - 100.00% -
Post 5 11:34:22 - 12:35:48 42 TRUE - - - - - - - - - - - -
FALSE 42 - 19.05% 80.95% - - - 100.00% - - - 100.00%
Total 09:21:36 - 12:35:48 1068 TRUE 904 0.88% 86.73% 12.39% 11.50% 7.97% - 80.53% - 7.52% 13.05% 79.43%
FALSE 164 0.61% 32.32% 67.07% 2.44% 2.44% - 95.12% - - 7.32% 92.68%
Snort Priority Response Strategy ModelCVSS v2
 
 
In general, a total of 904 incidents or 84.64% of incidents are considered as true incidents and this 
includes critical incidents as well as non-critical incidents. Only 15.36% or 164 incidents are 
considered as false incidents. As can be seen in the table, there is a clear distribution between true and 
false incidents. With the proposed framework and RSM, an average of 92.68% of the false incidents 
was prioritised as the lowest quadrant in the acceptance strategy column. This percentage is better 
compared to only 67.07% of the false incidents being prioritised under low priority with Snort 
Priority.  
 
There is a huge percentage or 79.43% of true incidents identified under the acceptance quadrant and 
this figure can be considered as misclassification, as in the ideal situation a true incident should be 




classified under the first or second quadrant. However, this percentage clearly shows that those true 
incidents are not really critical; therefore it is acceptable to be considered under that quadrant. The 
results are also consistent with the DARPA dataset where most of the true incidents were identified as 
failed incidents, especially in the last main phase.  
 
Furthermore, the distribution of true incidents using RSM is better compared to Snort Priority and 
CVSS v2. To look at them closer, in the 3
rd
 phase, the true incidents were prioritised into three 
different groups using RSM compared to only one group with Snort Priority. In this case, the 
distribution allows any automated response systems to initiate multiple actions on incidents. This 
means incidents will have different types of response depending on their criticality and priority. 
 
To summarise the result in Table 30, Figure 18 plots the distribution of incidents. The first quadrant 
was mapped with the avoidance column and high priority in Snort Priority and CVSS v2, followed by 
the second quadrant with the mitigation column as well as medium priority in Snort Priority and 
CVSS v2. Similarly, the third quadrant was mapped with the transfer column and the lowest priority 
for Snort Priority and CVSS v2. Finally, the last quadrant maps incidents without any CVSS v2’s 
score and the acceptance column. As can be seen in the graph, a better distribution for the high 
priority incidents in the first quadrant was produced by RSM. Snort Priority distributed 0.88% for true 
incidents and 0.61% for false incidents, as opposed to zero percentage with RSM. In this particular 




Figure 18. Graph for the incident distribution with the DARPA dataset 
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Response
Strategy Model
True Incidents False Incidents
1st Quadrant 0.88% 0.00% 0.00% 0.61% 2.44% 0.00%
2nd Quadrant 86.73% 11.50% 7.52% 32.32% 2.44% 0.00%
3rd Quadrant 12.39% 7.97% 13.05% 67.07% 0.00% 7.32%
























To further the discussion, Table 31 and Figure 19 tabulate the distribution of incidents using the 
private dataset. To recall, 98.20% of the incidents (i.e. 45,360) detected are asserted as false positives, 
while 1.80% of the total incidents (i.e. 833) are affirmed to be irrelevant positives
3
. With Snort 
Priority, 46,193 incidents were categorised into three priorities with 7.39% of them being grouped 
under the high priority, 74.50% under the medium priority and the balance were under the low 
priority. With CVSS v2, only 7.55% of incidents were able to be categorised under high, medium or 
low priority. A huge percentage, some 92.45% of incidents, cannot be categorised under any priority. 
The distribution of false incidents with Snort Priority shows an interesting figure. For instance, the 
majority of false incidents with 74.44% were categorised under the medium priority and the majority 
of true incidents with 1.75% were categorised under the low priority. The distribution of false 
incidents with CVSS v2 shows different figures in comparison to Snort Priority. With a low 
percentage of incidents with category (i.e. 7.55% as opposed to 92.45% without any category), 7.52% 
were prioritised as false incidents and under the medium priority and only about 0.01% of incidents 
were identified as under the high priority. 
Table 31. With the Plymouth datasets 
Type
High Medium Low High Medium Low None Avoidance Mitigation Transfer Acceptance
FALSE 7.39% 74.44% 16.37% 0.01% 7.52% 0.00% 90.66% 0.00% 7.52% 90.68% 0.00%
TRUE 0.00% 0.06% 1.75% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 1.79% 0.00% 0.01% 1.80% 0.00%
Total 7.39% 74.50% 18.12% 0.02% 7.53% 0.00% 92.45% 0.00% 7.53% 92.47% 0.00%
Snort Priority CVSS v2 Response Strategy Model
 
Figure 19. Graph for the incidents distribution with the Plymouth dataset 
 
With the Response Strategy Model, incidents were distributed into four quadrants. The highest 
priority is the avoidance quadrant, followed by the mitigation quadrant. The transfer quadrant is a low 
priority and the acceptance quadrant is considered as a very low priority, which is suitable for not 
                                                     
3
 There is a small round-off error when the percentages are rounded to 2 decimal places. This is also can be seen 
in Figure 19. For example, the correct value for 0.01% in the CVSS v2 distribution is 0.006%. 
Snort Priority CVSS v2
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Snort Priority CVSS v2
Response
Strategy Model
True Incidents (1.80%) False Incidents (98.20%)
1st Quadrant 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 7.39% 0.01% 0.00%
2nd Quadrant 0.06% 0.01% 0.01% 74.44% 7.52% 7.52%
3rd Quadrant 1.75% 0.00% 1.80% 16.37% 0.00% 90.68%











































critical and not urgent incidents. The graph plots no incident under the avoidance quadrant with RSM. 
This means that there is no incident that needs an urgent and important response. However, the 
majority of incidents, with 92.47%, were categorised under the transfer quadrant and indicated that 
the majority of them were not critical. This percentage is significant because the majority of them 
(45,360 or 98.20%) are considered as false incidents in the dataset description. In analysing the 
98.20%, 90.68% of incidents (i.e. 41,886) were categorised under the transfer quadrant and only 
7.52% (i.e. 3,474) were categorised under the mitigation quadrant. Furthermore, there was no incident 
under the high priority incidents or the first quadrant, as opposed to 7.39% with Snort Priority and 
0.01% with CVSS v2. This result is significant because it shows that the distribution of false incidents 
in RSM is better in comparison to the other two. Moreover, the majority of the false incidents in 
RSM, or 90.68%, were categorised under the third quadrant as opposed to only 16.37% with Snort 
Priority. In addition, there was zero percentage with CVSS v2 due to the limitation of its scoring 
system, and there was a huge percentage of false incidents (90.66%) which were unable to be 
prioritised. 
 
Although the distribution is significant, the model is unable to categorise the false incidents under the 
lowest quadrant. In an ideal situation, false incidents should be categorised under the lowest priority. 
However, with a huge percentage, or 90.68%, of incidents under the transfer quadrant, it satisfies the 
earlier prediction that false incidents are likely to be prioritised as low priority incidents. 
 
In analysing true incidents, 1.80% of incidents (i.e. 830) were categorised under the third quadrant 
and only less than 0.01% of incidents (i.e. 3) were categorised under the second quadrant. In an ideal 
state of affairs, the true incidents are more likely to be categorised under the avoidance or mitigation 
quadrants. However, the case study is unable to categorise them in the avoidance quadrant, and only a 
small percentage of them are under the mitigation quadrants. In comparison, the results are almost the 
same as those of Snort Priority and CVSS v2. The majority of the true incidents in Snort Priority, or 
1.75%, were categorised in the third quadrant and 0.06% the second quadrant. With the limitation in 
the CVSS v2 scoring system, only 0.01% were able to be prioritised correctly in the first and second 
quadrant, leaving the majority of them (1.79%) in the last quadrant. 
 
Although the distribution of true incidents is less significant because the case study is unable to 
categorise them in the avoidance quadrant, the percentages of the distribution are consistent with 
Snort Priority and CVSS v2. This consistency gives a good indicator to show that the true incidents 
are not really critical and, therefore, they should not be in the first and second quadrants. If this 
indicator can be considered as a good assumption, therefore, the distribution of true incidents using 
RSM is significant. To discuss this in detail, an additional comparison study was conducted and is 
discussed in the next section. 




In addition to the case study, the third goal in the experiment description aims to investigate the effect 
of using different weights in the decision factors. To analyse the results, Table 32 shows the 
distribution of incidents using the Plymouth dataset. The table summarises the percentage of the 
incident distribution. As mentioned in the description of the experiment, there were five scenarios in 
this case study and the first column on the left lists all of them, followed by two different classes of 
incidents: true and false incidents. The other columns summarise the percentage of incidents with 
regards to specific rows. Either they are true or false incidents with the Response Strategy Model. 
Similar to the representation of the previous result, they are distributed into 4 quadrants: avoidance, 
mitigation, transfer and acceptance.  
Table 32. The incident distribution for Response Strategy Model using the Plymouth dataset 
Scenario Type Avoidance Mitigation Transfer Acceptance
1 FALSE 0.00% 7.52% 90.68% 0.00%
TRUE 0.00% 0.01% 1.80% 0.00%
Total 0.00% 7.53% 92.47% 0.00%
2 FALSE 0.00% 7.52% 58.42% 32.26%
TRUE 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 1.80%
Total 0.00% 7.53% 58.42% 34.06%
3 FALSE 0.00% 7.52% 59.58% 31.09%
TRUE 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 1.80%
Total 0.00% 7.53% 59.58% 32.89%
4 FALSE 0.00% 7.52% 88.75% 1.93%
TRUE 0.00% 0.01% 1.80% 0.00%
Total 0.00% 7.53% 90.54% 1.93%
5 FALSE 0.00% 7.46% 90.74% 0.00%
TRUE 0.00% 0.01% 1.80% 0.00%




In general, the use of different weights results in a huge difference in the incident distribution. In 
terms of the distribution of the false incidents, the results in Scenario 2 and 3 are better compared to 
the original weight as shown in Scenario 1. As can be seen, huge percentages of the false incidents 
were moved from the transfer quadrant to the acceptance quadrant. This movement is significant 
because in an ideal situation false incidents are likely to be categorised under the last quadrant or the 
lowest priority. In this particular result, based on the weights used in the study, the smaller the weight 
for the consequence of event (e.g. asset) decision factor, the better the results for the distribution 
which can be produced. This is significant because the Plymouth dataset contains only one asset: the 
web server.  
 
Although the result was influenced by the number of asset in the dataset, a similar scene also affects 
the distribution of the true incidents. In conclusion, it can be seen that the configurations in Scenarios 




2 and 3 are the best configurations for a network environment with only one asset. This is important 
because the percentage of the consequence of event (e.g. asset) decision factor has no significant 
effect upon one asset. 
 
It is important to note that the proposed framework and RSM might not work in all contexts as they 
can be changed in a different scenario; a different dataset might produce a different set of results. 
However, the case studies shown in this study have their own strength in showing that it is possible to 
categorise and identify false incidents or true incidents using the priority of the incident itself. 
  





The results presented in the previous section are encouraging, as the Risk Index Model works well 
with the Response Strategy Model by mapping all incidents into their appropriate quadrants. The 
framework has also shown a significant result in mapping between the quantitative indexes with the 
qualitative group of priorities. Although this study does not have a correct reference result of the 
critical incidents, the comparisons made in the case study have shown a substantial value in balancing 
the distribution of incidents when it compared to available industry standards (e.g. CVSS and Snort 
Priority). The different levels in RSM give an advantage to security analysts or automated security 
appliances to act fast to respond to only true and critical incidents. As an implication of this, it allows 
easy management where each quadrant has its own type of response. Besides, this implication also 
demonstrates the suitability of the framework to be used in facilitating the autonomous mode in the 
response selection process. Furthermore, its suitability is strengthened by the significant relationship 
between the priority and classification of incidents. 
 
Similar to other studies, the results in this stage are unable to make a 100% correct classification. 
Therefore, in order to discuss them further, the case studies were compared with recent studies: 
Alserhani et al. (2010), Ning et al. (2004) and Tjhai et al. (2010). The selection of these studies is 
because they used a similar dataset, either the DARPA or Plymouth dataset. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, not much study has been done to compare incident prioritisation studies 
and incident classification. Therefore, this evaluation study takes the initiative of reducing the gap by 
comparing the results with a correlation study. One of the objectives in the correlation study is to 
identify false and true incidents, which are also similar to the results in this stage.  
 
There is a significant relationship between the incident priorities and their classification using the 
DARPA dataset. In particular, with RSM, 92.68% of false incidents were categorised as under the 
lowest category and only 7.32% of false incidents were categorised as the third quadrant; both 
categories are considered as below the medium priority. In order to compare the result, this study 
made a comparison between two correlation studies: Alserhani et al. (2010) and Ning et al. (2004). 
 
Ning et al. (2004) showed an interesting figure where their method manages to remove unnecessary 
false alarms in the DARPA dataset. With 60% of detection rates they identified 93.18% of them as 
true incidents and only 6.82% as false incidents. In comparing with the result in this stage, if RSM 
removes 92.68% of the incidents under the lowest quadrant, only 7.32% are considered as significant 
figures for false incidents. Both results are similar in terms of their percentage (i.e. 6.82% and 7.32%), 
although Ning et al. (2004) used a small number of incidents after they had been correlated. In 




addition, Ning et al. (2004) were unable to detect the whole related incident and, in particular, their 
detection rate was only 60%. Their model also depends on the quality of modelling (i.e. prerequisites 
and consequences) and they agreed that the process would be very difficult to perform if the attack 
modelling was weak and inconsistent. Furthermore, they deployed and tested their system in an 
offline mode, as opposed to online assessments in the proposed framework; hence it gives advantages 
to the proposed framework. 
 
Due to the low detection rate in Ning et al. (2004), the result was compared with the more recent 
study of Alserhani et al. (2010). Their study improved the detection rate as well as the false incidents 
detection. From the study, 8.1% of the correlated alerts were identified as false incidents. This result 
is also similar to the false incidents in the framework. Only 7.32% of incidents were categorised under 
the third quadrants.   
 
Furthermore, there is an irrelevant positive incident in the DARPA dataset. Irrelevant positives refer 
to incidents from unsuccessful attempts or unrelated vulnerabilities. According to the dataset 
description, the DDoS attacks in the last phase of the dataset are failed attacks, thus they can be 
considered as irrelevant positives. There is no discussion about this kind of incident in Alserhani et al. 
(2010) and Ning et al. (2004). To highlight a significant result, the case studies have prioritised them 
as lowest priority incidents and categorised them under the last quadrants.  
 
Similar with the DARPA dataset, the results in the private dataset have shown a significant 
relationship between low priority incidents and false incidents. As highlighted earlier, the distribution 
of incidents in RSM is better compared to Snort Priority and CVSS v2. With RSM, 90.68% of 
incidents were categorised as under the third quadrant and 7.53% of incidents were categorised as 
under the second quadrant. The results were compared with Tjhai et al. (2010). In the study by Tjhai 
et al. (2010), with two stages alarm correlation and filtering system using SOM neutral network and 
K-mean algorithm, they correctly identified 87% of the false incidents. The study used two stages of 
correlation, with 78.8% of false incidents being identified in the first stage and 96% of them being 
identified in the second stage. The result in RSM was considered as a reasonable result and distributed 
90.68% of incidents into the third quadrant, as opposed to only 78.80% identified in the first stage in 
the Tjhai et al. (2010) study. However, the second stage in Tjhai et al. (2010) has shown an 
improvement, 96% as opposed to only 90.68% with the framework. Although the second stage in 
Tjhai et al. (2010) indicated a better result, they correlated the incidents using an offline mode, giving 
an extra advantage to the proposed framework because the operation mode is online. 
  





The third stage of the evaluation study highlights some interesting findings as follows:  
 
(a) Formal model to map between quadrants and response options. The establishment of RSM in the 
proposed framework has shown a significant result in terms of distributing incidents into different 
levels of priorities. The urgent and important incidents are mapped into the highest quadrant, as 
opposed to the non-urgent incidents which are mapped into the lowest quadrant. The dynamic 
formulation in the rating process allows incidents to be mapped dynamically in the ranking 
process. The case studies have shown a significant result in distributing incidents into appropriate 
quadrants. 
 
(b) Significant relationship between incident priorities and their classification. The case studies in 
this stage have shown a significant relationship in addressing false and true incidents. There is a 
relationship between false incidents and their priority. Furthermore, the results in this stage were 
predicted to be similar because the proposed framework adopts the similarity and frequency 
indicators, and these indicators use a similar formulation with the correlation study in calculating 
the similarity between incidents and the frequency of them. 
 
(c) Balance between qualitative and quantitative results. We must be aware of the limitations of the 
results representation discussed in Chapter 3, where the quantitative values used to represent the 
incident risk indexes are difficult to understand. Thus, RSM provides a seamless way to express 
the different qualitative level for the incident priorities. Although the numerical values offer 
advantages in the ranking process, the qualitative representation is important too. In order to give 
a similar interpretation of incidents, RSM gives a balance by grouping them into four quadrants 
qualitatively based upon their risk indexes. 
 
(d) Effect of the different weights in the decision factors. Similar to the evaluation study in the first 
stage, the use of different weights in the decision factors also produces different results. 
 
In conclusion, with the highlighted findings above, it can be seen that the proposed framework is 
suitable for use in facilitating the autonomous mode in the response selection process. 
 
Although this stage has contributed a significant result in distributing incidents, there is a limitation. 
The main limitation in the case study is the use of a fixed threshold to map incidents. This threshold is 
not a definitive value and is subject to other reassessments, thus different scales will produce a 
different distribution. The discussion about the threshold limitation has been discussed in Section 




4.2.4. To recall, there is no specific guideline to determine the best threshold between critical or non-
critical incidents. However, the distribution of incidents in the case studies has shown acceptable 
results and the comparison results with CVSS v2 and Snort Priority strengthen the scale used in the 
thresholds. 
 
Furthermore, the threshold limitation is also highlighted in Mu and Li (2010) and Stakhanova et al. 
(2007a). For instance, the adaptive response strategy used by Stakhanova et al. (2007a) defined a 
“probability threshold” that indicates an acceptable level of confidence in triggering appropriate 
responses to counter incidents in progress. Similar to this study, the threshold in Mu and Li (2010) 
and Stakhanova et al. (2007a) is defined manually. Stakhanova et al. (2007a) adopted the “probability 
threshold” to set a tolerance in selecting possible responses; the increment of the probability threshold 
decreased the error of selection.  
  




5.5 The Performance Evaluation 
The previous stages evaluated the feasibility of the proposed framework and investigated its models in 
order to validate them. In addition, the previous stages investigated the effect of using different 
strategies in the ranking and rating process as well as the distribution of the incidents and their 
classification with the RSM. The progressive results from one stage to another in the previous studies 
have shown the feasibility of the framework and strengthened its suitability.  
 
The evaluation stage is continued with the fourth stage and this stage aims to investigate the 
performance of the framework. One of the criteria to enable the autonomous mode is to consider a fast 
processing time in order to support real time response. This is also important to the proposed 
framework, as a good processing time increases the reliability of the model in prioritising incidents. In 
order to facilitate the autonomous mode, this stage aims to measure the processing time in the rating 
and ranking process using real time simulation. 
 
By measuring the rating and raking process, this study is able to investigate the feasibility of the 
proposed framework to run in a live traffic network and perform an online assessment. Therefore, it is 
important to measure how long it takes to rate and rank the incidents. To satisfy the autonomous mode 
in the response selection process, the rating and ranking process should be able to rate and rank 
incidents within a reasonable and considerable processing time. With this performance study, it helps 
security analysts to configure the proposed framework to perform better in assessing a live traffic 
network, besides supporting an online assessment. 
5.5.1 Experiment and Procedure Description 
In order to investigate the performance, this stage simulates 12 simulations. Using a personal 
computer, the simulation was simulated on Intel
®
 Core™ 2 Duo Processor E6320 (4M Cache, 1.86 
GHz, 1066 MHz FSB) and 2GB memory. All the running programs, such as the MySQL database, 
Snort and other applications, run in a similar peripheral. 
 
To maintain the consistency of the results, the simulations were conducted using the DARPA dataset 
but with some additional configuration. The following descriptions are the additional configurations 
made from the simulation.  
 
(a) There are two main experiments, one with the DDoS attacks and one without the attack. The main 
reason for having two types of experiment is to investigate the performance of the framework in 
relation to the effect of the number of incidents, as the DDoS attack in the dataset produces a 
burst of incidents per second, in fact more than 500 incidents per second. Since the DARPA 




dataset contains the DDoS attacks in the last phase of the dataset, it is suitable for showing the 
different results. The simulation with the DARPA dataset with the DDoS attacks contains 1,074 
incidents per cycle and the other one has only 502 incidents per cycle. Table 33 tabulates the 
configuration of the simulation set where SET A-F refer to set without the DDoS attacks and SET 
G-L with the DDoS attacks.  
 
(b) In order to simulate more incidents, the DARPA dataset is repeated several times. For example, in 
order to simulate 1,506 incidents, the dataset with 502 incidents is simulated 3 times. Table 33 
tabulates the configuration of the simulation. 
 
(c) In order to show the different effect, each set of the simulations contains a different time 
configuration, as it can be controlled using a simulation tool, namely Tcpreplay. A higher speed 
of the tool decreases the simulation time and increases the number of incidents per minute. The 
main reason for having a different time configuration on the simulation is to investigate the 
performance of the model and to analyse the result relationship between the number of incidents 
and time. For example, between SET A and SET C, although the total of incidents are similar, 
they were simulated in two different timeframes, SET A with 2052 seconds while SET C was 
with 1022 seconds. 
 
(d) In order to maintain the consistency with the previous stage, the simulation also contains five 
scenarios of configurations similar to the third stage, thus each incident will have 5 different risk 
indexes based on the different set of scenarios in the configuration. 
Table 33. The configuration of the performance simulation 
Set Speed No. of incidents Simulation Time (s)
Without DDoS A 100 1506 2052
B 100 3012 4132
C 1000 1506 1022
D 1000 3012 2131
E 10000 1506 644
F 10000 3012 1465
With DDoS G 100 1074 689
H 100 2148 1368
I 1000 1074 379
J 1000 2148 797
K 10000 1074 219
L 1000 2148 447   
 
The other configurations which are not mentioned in the descriptions are adapted from the previous 
stages.   





Table 34 shows the results of the simulations. There were 12 different simulations, each of them 
configured according to the experimental descriptions and procedures. Table 34 shows a summary of 
the experiment tabulated into two main tables, which are also similar to the configuration table. The 
first column on the left of the table refers to the type of dataset and whether it contains the DDoS 
attacks, followed by the label of the name of the set, speed of the simulation tool (i.e. packet replay 
tool), number of incidents, incidents per minute, the duration of the simulation and average time to 
rate incidents (i.e. processing time). 
Table 34. The average processing time for the rating process 
Set Speed No. of incidents Incidents/minute Simulation Time (s) Average (s)
Without DDoS A 100 1506 44 2052 18.26
B 3012 44 4132 72.66
C 1000 1506 88 1022 33.48
D 3012 85 2131 141.04
E 10000 1506 140 644 42.30
F 3012 123 1465 242.46
With DDoS G 100 1074 94 689 61.95
H 2148 94 1368 136.34
I 1000 1074 170 379 71.44
J 2148 162 797 209.91
K 10000 1074 294 219 70.59
L 2148 288 447 281.34
115.15  
 
In order to measure the performance of the proposed framework in the rating process, the average 
processing time was calculated. On average, the processing time to calculate the incident risk index 
was 115.15 seconds or less than 2 minutes per incident. However, the average processing time is not 
significant because there is a huge difference between the lowest and the highest processing time. The 
lowest average is 18.26 seconds and the highest is 281.34 seconds. Furthermore, the average 
processing time is influenced by the number of incidents. In order to investigate the effect of having a 
different number of incidents in the simulation, the next section discusses the performance results 
based upon the speed of simulation and type of dataset. 
 
In general, the speed of simulation has a significant effect upon the performance of the rating and 
ranking process. As can be seen in Table 34, the effect was very noticeable, where the higher the 
speed of the Tcpreplay tool, the higher the average of the processing time. In particular, the higher 
speed increased the number of incidents per minute. For example, SET A and SET C have a similar 
number of incidents, but the duration of the simulation was different. The duration for SET C is twice 
that of SET A, 2052 seconds as compared to 1022 seconds for SET C. SET C has 88 incidents per 




minute in comparison with 44 incidents for SET A. As a consequence, as can be seen in Table 34, the 
average processing time for SET C was increased 83.35% in comparison to SET A. This trend is 
consistent with other simulations and is a clear indicator of where the processing time is influenced by 
the number of incidents. The higher the number of incidents detected per minute, the higher the 
average time taken to rate incidents. 
 
A similar trend can also be seen when the simulation simulated a burst of incidents with the DDoS 
attack in the second dataset. For example, in comparing SET E and SET K, both of which simulations 
run using a similar speed, they were different in terms of the average time. The average processing 
time to rate incidents in SET K is 70.59 seconds, in comparison with only 42.30 seconds for SET E. 
This scenario shows that a burst of incidents has also affected the processing time.  
 
Furthermore, there are other factors to consider. Although the number of incidents detected per 
minute is similar, it can be seen in Table 34 that the average processing time for the scenarios was 
different. A higher number of the total of incidents in a simulation increases the processing time. For 
example, this trend can be seen in comparison between SET A and SET B as well as SET G and SET 
I. The average time is higher because there was an overhead to calculate the similarity indicators, as 
can be seen in SET B and SET I. The similarity indicator calculates the similarity of incidents, and in 
order to satisfy the calculation, it needs to consider the previous incidents. The overhead upon the 
similarity indicators is increased due to a bigger number of the total of incidents. In particular, the 
processing time for SET B is increased as double SET A. The similar trend can also be seen in SET G 
and SET I. 
 
In order to show the similar trend, Figure 20 combines all the simulations in one graph. Without the 
simulation time, it shows a processing time graph for each incident. The graph plots the duration 
taken to rate incidents and is taken from the difference between the detection time and when the 
processing time ends. 
 
In the first 500 incidents, most of the incidents were rated with less than a second. This result is 
interesting because the incidents can be rated and ranked immediately after they are detected. 
However, the case was different after that; the performance of the rating process was decreased. As 
can be seen in Figure 20, it appears that most of the graphs were increased when they reached a 
higher number of incidents. This trend is consistent with the results presented earlier, where the 
processing time increases in parallel with the nnuber of incidents. 
 
In order to show the difference between the graphs, the comparison is made between two groups of 
simulation, one with the DDoS attacks and other one without attacks. For the simulation with the 




DDoS attacks, the first group is differentiated between SET H, SET J and SET L. On the other hand, 
the second group compares SET B, SET D and SET F. 
 
 
Figure 20. Incidents vs. Time (s) 
 
All the simulations in the first group contain the DDoS attacks and therefore simulated more incidents 
per minute. The trend of the results can be seen clearly in the graph when the average time for SET L 
was higher compared to SET J and SET H. The highest peak for the processing time is 1000 seconds 
in SET L, in comparison to 800 seconds in SET J and 600 seconds in SET H. A similar trend can also 
be seen with the second group, in SET B, SET D and SET F. The trend of the results is similar to the 
previous scenario, but they give a better result in terms of their processing time. 
 
In conclusion, the performance of the rating process is influenced by the two factors: the number of 
incidents detected per minute and the total number of previous incidents. The first factor cannot be 
controlled since the number of incidents detected per minute is unpredictable, but the second one is 
slightly different where it can be reduced by limiting the number in the indicator calculation. The 
similarity and frequency indicators consider all the previous incidents in their calculation. The second 
factor has been considered in the proposed framework and the investigation into it has been evaluated 
in the second stage. 
 
In order to extend the discussion on the effect of the rating process, the following results show the 
measurement taken of the ranking process. Table 35 tabulates the results of the simulations. Similar to 
the rating process, there were 12 different simulations and these were tabulated into two main tables, 
each of them configured similarly to the previous descriptions. The first column on the left of the 
table refers to the type of dataset and whether it contains the DDoS attacks, followed by the label of 
the name of set, the speed of the tool, the number of incidents, the incidents per minute, the duration 
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Table 35. The measurement of the ranking process 
Set Speed No. of incidents Incidents/minute Simulation Time (s) Average
Without DDoS A 100 1506 44 2052 13
B 3012 44 4132 51
C 1000 1506 88 1022 49
D 3012 85 2131 145
E 10000 1506 140 644 76
F 3012 123 1465 275
With DDoS G 100 1074 94 689 82
H 2148 94 1368 154
I 1000 1074 170 379 151
J 2148 162 797 288
K 10000 1074 294 219 114




Similar to the performance factor in the rating process, the ranking process also has the same effect. 
An overhead caused by the number of incidents detected and also the previous incidents in the rating 
process influences the performance of the ranking process. As can be seen in Table 35, the effect of 
having a different number of incidents in the simulation is clearly shown. Furthermore, the result 
tabulated is also identical with the performance results in the previous analysis in the rating process. 
 
In order to investigate the performance result in the ranking process, Figure 21 shows two different 
sets of graphs, SET C and SET E. The graphs were plotted using two values, the blue bar is the 
number of incidents detected within a minute and the red line is the number of incidents with priority 
and rank. SET C was simulated for 1022 seconds and with an average of 88 incidents per minute and 
it ranked an average 49 incidents per minute. The first graph in Figure 21 shows the ranking 
performance for SET C. It shows the total number of detected incidents per minute and the total 
number with priority. The first 6 bars show a better performance compared to the other bars, as all the 
first 500 incidents in that particular moment were ranked in real time as when they were detected. 
Immediately after that, the situation was changed where the performance of the ranking process was 
decreased and caused a bit of a delay. A similar trend can be seen in the second graph in the figure. 
 
 





Figure 21. SET C and SET E 
Although the graphs show a bit of a delay in the incidents with priority, the delay is not significant 
because on average each of incidents will be ranked less than a minute. 
 
Figure 22. SET H and SET J 
 
A similar trend can also be seen in Figure 22, where the first 500 incidents were ranked immediately 
they were detected. This is similar to the performance results in the rating process, where all the first 
500 incidents were rated in real time. The performance was decreased after that, due to the 
performance of the processing time in the rating process. A burst of incidents in this scenario can 





















































































































































































































































































5.5.3 Discussion  
The results presented in the previous section are encouraging as the performance of the rating and 
ranking process can be achieved in less than a second. It appears from this evidence that the higher 
number of incidents affects the performance of the processing time in the rating and ranking process.   
 
In particular, the performance is influenced by two main factors, firstly by the total number of 
incidents detected per second where a burst of incidents increases the processing time and secondly, 
the total number of previous incidents involved in the similarity indicator calculation. A higher 
number of both factors cause an extra overhead and slowing down of the processing time in the rating 
and ranking process. As an implication from this, the framework should consider the limitation as one 
of the factors in order to facilitate the autonomous mode in the response selection process.  
 
The first factor is hard to control; it depends upon the effectiveness of an IDS sensor and other 
security appliances, such as firewalls and access controls.  
Table 36. Average Time (s) 
Set Speed No. of incidents Incidents/minute Simulation Time (s) Average (s)
Without DDoS Without Limitation 10 3012 18 10283 38.20
With 1 hour Limitaion 10 3012 18 10122 15.12
 
 
Figure 23. The performance comparison 
 
The second factor, however, has been considered in the design of the framework. Table 36 and Figure 
23 show the improvement made to the processing time in the rating and ranking process. The graph 
shows two simulations, one with the implementation of the rating and ranking strategy in the incident 
prioritisation process. For instance, unlike the previous simulations, the total number of the previous 
incidents to be considered in the similarity and frequency indicator was limited to one hour. As a 
consequence, the total number of incidents was decreased and this helped to improve the processing 
time. The consideration also helps to improve the overall performance. This can be seen clearly in 
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rating strategy, although they were simulated using a similar speed of tools, number of incidents per 
minute and total number of incidents. It appears that the result is significant and it is also improved 
the processing time of the ranking process.  
 
Furthermore, in order to compare the performance results with other studies, they are compared with 
those of Cohen (1999) and Alsubhi et al. (2011). To illustrate the importance of timely response, 
Cohen (1999) highlights that the longer the delay between detection and response, the higher the 
attack success rate is. In a recent publication, Alsubhi et al. (2011) investigated a complexity analysis 
in the FuzMet system and as a result they found a light overhead in the prioritisation process. 
 
In Cohen (1999), the success of attacks is influenced by the delay between the time of detection and 
its response. For example, if skilled attackers are given 10 hours after they are detected before a 
response, the success rate is 80%. If an extra 10 hours are given to them, the success rate is increased 
to 95% and beyond 30 hours, the attacker never fails. In comparison with the results of this study, the 
worst processing time taken to rate and rank incidents is less than an hour, which is considered a 
reasonable result in comparison to Cohen’s study. In this particular case, the performance in the 
processing time is considered appropriate and reasonable because no incident is rated and ranked 
more than 30 hours. A reasonable time to rate and rank incidents is important in order to limit the 
probability of the attacker being successful and reduce their opportunity to attack the system entirely. 
This result strongly suggests that the framework has shown an appropriate performance in terms of its 
processing time. With less than an hour, the result is considered a significant result in showing the 
ability of the proposed framework in facilitating the response selection process, in order to provide an 
effective active response to respond to incidents. 
 
Alsubhi et al. (2011) presented an alert processing time in calculating the alert relationship metric in 
the FuzMet system. In order to compare the processing time, since they performed the investigation 
using a small number of alerts, this study considers the performance of the rating process for the first 
500 incidents. With 300 incidents, the maximum peak for the processing time in their study is 160ms 
and they considered this a small overhead, although it might increase an overhead to the system. In 
order to limit the overhead, they have considered a similar consideration like this study by limiting the 
number of incidents in the process. In comparison, the performance results tabulated in the figures 
above are similar for the first 500 incidents. The performance in the proposed framework is working 
very well by rating and ranking all the first 500 incidents in less than a second and in real time. In 
conclusion, the performance result presented in this study and time taken to prioritise incidents is 
considered reasonable. This also satisfies the requirement of an online assessment.  
 




The comparison study shows that the framework has performed in a reasonable situation and, based 
upon the performance results, it is appropriate for use in facilitating the autonomous mode in the 
response selection process. However, this is not a full evaluation of the performance and the 









The fourth stage of the evaluation study investigated the performance of the proposed framework. The 
measurement of the performance investigated two parts of the processing time, in the rating and 
ranking process. In conclusion, the investigation was done by looking at two main aspects as follows: 
 
(a) The performance of the rating and ranking process. The performance of the proposed framework 
was measured using the processing time in the rating and ranking process. It appears that the 
performance results are significant with a reasonable processing time in the rating and ranking 
process. Furthermore, the processing time is influenced by two factors, mainly upon the number 
of incidents in the process. The higher the number that need to be processed, the slower the 
processing time. The two factors identified in the investigation are the total number of incidents 
detected per second and the total number of previous incidents involved in the calculation of the 
similarity indicator. In particular, a burst of incidents increases the processing time and having too 
many incidents to calculate the similarity indicators also induces the process. 
 
(b) In comparison with other performance studies. In comparison with the performance results of 
Cohen (1999) and Alsubhi et al. (2011), the performance of the proposed framework has shown a 
reasonable result in the rating and ranking process. In terms of the processing time, the rating 
process simulated on average 115.15 seconds and also satisfied the proposal made by Cohen 
(1999). In addition, the performance for the first 500 incidents is similar to the result presented in 
Alsubhi et al. (2011).  
 
In addition, the greatest advantage of the investigation in this study is to analyse the overall 
performance, with different configurations in the rating and ranking process, in order to evaluate the 
practicality of the proposed framework. Furthermore, with the main aspects above, the experiment 
also clearly demonstrated that the performance of the rating and ranking process is reasonable and can 
be seen as a significant result since it can be achieved in a short time, which benefits the response 
selection process. 
 
In conducting the experiment, this study has found some limitations and below is some of these along 
with suggestions on how to reduce them. 
 
(a) Computing Power. Although the results presented in this study were considered a reasonable 
result, they were also influenced by the computing power, where the experiment was conducted 
using a personal computer and run other non-related applications as well during the simulation. 
This limitation affected the measurement of the results and, as a consequence, it decreased the 




processing time. Therefore, in order to reduce the limitation and increase the real time processing, 
it is suggested to consider other factors such as hardware, algorithms, codes optimisation, 
processor utilisation and also communication between systems (Stankovic, 1988). 
 
(b) Responses. The performance results highlighted a reasonable processing time in terms of the 
rating and ranking process. However, the processing time presented in this evaluation study does 
not consider the real response time because the simulation does not include any security 
appliances, such as firewalls and access control to respond to the incidents. An important question 
for future studies is to determine the best response time by including the practicality of those 
security appliances, in order to respond to the incidents. 
  





This chapter has discussed the evaluation study of the models, strategies and indicators used in the 
proposed framework. The progressive results from the first stage to the last stage have demonstrated a 
combination of different aspects of evaluation, and they highlighted their unique findings and 
conclusions. 
 
The key objective of describing the evaluation at different stages of studies is to investigate the unique 
objectives at each stage. The result presented has shown strong evidence to support the ability of the 
proposed framework to work robustly based upon its operational characteristics. Furthermore, the 
comparison study in the evaluation studies also strengthens the framework and its suitability to 
facilitate the autonomous mode in the response selection process in IRSs. In conclusion, the analysis 
made of the studies clearly defined their contribution as well as stating their limitations. 
 
To further investigate the usefulness and feasibility of the proposed framework in a practical mode, a 
live traffic network and online assessment, the following chapter presents the prototype of the 






6 A Prototype implementation of Security Incident Prioritisation 
Modules 
After validating and evaluating the proposed framework, the next stage of the research is to design 
and implement a prototype system that can demonstrate its key operations and show how these can be 
implemented in practice. This chapter describes the prototype implementation of the proposed 
framework, and specifically the administration and prioritisation modules. The main features of the 
administration module have been embodied in a web interface, which can be used to monitor, 
configure, and analyse the prioritisation modules. Several modelling languages, including use case 
diagrams and state diagrams, are used to provide a visual illustration of the prototype. Finally, the 
incident scenarios that are used in this chapter are based on the DARPA dataset.  
6.1 Implementation Overview 
There are three main parts in the proposed framework as illustrated in Figure 24. The two main parts, 
the prioritisation and administration modules, have been fully implemented, whereas the external 
systems have been adopted from other sources. The rationale behind adopting existing IDS sensors 
and response agents, rather than implementing them from scratch is twofold; firstly implementing 
these modules would have been out of the scope of the proposed research, and secondly supporting 
input from existing IDS sensors serves to provide a more realistic environment and strengthen 
compatibility with existing solutions. Snort, a popular, well documented, and open source IDS tool, 
was chosen as the IDS sensor in the prototype (Caswell and Roesch, 1998). As for the modules that 
were fully implemented, their descriptions are as follows: 
 
(a) Prioritisation Systems. The three main modules of the prototype are: Rating Strategy, Ranking 
Strategy and Response Strategy. More details on the functionality of these modules can be found 
in Section 4.3. The modules run independently as application daemons and they are used to 
prioritise incidents. Similar with the experiment in the previous chapter, their development is 
based on PHP, a server-side HTML-embedded scripting language. All these modules connect to 
the same MySQL database, in order to retrieve and upload incident prioritisation and response 
data. MySQL was chosen to allow compatibility with Snort, which also supports logging to 
MySQL.  
 




(b) Administration. The Security Incident Prioritisation Modules provide a graphical user interface 
to help summarise, visualise prioritisation results, configure, analyse, and monitor the 
prioritisation systems. The design of the modules is inspired by the Snorby
4
 (2011) web 
application and has been developed using the latest web development technologies PHP5 version 
5.3.3, HTML5 and CSS3. The combination of these technologies allows the modules to have 
interactive and friendly interfaces. These modules also share the same database with Snort and the 
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Figure 24. Modules Implementation 
                                                     
4
 Snorby is an open source web application which provides monitoring interfaces for intrusion detection 
systems. Some of the graphical interfaces in the prototype were designed based on ideas taken from the Snorby 
interfaces.  
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6.2 Prototype Functionalities 
To gain insight into the main functionality of the proposed framework, modelling languages, such as 
use case diagrams and state diagrams, are presented. 
6.2.1 Use case diagram 
Use case modelling has been widely utilised to graphically portray a functional description of 
interaction between external entities and systems, as well as their collaborations. They are applied to 
capture the behaviours of the developed systems, without having to specify how those behaviours are 
implemented (Booch et al., 2005). Figure 25 shows the system level, and describes the interaction 
between external systems and the system itself. 
 
The role of administrator, as presented in Figure 25, is given below: 
 
(a) Administrators have the ability to run specific applications as daemons after they have properly 
configured the configuration files. The configuration files can be found in the second part of the 
proposed framework, Prioritisation Systems (see Section 4.3). The applications run until they are 
stopped manually by administrators. 
 
(b) Administrators have the ability to manage the web modules, which represent the third part of the 
proposed framework, Security Incident Prioritisation Modules (SIPM)
5
. This includes the ability 
to visualise incidents, analyse them and configure the web modules.  
 
(c) Apart from running applications in a daemon mode, administrators are also given privileges to 
stop and re-run them again manually. 
 
(d) Administrators also have an ability to reset databases and it allows them to restart the applications 
and web modules in different environments. 
                                                     
5
 For the remainder of this chapter, the terms “Security Incident Prioritisation Modules” and “web modules” 
will be interchangeable. 
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Figure 25. SIPM Use case diagram 
 
Although the use case diagram has provided a brief overview of the modules’ functionality, it does 
not clarify how those modules are performed. For this purpose, state diagrams are presented in the 
next sub-section.   
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6.2.2 State diagrams 
A state diagram describes all the possible states of an object as events occur, and is used to 
demonstrate the behaviour of an object through many use cases of a system, as well as to emphasise 
the flow of control from one state to another (Booch et al., 2005).  
 
(T4.2) Incident with CVSS







(T2) No incident detected
(T3) Incident detected
(T4) Incident updated
(T5) No incident 
detected
 
Figure 26. Super State 
 
Figure 26 shows all the possible states in the proposed framework and it summarises the behaviours 
of the running system. As a super-state, there are four main states and brief descriptions of them are 
given below: 
 
(a) Check Incident. The initial state (T1) starts when administrators run the application daemons and 
it remains in the same state as long as no incidents are detected (T2). The transition of the state 
occurs only when there is a detected incident (T3); when triggered, it goes to the Incident Update 
state.  
 




(b) Incident Update. This is a continuous state from Check Incident, where the state starts when there 
is an incident (T3), which an output comes from it; or otherwise it remains in the same state (T5). 
As illustrated in Figure 27, this state is built up from three main sub-states, which run in 
succession: Update Incident Detail, Update Similarity and Update Frequency. The outputs of this 
state will be used in the next states, Incident Value and CVSS Update, which run in parallel. The 
Update Incident Detail state updates the details of incident such as its source address, destination 
address, type of attack, time occurring and signature. The Update Similarity state calculates the 
similarity of each incident and updates it in the database. Similarly, the Update Frequency state 
updates the quantitative values which relate to signature similarity.  
Update Incident Detail Update Similarity Update Frequency
(T3.2) Incident Detail Updated (T3.3) Incident Similarity Updated
(T3.1) New Incident Detected
 
Figure 27. Incident Update State 
(c) Incident Value. This particular state starts when there is an updated incident as a result of a 
previous state (i.e. the Incident Update state) (T4.1). There are four sub-states in this particular 
state, as illustrated in Figure 28: Get Last Incident, Retrieve Incident Value, Update Incident 
Value and Update Scenario. The transition from one state to another is dependent upon the output 
from the state before them; for instance, the transition from the Get Last Incident state to the 
Retrieve Incident Value state depends upon the output of the Get Last Incident state. To detail out 
the related processes, the Get Last Incident state (T4.1.1) retrieves the last incident in the stored 
database and uses it as a key to retrieve other new incidents, as it helps to minimise time to update 
every single incident. As a result from the previous state, it triggers the Retrieve Incident Value 
state (T4.1.2), and, in this particular state, the indicator values for incidents are calculated and the 
calculation is based upon the configuration made earlier, which is why it is also called the 
calculation phase. Once the calculation phase has been done (T4.1.3), the state moves to the 
Update Incident Value state and updates (or stores) the indicator values for each incident involved 
in the calculation phase. Continuously, the state is repeated (T4.1.4) until there are no other 
incidents to update (T4.1.5). Once the incident value is updated, it moves to a new state, the 
Update Scenario state, to update the new risk index values based upon the scenario setting and 
indicator values. In cases where there are more than one scenario, the state is repeated (T4.1.6) 
until all the scenario values are calculated and, as results to this state, the risk index values are 
updated. 
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Get Last Incident Retrieve Incident Value Update Incident Value
(T4.1.1) Incident Update
(T4.1.2) Incident Update (T4.1.3) Incident Value
Update Scenario




Figure 28. Incident Value State 
 
(d) CVSS update. Similar to the Incident Value state, the transition to enter this stage is dependent 
upon the output from the previous state (T4.2); in cases where this is an incident with CVSS. This 
state runs simultaneously with the Incident Value state and it retrieves input for the CVSS v2 
value from NVD (NIST, 2011) and stores it appropriately onto a specific table in a database. 
On top of the super state, the Manage Web Modules state is an independent state and used for the 
administration modules. This state starts when there is an initial login from authorised administrators 
(T8.1) and it remains in the same state until they choose to logout from the web modules (T8.4). In 
this particular state, there is a sub-state where administrators are authorised to browse any web pages 
as they wish (T8.2) and return back to the main menu (T8.3) when they like. There are many web 
pages that can be selected at this particular stage, as described in the next sections.  
 
Figure 29. Manage Web Modules State 
  
Menu Selected Page
(T8.1) Admin Login (T8.4) Admin Logout
(8.2) Other Pages Clicked
(8.3) Menu Page




6.2.3 Web Modules 
The web modules provide a graphical user-friendly interface that allows administrators to view and 
configure the modules. The web modules provide a web analytics solutions that give rich insights into 
the incident prioritisation process and analysis simpleness. Simplicity, easy-to-use, customisable, 
flexible and optimisation of results features allow administrators to analyse the entire prioritisation 
process. The web modules provide various types of custom results and give a broader view of the 
current situation related to incidents and IDSs. Their functionality can be summarised into three key 
functions: 
 
(a) Incident Summarisation. This category provides the summarisation of the incident prioritisation 
results in the front page. As highlighted in the use case diagram in Section 6.2.1, examples of 
outputs that can be presented include: 
 
a. Incident Status. The current status provides a summative view of the incident risk index, by 
providing information such as the number of incidents in each risk index category.  
 
b. Priority Graphs. These show the distribution of risk indexes based upon their priority and the 
summarisation of results in graphs.  
 
c. Assets. The web modules show the available asset in the systems. It also highlights critical 
assets and summarise the most attacked assets. 
 
d. Incidents. As it is important information, the web modules show the current incidents and 
their priority. It also highlights top incidents based upon their type of signatures. 
 
(b) Analysis. This category examines results from the prioritisation process. The analysis processes 
are performed as follows: 
 
a. Event. The event page allows the user to view details of live events, based on criteria such as 
priority level. The information provided for each event includes: detection time, sensor ID, 
incident priority, source IP address, destination IP address and generated IDS rule. This page 
also allows “marking” of specific incidents for further analysis on the Live page (please see 
item b below). In addition, the user can access response options in this page, by following 
links to pages: show response, and insert response. The show response page allows 
administrators to show all the actions that have been taken in response to the selected 
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incident.  The insert response page allows the administrator to issue responses using a simple 
form. 
 
b. Live. This page presents the incidents that have been marked for further review in the Event 
page. It follows the same format as the Event page. 
 
c. Search. This page allows queries based on criteria such as source address, destination address, 
signature name, signature class. It follows the same format as the Event page, but it is not 
refreshed. 
 
d. Query. This page provides more in-depth queries based on scenarios, IP addresses, signatures, 
incidents and protocols.  The query results are displayed in a table, which typically contains 
the incidents priority as well as associated graphs.  
 
(c) Configuration. This interface enables the configuration of several parameters, such as the 
sensitivity of sensors, asset categories, indicator values and thresholds for different scenarios. An 
illustration of how these configuration parameters can be used is given in the next section. 
 
This section has provided the prototype functionalities. Furthermore, to facilitate the usage and 
visualisation of the web modules, print screens for the prototype can be viewed in the next section. 
  




6.3 Demonstrating the Security Incident Prioritisation Modules (SIPM) Prototype 
Having presented the main features of the proposed framework and its web modules, this section 
demonstrates some examples of how incidents can be prioritised, ranked and grouped according to 
their priorities. It also presents the details of the prioritisation results using the relevant features to 
show the incident priorities with two different dimensions: a group of the incident priorities and a list 
of the incident risk indexes with a quantitative value. The prioritised incidents, which are stored in a 
database, are detected in a real-time simulation using the DARPA datasets and Tcpreplay (2011) with 
Snort IDS.  The rationale for demonstrating only one dataset instead of two is that the prioritisation 
results using other scenarios will produce a similar visual upon the related pages.  
 
The prototype contains two separate modules: the application daemons (i.e. for the back end and run 
as a service) and web modules (i.e. for the front end). To demo the prototype, there are four sections 
and the details of their descriptions are as follows: 
6.3.1 The Application Daemons 
In order for the application daemons of the prototype to operate properly, Snort and Tcpreplay need to 
be running first: 
 
(a) Snort and its database. As illustrated in Figure 30, Snort IDS is executed to listen to a virtual 
network interface “\Device\NPF_{F78C9D26-4B9A-4E0B-9563-92C82FB28C8”. Label 1 in 
Figure 30 shows the details of its configuration and, as stated in the figure, the suspicious 
incidents detected will be stored in the localhost database, namely Snort2.  
 
(b) Tcpreplay (2011). In order to inject packets in the network and simulate a realistic monitoring 
environment, the demonstration used the Tcpreplay application. As illustrated in Label 3 in 
Figure 31, Tcpreplay replays the simulation files (e.g. a pcap format file) and pumps them into a 
similar interface listened to by Snort IDS (i.e. Figure 30).  
 






Figure 30. Snort IDSs 
3
 
Figure 31. The use of TCPreplay 
 
The results of the simulation are stored in a database based upon the Snort IDS configuration file 
which is manually set by administrators. To continue the demonstration process, the calculation of the 
incident risk indexes and other processes are done using two applications which are also 
independently executed in a daemon mode: 
 
(a) Incident Update. Figure 32 shows a running application as it waits for new incidents to be 
analysed. It is a process of checking that a new incident is running periodically and stops only 
when administrators end the application manually. Label 1 in the figure shows a command typed 
by administrators to execute the application and, in this particular example, a file named 
“update_incident.php” was used. As mentioned in Section 6.2.2, the application daemon calls 
three different functions – Update Initial Detail, Update Similarity and Update Frequency – and, 




Label 2 shows the related output. Within the output, there is some interesting information that can 
be used as a tracker for administrators to monitor the application daemon so that it runs 
seamlessly, such as incident duration, which shows the update process duration, timestamp and 




Figure 32. The Incident Update application daemon 
 
(b) Incident Value. This application daemon starts the updating process only when there is an output 
from the previous application. The application aims to satisfy two objectives: i) to update the 
incident risk indexes based upon settings in the configuration file (see Label 5 for the updating 
process tracker) and ii) to retrieve information and other related scores from CVSS v2 as marked 





Figure 33. The Incident Value application daemon 
 
Once the suspicious incidents are detected and stored in a database, they can be visualised using any 
web browser with the web modules and the next section visualises the related pages. 
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6.3.2 Incident Summarisation 
To log into the web modules, administrators need to use a legitimate username and password; 
otherwise the web modules will not allow them to visualise the other analytics pages. Label 1 in 
Figure 34 illustrates the login form that needs to be filled in by administrators before they can browse 




Figure 34. Login page 
 
Once the login process is successful, administrators are redirected to the first page of the web modules 








Figure 35. Main Board 




The main board provides very useful information such as a summarisation and snapshot of the current 
status of the prioritisation results. As mentioned in Section 6.2.3, it also displays information 
including the current scenario, distribution of incidents and graphs.  Label 1 summarises the page and 
it shows the current scenario in the main board. The scenario is a set of settings for any configuration 
where each configuration is used to generate the incident risk index. Each scenario has a different 
configuration for specifics such as colours (e.g. red, green, yellow), priority wording (e.g. high, low, 
medium) and also the weight of indicators used to calculate the incident risk index. Depending on 
how many scenarios are created, the page can be changed easily by administrators. In this particular 
main board, the graph shown on the page was based on Scenario 1. To add a new scenario, the 
administrator can use the configuration page.  
 
To show the distribution of incidents, Label 3 refers to four boxes with different colours and the boxes 
summarise the total number of incidents based on their priority. Each box contains an active link and 
it can be used to navigate the administrator to the Event page, in order to make a further analysis on 
specific incidents based upon their priority. The boxes are coloured using different colours to 
differentiate their priorities and this can be configured using the configuration page. In this example, 
the red colour with “0” represents an urgent priority incident with no incident under it, followed by 
other priorities. In order to increase the customisation of the page, the name and colour of the boxes 
are also customisable – for example, ‘urgent’ can be changed to ‘important’ and so on.  
 
In order to show the current scenario using other representation, additional graphs as in Label 6 are 
generated in real time, giving an opportunity to administrators to update the current scenario. The 
graph is interactive and there is a vertical line to show the current risk index in any particular time. 
For example, at 19:47, Label 6 shows the current level of the incident priorities, such as 0.5374 for the 
highest index, 0.2524 for the average index and 0.0936 for the lowest index. 
 
To provide an interactive page, all the wording in the main board is active; hence they allow easy 
navigation within the module. For example, Label 2 allows administrators to summarise the results 
within the last 1 hour, 24 hours, one week and one month. On top of that, Label 4 summarises lists for 
the top incidents, assets and protocols, and administrators are allowed to navigate to other pages such 
as the scenario and event pages.  
 
To analyse each incident in further detail or to thoroughly examine assets and events, the next section 
illustrates the other related visuals.  
  




Using a similar scenario as the previous example, Figure 36 shows a live event for the Event page. In 
this particular example, there were 261 incidents and most of them were labelled as a high priority. 
The priority of the incidents can be differentiated using the customisable colours, such as yellow for 










Figure 36.  The Event page 
 
The event page provides insight information related to the prioritised incidents. The page provides two 
main functions including the setting and summarisation functions. 
 
In order to display the settings menu, the drop-down button in Label 2 gives a shortcut to 
administrators to exhibit and close the settings menu. The settings menu allows the output in the Event 
page to be represented in a combination of five different settings include data per page (e.g. 30 events 
showed on each page), data limit (the time limit of events, e.g. 1 hour), refresh rate (the web page is 
refreshed periodically based upon this setting, e.g. no refresh rate is selected), the selection scenario 




and the priority level, which can be used to filter the level of priority of an event (e.g. administrators 
have the ability to set it to have a high incident only). 
 
Based on the settings, the page updates the modules periodically and this can be seen in Label 3, as it 
shows a list of incidents by indicating the current time and refresh rate used by the page. The table in 
the page displays information related to incidents such as priority, source IP address, destination IP 
address and signatures (i.e. Label 4); each of them can be used to navigate to the query page in order 
to investigate them further.  
 
Since the page updates periodically, it provides additional functions to ‘mark incidents’. The first 
column of the list in the table shows a star – this function allows administrator to highlight incidents 
in case they want to revise them again in future (see Label 5). The revision page can be found on the 
Live page, as illustrated in Figure 37.  
 
In order to facilitate the usability of the page, there are additional navigation functions on the page. 
The four buttons ( ) are used to load other pages as mentioned in Section 6.2.3; the pages are 
the show response, insert response and show details page. In addition, at the bottom of the page, there 
are four buttons: the first, previous, next and last button. These buttons can be used to navigate 






Figure 37. The Live page 
In order to revise marked incidents, Figure 37 shows a snapshot of the page. As can be seen in Label 
1, the page summarises the total number of marked incidents from other pages, such as the Event page 
and Search page. In particular, this page shows four incidents. Furthermore, the first column of the 
page lists yellowish stars and they show highlighted incidents that have been marked previously on 
the other pages, such as the Event page and Search page (i.e. Label 2). Like other pages, all the 
wording in this page is also an active link which can be used to navigate directly to the query page. 
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In addition to the Event and Live page, to analyse the detail of each incident, it is recommended that 
administrators load additional pages like the Response and Detail page, as illustrated in Figure 38. For 





Figure 38. The additional pages 
 
The Detail page shows other information related to the selected incidents. For example, the page 
summary tabulates useful information such as sensor ID, incident priority, time detected, source and 
destination IP as well as its signature (see Label 1). Every single detail has an active link which can be 
used as a reference for administrators to navigate to a new page such as the Query page. In addition to 
that, in order to give additional information, there is a graph below the incident information (i.e. Label 
2). The graph is temporal and shows the history of risk indexes which are taken periodically within a 
specific period of time (i.e. the time period itself is configured by administrators manually – the 
interval limitation). As the graph grows periodically over time, it allows administrators to make an 
additional judgement upon the selected incident. For example, the illustrated graph in the figure 
shows a declining graph and, arguably, it therefore shows that the incident itself is not really as 
critical in time as when it was first detected. 




The response page in Label 3 is a form loaded after the response button is clicked. It provides a 
manual input from administrators; for example, if there is a case of false incidents, it can be noted as it 
is. At the bottom of the page, there is a list of responses and it shows the previous responses entered 
manually by administrators or automatically by response agents. This list allows administrators to 
analyse the selected incident thoroughly, and other further actions could be planned based upon the 
list. 
 
To extend the analysis upon incidents, it is recommended that administrators extend their 
investigation by searching a specific type of incident and this can be done using the Search page. As 
illustrated in Figure 39, the search facilities allow administrators to focus upon a specific type of 






Figure 39. The Search Page 
 
The searching form allows administrators to enter a specific query manually. The query can be made 
using 8 attributes such as source address, destination address and signature. In this example, a new 
query using the source address has been entered with “192.168.1.1” as the input (i.e. Label 1). The 
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output of the query uses similar attributes to the other pages, such as the heading of the page and its 
table. On this particular page, the table displays the search results using 6 main columns including the 
sensor with incidents’ ID, its priority, timestamp, source and destination address as its reference of 
signatures (i.e. Label 2).  
 
The analysis function in the web modules also provides the additional query page, on top of what the 
Search page provides. To analyse the details of the incidents, Figure 40 shows the Query page. It is 
similar to the Search page except that this page allows administrators to focus on and summarise the 
similar incidents based upon specific attributes. The attributes can be categorised into five fields: 
scenario, IP address, signature, protocol and specific incidents (i.e. Label 1 – Label 4).  
 
With the scenario query, administrators are allowed to summarise the results based upon a specific 
timeline; for example, a summarisation of a scenario for the last 30 hours and so on. In addition, the 
page provides a graph to summarise the percentages of incidents and it categorises them into different 
levels of priority based on the settings made on the configuration page (i.e. Label 5). Using this 
visualisation, it summarises a general view of what is the current status compared to the previous 
days. The result of the query is tabulated into six columns include signatures, class, priority and time 
detected as well as the total number of incidents. 
 
In addition, in order to provide more specific queries, administrators are allowed to make a query 
based on incidents’ protocol, such as TCP and UDP. Furthermore, the query can also be made using 
signatures and the query form only lists signatures which can be obtained automatically from 
databases. 
 
The result of the query is displayed according to the selection category. For example, a query made 
based upon IP address attributes tabulates the percentage of similar IP addresses together with the 
total number of incidents.  
 
Similar with other pages, every single result on the page has an active link which can be used to 
navigate from one page to others; for example, if there is an “IP address” attribute, it is possible to 
click to navigate to the Query page using IP address as its attribute. 










Figure 40. The Query Page 
6.3.4 Configuration 
To facilitate the analysis and visualisation of the web modules, the configuration page plays an 
important role; in particular, the page provides various settings such as colours, weightings for 
indicators, assets configuration, sensor indicators and scenario settings. These configurations are 
illustrated in Figure 41 through to Figure 46. 
 







Figure 41. The Configuration Page - Scenario 
 
Figure 41 shows the configuration page for scenarios used in the web modules, as they can be added 
and removed depending on the administrators’ desire. As can be seen in Label 1, the summarisation of 
the configuration is tabulated into several columns such as scenario name, descriptions, weight of 
indicators, custom names for the priority level and appropriate thresholds with their colours. In order 
to add a new scenario, administrators are allowed to click the button with Label 2 and a form will be 
loaded to be filled. To optimise the navigation process, there are two buttons for each scenario (i.e. 
Label 3). The first button allows administrators to navigate the edit page and updates the selected 




Figure 42. The Configuration Page – Sensor 
 
In addition to the configuration page for the scenario setting, Figure 42 shows an example page of the 
sensor setting which is used to configure the sensor indicator. In addition to the interface’s original 
name stored in databases, the sensor name itself can be renamed as an alias (see Label 4). The custom 
name gives an additional attribute to administrators when monitoring the entire modules. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of the sensor can be configured using the drop-down menu on the page.  










Figure 43. The Configuration Page – Asset 
 
The configuration page also allows administrator to configure assets. There are four main 
configuration pages for the asset setting: asset list, category, unassigned asset and search.  On the top 
of Figure 43, there are several shortcuts and these are active links used to load other pages such as the 
asset list, category, unassigned asset and search page (see Label 1). 
 
The page contains customisable tabs and these allow administrators to navigate from one category to 
another in order to view the asset settings. In this particular example, there are five tabs which 
represent five categories, namely: network asset, host with services, host for non-Windows OS, host 
with Widows OS and unassigned in the DARPA dataset (see Label 2).  
 
The table highlights all the settings which are configured manually by administrators and a simple 
view like this allows them to view all the assets thoroughly. Similar to other pages, the list shows the 
weight for each indicator represented by the corresponding assets. In addition, the button on the right 
of the page (i.e. Label 4) gives a hand to administrators to add a new asset and administrators need to 
enter the appropriate input in a form loaded after the button is clicked, such as asset name, IP address 
and indicators’ values (see Label 3). 
 
Similar to the other configuration pages, there are two buttons (i.e. Label 5). The first one allows 
administrators to navigate to the edit page in order to update the current configuration setting. The 
current setting can also be deleted using the second button. 
 





Figure 44. The Configuration Page – Asset Category 
 
Furthermore, using the category menu link, administrators are allowed to configure and update the 
category of assets. Figure 44 tabulates a list of the category configuration settings and contains details 
about them. It shows only the appropriate category which is entered manually by administrators and 
each of them will be used as a reference to calculate the incident risk indexes. 
 
Similar to other the configuration pages, the button on the right allow administrators to add a new 
category (i.e. Label 6). Input such as asset category, descriptions and indicators’ values are 




Figure 45. The Configuration Page – Unassigned Asset 
 
With the unassigned asset page, administrators are allowed to list the unassigned assets as this is 
important to the proposed framework because the appropriate values for indicators are needed in the 
calculation process. Figure 45 shows an example and lists only one asset; it shows only the total 
number of incidents which relate to the reference assets and its IP addresses. The page also allows 
administrators to make a custom list on the page. For example, administrators are allowed to display 
the unassigned assets by grouping them using similar an IP destination or source (see Label 7).   
 






Figure 46. The Configuration Page – Asset Search 
 
Finally, to find any assets, and in order to view or update their settings, it is recommended that 
administrators load the search asset page as it provides an easy way to locate a desired asset. As 
illustrated in Figure 46, the keyword form can be used to enter the desired IP address in order to make 
a query (i.e. Label 8). To give an additional facility to administrators, it allows a query made using a 
wildcard character (%) and, with it, appropriate results will be returned by listing several assets 
according to the query made. To limit the query results, administrators can use the drop-down menu 
which allows them to choose a number between 1 to 200 assets (i.e. Label 9). 
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6.4 Advantages and Limitations 
In providing a flexible platform to administrators to configure, analyse and make a wise decision 
using the prioritisation results, the web modules give the following advantages: 
 
(a) Analytics results. The web modules provide a web analytics solutions that give rich insights into 
the incident prioritisation process and analysis simpleness. Simplicity, easy-to-use, customisable, 
flexible and optimisation of results features allow administrators to analyse the entire 
prioritisation process and their results examined in online assessment mode. The web modules 
provide various types of custom results and give a broader view of the current situation related to 
incidents and IDSs. 
 
(b) Simplicity with graphical interfaces. Instead of having numerical values, the web modules 
simplify reporting and analytics by providing graphical interfaces in interpreting the incident 
priorities with the aid of the usage of different colours and graphs. The use of different colours 
allows administrators to interpret the meaning of the prioritisation process results easily and also 
gives additional advantage to high-level management and non-technical people to understand the 
current situation easily because the representation of results are displayed in a combination 
between qualitative and qualitative results. 
 
(c) Easy management and user friendly interfaces. The use of the web modules provides user friendly 
interfaces because administrators have an ability to manage any human-computer interaction such 
as customisation upon settings, change the configuration setting, analyse the prioritisation results 
and make a decision via any web browsers. With the openness of the web modules, they can be 
accessed from any platforms anywhere, and all these can be done without any hassle. 
 
(d) Flexible setting to optimise the prioritisation results. The web modules provide a flexibility mode 
upon the module configurations which allows administrators to modify them dynamically, in 
order to optimise the view of the prioritisation results. With the result optimisation, the web 
modules provide comprehensive summarisations of the incident priorities and for example, the 
web modules summarise the top incidents, top assets as well as to customise the incident 
priorities. By having this, it is also improve the understanding by giving different perspective in 
interpreting the incidents because they are initially using numerical values to represent theirs 
priority. 
 
(e) Live traffic network and online assessment mode. With the capabilities of the proposed framework 
to examine a live traffic network, the web modules provide a direct access management system as 




well as run them in online assessment mode, in order to analyse the incident risk indexes. Unlike 
other offline systems, the web modules allow administrators to make a wise decision instantly 
based upon the online results without have to wait for the entire information to be collected using 
batch systems.  
 
(f) Practical and cost effective. With the openness of the web modules, they can be viewed and 
browsed using any web browsers. A practical solution for enterprises, to extend the usage to have 
a large audience of analysts is considered cheap and very cost effective as it does not require any 
cost since web browsers are free to download. 
 
In addressing the advantages of the web modules, they also inherit some limitations as follows: 
 
(a) Applications Dependent. As the web modules are served using a web server, they rely on the 
efficiency of the web server itself, in case of the server offline, the prioritisation process cannot be 
done and other analyses are halted. In addition, as the nature of the World Wide Web, they also 
rely upon the network consistency to communicate and exchange information. 
 
(b) Inherit other vulnerabilities. Due to the used of web applications, the web modules are vulnerable 
with the web application vulnerabilities such as HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) , SQL injection, 
cross-site scripting and session hijacking. In addition to that, the web modules also vulnerable to 
the other vulnerabilities such as hardware (e.g. web server) and software (e.g. browsers); as they 
can be used as a weak point to exploit the entire modules.  
 
Therefore, to provide a better service in the future, it is important to address thus limitations using 
other security precautions and countermeasures.  
 
  




This chapter demonstrated the implementation stage of the proposed framework by providing some 
examples and snapshots from Security Incident Prioritisation Modules. The details of its modules, 
system architecture, state diagrams and web modules have been presented to show how they interact.   
 
The key objective of demonstrating and describing the details of the modules is to enable a better 
understanding of how the proposed framework works, and how its internal modules are affected by 
the external environment. Due to time constraints, it was not possible to fully implement the operation 
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7 Conclusion 
This chapter summarises the study by reviewing the achievements of the research. It highlights its 
most important findings, as well as its limitations. It then discusses the potential of new studies within 
the domain, showing how the proposed framework could be enhanced in the future. 
7.1 Achievements of the study 
The study commenced with an investigation into the different types of response options, exploring 
issues related to the incident response and prioritisation process. It also identified the generic decision 
factors needed to facilitate the estimation of the level of risk of incidents, using a methodically 
approach in the ranking and rating process. The study proposed a novel framework in order to address 
the incident prioritisation process and to facilitate an autonomous mode in the response selection 
process in IRSs. Several models and strategies were explored and their capabilities evaluated in order 
to satisfy the aims of this study.  
 
Literally, the overall goal of this study is to establish a novel approach to prioritising incidents for 
different types of response options in network environments. Within the proposed framework, which 
included experiments as well as the prototypes of web modules, this study has been successful. 
Details are as follows: 
 
1. A response model for Intrusion Response Systems. This study has established a model which 
categorises several response options such as proactive, reactive and passive responses. Using a 
new perspective, the establishment of the model allows the proposed framework to be designed to 
respond to and prioritise different levels of incident (See Chapter 4). The model helps the 
proposed framework to work flawlessly in mapping different types of incident, each of which has 
its own unique characteristics. A survey study was conducted to investigate the correlation 
between the model and its response options when applied to commercial and research products 
(see Chapter 2). To show the feasibility and suitability of the model, as well as other models, 
several experiments were conducted and their results suggested positive outcomes (see Chapter 
5).  
 
2. Issues in incident response and prioritisation studies. In Chapter 3, this study established a 
critical analysis of different perspectives when addressing the significant problems of the 
incident prioritisation and response selection process, as well as its challenges. With an aim to 




establish a framework to prioritise incidents, several issues were exposed in the rating and 
ranking of, and responses to, incidents. By presenting the strengths and weaknesses of these 
issues, several strategies were identified which address the limitations of the previous 
approaches, by enhancing the incident prioritisation process so that it is more systematic in the 
response selection process.   
 
3. Generic indicators required to estimate risk indexes of incidents. The study proposed generic 
indicators to assist the estimation process and to rate the incident risk indexes, as they are 
important in the designing of the proposed framework. Two important decision factors were 
considered - the impact on assets and the likelihood of threats and vulnerability (see Section 
3.2.3) - in order to address the incident prioritisation process.  
 
4. A novel framework which addresses the incident prioritisation process. Using models and multi- 
strategies in rating, ranking and response incidents, this study proposed a novel framework to 
methodically address the incident prioritisation and response selection process. With the aid of the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and its generic indicators, a new risk estimation model was 
established: Risk Index Model (RIM). Simultaneously, the proposed framework facilitated the 
response selection process, which also offered a flawless approach in mapping different types of 
response options with different priorities of incident; this is done by using the Response Strategy 
Model (See Section 4.2.3). 
 
5. Comprehensive evaluation stages for the proposed framework. In addressing the incident 
prioritisation and response selection process in IRSs, the proposed framework outlined several 
models and strategies.  These need to be evaluated. The objective of the evaluation is to examine 
the proposed framework and to decide whether it is sufficiently applicable to facilitate the 
response selection process in a live traffic network with on-line assessment capabilities.  The 
evaluation presented four stages: the proposed framework was analysed in terms of its 
effectiveness and performances when related to the models and strategies selected (See Chapter 
5). The progressive results presented from one stage to another demonstrated the suitability and 
feasibility of the proposed framework in facilitating the selection process in IRSs. More 
importantly, the evaluation stages satisfied the main criteria to support the selection process, in 
particular, the ability of the framework to facilitate the autonomous mode, besides to operate 
with a reasonable processing time in the prioritisation process and reduce false responses upon 
false incidents. 
 
6. Implementation of the proposed framework. To extend the investigation upon the feasibility of the 
proposed framework, and demonstrate its practical application in a live traffic network with on-




line assessment mode, a proof-of-concept study was designed and realised (See Chapter 6). As an 
extension to the evaluation study, the implementation stage has developed a web-based system, 
which concentrates on the web modules of the proposed framework, together with its application 
daemons. In order to illustrate the implementation stage, the detail of the proposed framework 
was presented using several modelling languages. These included case diagrams and state 
diagrams, as well as some snapshots of the prototype pages. 
To conclude, it is believed that this study has achieved its aims and objectives as stated in Chapter 1. 
  




7.2 Limitations of the study 
The discussions of the previous chapters have demonstrated that this research has adequately achieved 
its aims and objectives: the establishment of a novel framework to use when prioritising incidents in 
an intrusion response environment. However, a number of limitations and challenges were 
encountered during the study and they are listed here for future reference: 
 
1. Quantitative measurements. In conducting the experiment during the evaluation phase (see 
Chapter 5), this study found some practical limitations. In particular, all input to the experiments 
is quantitative.  However, in a practical situation, it is difficult to establish such quantitative 
measures, particularly on asset values. Arguably, a qualitative input which has a different group 
of rating (e.g. high, medium and low) would be more meaningful. This study used quantitative 
values because the proposed framework allows incidents to be differentiated. Because of this 
limitation, it is suggested that, in future studies, a qualitative input needs to be changed to a 
quantitative input, in order to calculate and estimate the incident risk indexes.  
 
2. A rational assumption. At present, the evaluation study used assumption to obtain the indicator 
values when estimating the incident risk indexes, particularly in rating the values which related to 
assets and the judgement matrices. Although this study has presented positive results, future work 
should focus on strengthening the estimation process for rating every indicator which is involved 
in the proposed framework, in particular in the RIM. As decision factors, it is suggested that the 
indicator input be extended by giving a precise and detailed metric for measuring incidents.  This 
will ensure the reduction of uncertainty amongst indicators.  
 
3. The evaluation of the study of incidents from the signature-based IDS only. This evaluation study 
optimised the use of incidents based on the detection of signature-based IDS only, particularly 
Snort IDS. The available time did not permit the development of those modules which focus on 
other IDS’s such as anomaly-based IDS or other signature-based examples. The proposed 
framework is not widely applicable and is limited to Snort only. However, it is considered 
valuable since Snort is the world’s most widely-used IDS in both practising and research 
communities. Furthermore, the proposed framework operates with post-incident prioritisation 
process, which considers incidents after the detection process. Thus, theoretically it is possible to 
rate those incidents even with anomaly-based IDS. 
 
4. A practical proof-of-concept and response agents. Although a practical evaluation study using 
web modules and a live traffic simulation has been presented in Chapter 6, it is important to 
perform the entire prototype in a live traffic network with actual response agents, in order to 




strengthen the feasibility of the proposed framework. Furthermore, the results in this study have 
provided a clear distinction between the ways incidents are rated, ranked and prioritised. 
However, no practical consideration is given to counter-measures in order to control critical 
incidents. Although, in the proposed frameworks, there are response agents that can be used to 
respond to incidents, this is not fully implemented due to the lack of the availability of such 
security appliances (e.g. firewall) and insufficient time to perform the evaluation study.  There are 
some response feedbacks from the agents, which have a potential to adjust risk indexes, however, 
this study does not consider it as the main objective. Thus, an important issue for future studies is 
how to improve strategies when deciding whether other counter-measures or responses would 
stop the critical incident.  
 
5. The usability of web modules. The evaluation study extended the implementation stage to 
demonstrate the practicality of the web modules. However, the usability of such modules is not 
evaluated in this study. Although the usability evaluation of the modules is important, in order to 
demonstrate its easiness and navigation friendly, it is not the main objective of this study. 
However, the snapshots of the prototype pages presented in Chapter 6 are considered adequate in 
order to demonstrate the usage of the web modules in practice. 
  




7.3 Suggestions and Scope for Future Work 
A number of suggestions for future work outside the scope of this study have been identified. Several 
issues have arisen and they are as follows: 
 
1. Anomaly IDS alarms. As mentioned above, the input for the application daemon used in the 
evaluation study and implementation stage is limited to Snort-based alerts. Given this limitation, 
it would be beneficial that future works be directed towards increasing input from heterogeneous 
alerts which come from different types of IDS’s, such as other signature-based IDS and anomaly-
based IDS. 
 
2. Correlation between false incidents and prioritisation. The result of the evaluation study in the 
third stage demonstrated a significant relationship between the classification of incidents and their 
priorities. Further analysis to investigate the correlation between them would be useful, especially 
on dealing with a live traffic network. This investigation is significant because it be can used to 
strengthen the proposed framework as well as to improve the response strategy in responding to 
false incidents.   
 
3. Visualisation of the critical incidents. Figures, tables and graphs would benefit security analysts 
in terms of an easy and interactive approach when monitoring critical incidents. The other 
recommendation for future studies is to consider a visualisation domain of critical incidents (e.g. 
Human-Computer Interaction). Instead of using numbers, graphical images would be accessible 
and would give more information to security analysts. Most experiments were initially simulated 
and analysed using PHP. Therefore, revising the web modules and summarising the prioritisation 
results, using different types of graph models, could offer further opportunities for future studies. 
 
4. Response agents. One of the limitations mentioned in the previous section was the use of response 
feedback from response agents. Future studies could use other approaches, such as machine 
learning domains; feedback mechanisms would be more meaningful if they were integrated into 
the current approach to responding to critical incidents. 
  




7.4 Summary – The Future for Automated Response Systems 
With thousands of incidents identified every day, relying upon manual processes to identify their 
importance and urgency is complicated, difficult, error-prone and time-consuming. This study has 
presented a novel framework that focuses upon the process of prioritising and responding to incidents 
using a methodically models and strategies. The framework helps security analysts to prioritise them 
automatically.  In fact, the entire study has shown the advantages of using the proposed framework to 
facilitate the response selection process in IRSs, which not only focuses on critical incidents, but also 
provides a way to differentiate between incidents, assessing whether they are genuine, or not, and 
allowing an appropriate response to respond to them. Most importantly, the study has focused on 
enhancing the prioritisation scheme of identifying critical incidents, in order to provide a way to 
respond to them methodically. The important concept behind the proposed framework is the 
methodically steps, which include the rating, ranking and response selection process. 
 
With models and strategies such as the Risk Index Model (RIM) and the Response Strategy Model 
(RSM), the adoption of the proposed framework in IRS’s has given new perspectives in rating, 
ranking, and responding as well as in prioritising incidents, with generic indicators introduced in the 
proposed framework. Literally, the future of an automated response in IRS’s is a step forward from 
the prioritisation scheme proposed in this study, because with all its positive results, it contributes 
significantly to the identification of critical incidents, based upon their importance and urgency. It 
means that only appropriate events are responded to and, at the same time, allows other legitimate 
users. Also, the use of web modules in visualising the prioritisation results means that online 
assessment mode can be employed. Additional visualisation studies would be beneficial, as they 
would be able to summarise thousands of results (i.e. not just the prioritisation results) in a single 
image. 
 
In reality, the future of the automated response in Intrusion Response Systems still relies on human 
intervention, and it is normal with any management systems. However, with modern technology and 
introduction of an autonomous mode, such interventions are decreasing and this study has contributed 
in some significant degree to that domain. Although, the human intervention is needed in creating a 
check-and-balance situation, an automated system is important in order to ensure the survival of the 
interconnected systems.  With more studies working to address the human intervention, it is hoped 
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Results of the first stage of the evaluation study 
 
Appendix A extends the experimental results in the first stage of the evaluation study (see Section 
5.2). There were two experiments conducted in the first stage and their full results as follows. 
  







































































Pre 1 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 3 09:29:20 09:29:24 0.1725 0.1725 21 19 59 57 77 75 265 263 265 263 316 314 316 314 320 318 324 322 331 329 331 329 331 329
FTP Bad login 1 09:32:34 09:32:34 0.3142 0.3142 1 1 4 4 4 4 114 114 114 114 149 149 149 149 149 149 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
TELNET login incorrect 3 09:32:34 09:45:36 0.1561 0.1764 23 18 61 56 79 74 299 262 299 262 358 313 364 313 368 317 372 321 379 328 381 328 383 328
ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1 09:37:05 09:37:05 0.1442 0.1442 24 24 62 62 80 80 308 308 308 308 367 367 385 385 389 389 393 393 400 400 402 402 404 404
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 1 09:45:34 09:45:34 0.1429 0.1429 25 25 63 63 81 81 309 309 309 309 368 368 386 386 390 390 394 394 401 401 403 403 405 405
ICMP Echo Reply 8 09:45:37 09:45:37 0.1990 0.1990 9 2 41 34 59 52 208 201 208 201 251 244 251 244 255 248 259 252 266 259 266 259 266 259
ICMP PING 8 09:45:37 09:45:37 0.1970 0.1970 17 10 49 42 67 60 216 209 216 209 259 252 259 252 263 256 267 260 274 267 274 267 274 267
                            
1 ICMP Echo Reply 20 09:51:36 09:52:00 0.0939 0.3542 65 2 86 2 317 66 321 66 385 95 413 95 423 95 435 99 1014 99 1042 99 1056 99
ICMP PING 20 09:51:36 09:52:00 0.0942 0.3542 64 1 85 1 316 65 320 65 384 94 412 94 422 94 434 98 1013 98 1041 98 1055 98
                            
Pre 2 ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1 09:52:10 09:52:10 0.1135 0.1135 84 84 315 315 315 315 376 376 398 398 408 408 415 415 422 422 450 450 464 464
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 09:54:45 09:58:36 0.1345 0.1345 83 82 311 310 311 310 372 371 392 391 396 395 401 400 408 407 412 411 414 413
ICMP Echo Reply 9 10:01:41 10:01:41 0.2031 0.2031 42 34 191 183 191 183 234 226 234 226 238 230 242 234 249 241 249 241 249 241
ICMP PING 9 10:01:41 10:01:41 0.2013 0.2013 51 43 200 192 200 192 243 235 243 235 247 239 251 243 258 250 258 250 258 250
                            
2 ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 72 10:08:07 10:18:05 0.2100 0.3235 153 69 153 69 196 104 196 104 200 104 204 108 211 108 211 108 211 108
RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 76 10:08:07 10:18:05 0.0802 0.3412 329 68 333 68 397 103 425 103 435 103 447 107 1026 107 1054 107 1068 107
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request 76 10:08:07 10:18:05 0.2802 0.5412 141 1 141 1 184 7 184 7 188 7 192 7 196 7 196 7 196 7
ICMP Echo Reply 8 10:11:05 10:11:05 0.1612 0.1612 298 291 298 291 349 342 349 342 353 346 357 350 364 357 366 359 366 359
ICMP PING 8 10:11:05 10:11:05 0.1529 0.1529 307 300 307 300 366 359 375 368 379 372 383 376 390 383 392 385 394 387
TELNET login incorrect 3 10:15:28 10:17:38 0.1302 0.1303 314 312 314 312 375 373 397 395 407 405 414 412 421 419 437 435 447 445
                             
Pre 3 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 4 10:22:43 10:31:30 0.1061 0.1061 319 316 380 377 408 405 418 415 430 427 437 434 465 462 479 476
                            
3 RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.1959 0.3462 267 97 267 97 271 97 275 101 282 101 282 101 282 101
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp portmapper sadmin port query attempt 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.3799 0.5303 69 8 69 8 69 8 73 8 73 8 73 8 73 8
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.3959 0.5462 22 1 22 1 22 1 26 1 26 1 26 1 26 1
RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.1573 0.3076 357 150 357 150 361 150 365 154 372 154 374 154 376 154
TELNET login incorrect 4 10:33:18 10:34:57 0.1363 0.2865 370 171 388 171 392 171 396 175 403 175 407 175 409 175
ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 3 10:33:33 10:34:09 0.1061 0.1061 383 381 411 409 421 419 433 431 440 438 468 466 482 480
SQL version overflow attempt 1 10:34:57 10:34:57 0.4679 0.4679 14 14 14 14 14 14 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
                        
Pre 4 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 6 10:36:29 10:43:57 0.1090 0.1090 404 399 414 409 426 421 433 428 461 456 475 470
TELNET login incorrect 2 10:36:34 10:46:04 0.1361 0.1362 390 389 394 393 398 397 405 404 409 408 411 410
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 10:46:28 10:46:28 0.1315 0.1315 394 393 404 403 411 410 418 417 434 433 441 440
ICMP Echo Reply 9 10:49:00 10:49:18 0.1469 0.1511 384 376 388 380 392 384 399 391 401 393 403 395
ICMP PING 9 10:49:00 10:49:18 0.1550 0.1571 367 358 371 362 375 366 382 373 384 375 386 377
                    
4 RSERVICES rsh root 8 10:50:02 10:50:38 0.1334 0.2835 400 173 405 177 412 179 416 179 418 179
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 10:50:15 10:50:54 0.1318 0.1323 402 401 409 408 416 415 420 419 427 426
                
Pre 5 ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 10:58:16 11:00:32 0.1327 0.1331 407 406 414 413 418 417 420 419
TELNET login incorrect 1 11:00:11 11:00:11 0.1355 0.1355 399 399 406 406 410 410 412 412
ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 4 11:00:16 11:03:33 0.1109 0.1109 420 417 427 424 455 452 469 466
ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 4 11:03:38 11:04:13 0.5067 0.5067 17 14 17 14 17 14 17 14
ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1 11:05:11 11:05:11 0.1116 0.1116 416 416 423 423 451 451 465 465
            
5 (snort decoder) Bad Traffic Loopback IP 572 11:27:51 11:27:56 0.0984 0.1027 1012 441 1040 469 1054 483
SNMP AgentX/tcp request 3 11:27:54 11:27:55 0.2349 0.2366 199 197 199 197 199 197
ICMP Echo Reply 1 11:28:18 11:28:18 0.2857 0.2857 177 177 177 177 177 177
ICMP PING 1 11:28:18 11:28:18 0.2838 0.2838 178 178 178 178 178 178
ICMP PING *NIX 1 11:28:18 11:28:18 0.2811 0.2811 184 184 184 184 184 184
ICMP PING BSDtype 1 11:28:18 11:28:18 0.2811 0.2811 183 183 183 183 183 183
    
Post 5 TELNET login incorrect 4 11:39:07 12:33:25 0.1578 0.1702 358 356 368 356
ICMP Echo Reply 17 11:51:56 12:26:16 0.1290 0.1316 432 421 449 428
ICMP PING 17 11:51:56 12:26:16 0.1285 0.1326 449 438 461 421
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 3 12:14:18 12:31:13 0.1186 0.1393 404 404 463 406




























































































































































Pre 1 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 3 09:29:20 09:29:24 0.1956 0.1956 21 19 53 51 71 69 259 257 259 257 310 308 310 308 314 312 318 316 325 323 325 323 325 323
FTP Bad login 1 09:32:34 09:32:34 0.3135 0.3135 1 1 4 4 4 4 141 141 141 141 176 176 176 176 176 176 180 180 183 183 183 183 183 183
TELNET login incorrect 3 09:32:34 09:45:36 0.1747 0.2007 23 18 61 50 79 68 299 256 299 256 358 307 358 307 362 311 366 315 373 322 375 322 375 322
ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1 09:37:05 09:37:05 0.1650 0.1650 24 24 62 62 80 80 308 308 308 308 367 367 382 382 386 386 390 390 397 397 399 399 401 401
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 1 09:45:34 09:45:34 0.1633 0.1633 25 25 63 63 81 81 309 309 309 309 368 368 384 384 388 388 392 392 399 399 401 401 403 403
ICMP Echo Reply 8 09:45:37 09:45:37 0.2188 0.2188 9 2 38 31 38 31 187 180 187 180 238 231 238 231 242 235 246 239 253 246 253 246 253 246
ICMP PING 8 09:45:37 09:45:37 0.2162 0.2162 17 10 49 42 58 51 207 200 207 200 258 251 258 251 262 255 266 259 273 266 273 266 273 266
                                                
1 ICMP Echo Reply 20 09:51:36 09:52:00 0.0950 0.3459 65 2 86 2 317 123 321 123 385 158 413 158 423 158 435 162 1014 165 1042 165 1056 165
ICMP PING 20 09:51:36 09:52:00 0.0955 0.3459 64 1 85 1 316 122 320 122 384 157 412 157 422 157 434 161 1013 164 1041 164 1055 164
                                        
Pre 2 ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1 09:52:10 09:52:10 0.1177 0.1177 84 84 315 315 315 315 376 376 398 398 408 408 415 415 422 422 450 450 464 464
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 09:54:45 09:58:36 0.1531 0.1531 83 82 311 310 311 310 372 371 392 391 396 395 401 400 408 407 412 411 414 413
ICMP Echo Reply 9 10:01:41 10:01:41 0.2175 0.2175 50 42 199 191 199 191 250 242 250 242 254 246 258 250 265 257 265 257 265 257
ICMP PING 9 10:01:41 10:01:41 0.2153 0.2153 67 59 216 208 216 208 267 259 267 259 271 263 275 267 282 274 282 274 282 274
                                    
2 ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 72 10:08:07 10:18:05 0.2402 0.3684 153 77 153 77 196 106 196 106 200 106 204 110 211 110 211 110 211 110
RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 76 10:08:07 10:18:05 0.0891 0.3408 329 125 333 125 397 160 425 160 435 160 447 164 1026 167 1054 167 1068 167
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request 76 10:08:07 10:18:05 0.4041 0.6558 76 1 76 1 105 7 105 7 105 7 109 7 109 7 109 7 109 7
ICMP Echo Reply 8 10:11:05 10:11:05 0.1769 0.1769 298 291 298 291 357 350 357 350 361 354 365 358 372 365 374 367 374 367
ICMP PING 8 10:11:05 10:11:05 0.1662 0.1662 307 300 307 300 366 359 375 368 379 372 383 376 390 383 392 385 394 387
TELNET login incorrect 3 10:15:28 10:17:38 0.1484 0.1485 314 312 314 312 375 373 397 395 407 405 414 412 421 419 425 423 427 425
                                 
Pre 3 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 4 10:22:43 10:31:30 0.1086 0.1086 319 316 380 377 408 405 418 415 430 427 484 481 512 509 526 523
                            
3 RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.2195 0.3469 220 151 220 151 224 151 228 155 235 158 235 158 235 158
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp portmapper sadmin port query attempt 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.5178 0.6452 69 8 69 8 69 8 73 8 73 8 73 8 73 8
RPC portmap Solaris sadmin port query udp request 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.5345 0.6619 22 1 22 1 22 1 22 1 22 1 22 1 22 1
RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP 14 10:33:10 10:34:59 0.1826 0.3100 325 177 325 177 329 177 333 181 340 184 342 184 342 184
TELNET login incorrect 4 10:33:18 10:34:57 0.1558 0.2828 370 183 388 183 392 183 396 187 403 190 407 190 409 190
ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 3 10:33:33 10:34:09 0.1083 0.1083 383 381 411 409 421 419 433 431 531 529 559 557 573 571
SQL version overflow attempt 1 10:34:57 10:34:57 0.5386 0.5386 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
                        
Pre 4 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 6 10:36:29 10:43:57 0.1114 0.1114 404 399 414 409 426 421 433 428 461 456 475 470
TELNET login incorrect 2 10:36:34 10:46:04 0.1550 0.1552 390 389 394 393 398 397 405 404 409 408 411 410
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 10:46:28 10:46:28 0.1505 0.1505 394 393 404 403 411 410 418 417 422 421 424 423
ICMP Echo Reply 9 10:49:00 10:49:18 0.1601 0.1654 386 376 390 380 394 384 401 391 404 393 406 395
ICMP PING 9 10:49:00 10:49:18 0.1704 0.1731 367 359 371 363 375 367 382 374 384 376 386 378
                    
4 RSERVICES rsh root 8 10:50:02 10:50:38 0.1526 0.2797 400 185 405 189 412 192 416 192 418 192
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 10:50:15 10:50:54 0.1507 0.1514 402 401 409 408 416 415 420 419 422 421
                
Pre 5 ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 2 10:58:16 11:00:32 0.1516 0.1522 407 406 414 413 418 417 420 419
TELNET login incorrect 1 11:00:11 11:00:11 0.1540 0.1540 399 399 406 406 410 410 412 412
ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 4 11:00:16 11:03:33 0.1136 0.1136 420 417 427 424 455 452 469 466
ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 4 11:03:38 11:04:13 0.5292 0.5292 38 35 38 35 38 35 38 35
ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 1 11:05:11 11:05:11 0.1161 0.1161 416 416 423 423 451 451 465 465
            
5 (snort decoder) Bad Traffic Loopback IP 572 11:27:51 11:27:56 0.1036 0.1090 1012 434 1040 462 1054 476
SNMP AgentX/tcp request 3 11:27:54 11:27:55 0.3592 0.3614 157 155 157 155 157 155
ICMP Echo Reply 1 11:28:18 11:28:18 0.2786 0.2786 196 196 196 196 196 196
ICMP PING 1 11:28:18 11:28:18 0.2762 0.2762 197 197 197 197 197 197
ICMP PING *NIX 1 11:28:18 11:28:18 0.2739 0.2739 199 199 199 199 199 199
ICMP PING BSDtype 1 11:28:18 11:28:18 0.2739 0.2739 198 198 198 198 198 198
        
Post 5 TELNET login incorrect 4 11:39:07 12:33:25 0.1733 0.1890 329 327 377 327
ICMP Echo Reply 17 11:51:56 12:26:16 0.1426 0.1460 437 426 449 433
ICMP PING 17 11:51:56 12:26:16 0.1421 0.1472 449 438 461 428
ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden 3 12:14:18 12:31:13 0.1252 0.1605 402 402 463 404

















































































Results of the second stage of the evaluation study 
Appendix B extends the experimental results in the second stage of the evaluation study (see Section 
5.3).  
 
B.1 Full comparison result between the incident risk index and its position – CID 4 
   09:51:35 09:52:00 10:08:06 10:18:06 10:33:09 10:35:01 10:50:00 10:50:54 11:26:14 11:34:21 12:23:39 12:35:48
Incident Detected 25 40 21 243 4 64 28 10 12 579 28 14
  Total 25 65 86 329 333 397 425 435 447 1026 1054 1068
Experiment 1 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.314 0.3142 0.3142 0.3142 0.3142 0.3142 0.3142 0.3142 0.3142 0.3142 0.3142 0.3142
 Position 1 4 4 114 114 149 149 149 153 153 153 153
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.314 0.2970 0.2951 0.2885 0.2892 0.2898 0.2910 0.2911 0.2920 0.3193 0.3186 0.3183
 (No limit) Position 1 4 4 129 129 170 167 167 159 98 98 98
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.314 0.2970 0.2951 0.2885 0.2892
 (1 Hour) Position 1 4 4 129 129
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.314 0.2970 0.2951 0.2885 0.2892 0.2898 0.2910 0.2911 0.2920 0.3193
 (2 Hours) Position 1 4 4 129 129 170 167 167 159 98
   
   
Experiment 2 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.314 0.3135 0.3135 0.3135 0.3135 0.3135 0.3135 0.3135 0.3135 0.3135 0.3135 0.3135
 Position 1 4 4 141 141 176 176 176 180 183 183 183
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.314 0.2954 0.2935 0.2862 0.2869 0.2875 0.2886 0.2888 0.2899 0.3147 0.3140 0.3139
 (No limit) Position 1 4 4 141 141 182 182 182 186 158 158 158
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.314 0.2954 0.2935 0.2862 0.2869
 (1 Hour) Position 1 4 4 141 141
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.314 0.2954 0.2935 0.2862 0.2869 0.2875 0.2886 0.2888 0.2899 0.3147
 (2 Hours) Position 1 4 4 141 141 182 182 182 186 158
Time Interval
 
B.2 Full comparison result between the incident risk index and its position – CID 28 
   09:51:35 09:52:00 10:08:06 10:18:06 10:33:09 10:35:01 10:50:00 10:50:54 11:26:14 11:34:21 12:23:39 12:35:48
Incident Detected 25 40 21 243 4 64 28 10 12 579 28 14
  Total 25 65 86 329 333 397 425 435 447 1026 1054 1068
Experiment 1 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542
 Position 1 1 65 65 94 94 94 98 98 98 98
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.3542 0.3504 0.3339 0.3330 0.3334 0.3325 0.3309 0.3301 0.2910 0.2922 0.2926
 (No limit) Position 2 1 66 66 101 101 101 105 108 108 108
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.3542 0.3504 0.3339 0.3330 0.3334 0.3325 0.3309
 (1 Hour) Position 2 1 66 66 101 101 101
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.3542 0.3504 0.3339 0.3330 0.3334 0.3325 0.3309 0.3301 0.2910
 (2 Hours) Position 2 1 66 66 101 101 101 105 108
   
   
Experiment 2 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459
 Position 1 1 122 122 157 157 157 161 164 164 164
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.3459 0.3410 0.3327 0.3317 0.3341 0.3325 0.3306 0.3298 0.2854 0.2865 0.2869
 (No limit) Position 2 1 123 123 158 158 158 162 187 183 183
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.3459 0.3410 0.3327 0.3317 0.3341 0.3325 0.3306
 (1 Hour) Position 2 1 123 123 158 158 158
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.3459 0.3410 0.3327 0.3317 0.3341 0.3325 0.3306 0.3298 0.2854











B.3 Full comparison result between the incident risk index and its position – CID 52 
   09:51:35 09:52:00 10:08:06 10:18:06 10:33:09 10:35:01 10:50:00 10:50:54 11:26:14 11:34:21 12:23:39 12:35:48
Incident Detected 25 40 21 243 4 64 28 10 12 579 28 14
  Total 25 65 86 329 333 397 425 435 447 1026 1054 1068
Experiment 1 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542 0.3542
 Position  3 3 67 67 96 96 96 100 100 100 100
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.3542 0.3504 0.3337 0.3329 0.3318 0.3310 0.3295 0.3285 0.2902 0.2915 0.2919
 (No limit) Position  1 2 67 67 102 102 102 106 109 109 109
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.3542 0.3504 0.3337 0.3329 0.3318 0.3310 0.3295
 (1 Hour) Position  1 2 67 67 102 102 102
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.3542 0.3504 0.3337 0.3329 0.3318 0.3310 0.3295 0.3285 0.2902
 (2 Hours) Position  1 2 67 67 102 102 102 106 109
   
   
Experiment 2 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459 0.3459
 Position  3 3 124 124 159 159 159 163 166 166 166
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.3459 0.3410 0.3325 0.3315 0.3320 0.3305 0.3287 0.3276 0.2844 0.2855 0.2859
 (No limit) Position  1 2 124 124 159 159 159 163 188 184 184
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.3459 0.3410 0.3325 0.3315 0.3320 0.3305 0.3287
 (1 Hour) Position  1 2 124 124 159 159 159
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.3459 0.3410 0.3325 0.3315 0.3320 0.3305 0.3287 0.3276 0.2844




B.4 Full comparison result between the incident risk index and its position – CID 88 
   09:51:35 09:52:00 10:08:06 10:18:06 10:33:09 10:35:01 10:50:00 10:50:54 11:26:14 11:34:21 12:23:39 12:35:48
Incident Detected 25 40 21 243 4 64 28 10 12 579 28 14
  Total 25 65 86 329 333 397 425 435 447 1026 1054 1068
Experiment 1 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.5412 0.5412 0.5412 0.5412 0.5412 0.5412 0.5412 0.5412 0.5412
 Position 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.5412 0.5402 0.5460 0.5411 0.5393 0.5379 0.4941 0.4936 0.4933
 (No limit) Position 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 5 5
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.5412 0.5402 0.5460 0.5411 0.5393 0.5379
 (1 Hour) Position 1 1 7 7 7 7
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.5412 0.5402 0.5460 0.5411 0.5393 0.5379 0.4941
 (2 Hours) Position 1 1 7 7 7 7 7
   
   
Experiment 2 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.6558 0.6558 0.6558 0.6558 0.6558 0.6558 0.6558 0.6558 0.6558
 Position 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.6558 0.6547 0.6615 0.6562 0.6542 0.6527 0.6037 0.6031 0.6028
 (No limit) Position 1 1 7 7 7 7 5 7 7
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.6558 0.6547 0.6615 0.6562 0.6542 0.6527
 (1 Hour) Position 1 1 7 7 7 7
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.6558 0.6547 0.6615 0.6562 0.6542 0.6527 0.6037









B.5 Full comparison result between the incident risk index and its position – CID 353 
   09:51:35 09:52:00 10:08:06 10:18:06 10:33:09 10:35:01 10:50:00 10:50:54 11:26:14 11:34:21 12:23:39 12:35:48
Incident Detected 25 40 21 243 4 64 28 10 12 579 28 14
  Total 25 65 86 329 333 397 425 435 447 1026 1054 1068
Experiment 1 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.5462 0.5462 0.5462 0.5462 0.5462 0.5462 0.5462
 Position 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.5462 0.5413 0.5396 0.5381 0.4942 0.4937 0.4934
 (No limit) Position 1 6 4 2 5 3 3
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.5471 0.5421 0.5403 0.5388 0.4942
 (1 Hour) Position 1 2 3 3 1
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.5462 0.5413 0.5396 0.5381 0.4942 0.4937 0.4934
 (2 Hours) Position 1 6 4 2 5 3 2
   
   
Experiment 2 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.6619 0.6619 0.6619 0.6619 0.6619 0.6619 0.6619
 Position 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.6619 0.6565 0.6546 0.6531 0.6038 0.6032 0.6029
 (No limit) Position 1 1 2 1 3 5 5
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.6628 0.6572 0.6553 0.6537 0.6038
 (1 Hour) Position 1 4 3 1 4
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.6619 0.6565 0.6546 0.6531 0.6038 0.6032 0.6029




B.6 Full comparison result between the incident risk index and its position – CID 428 
   09:51:35 09:52:00 10:08:06 10:18:06 10:33:09 10:35:01 10:50:00 10:50:54 11:26:14 11:34:21 12:23:39 12:35:48
Incident Detected 25 40 21 243 4 64 28 10 12 579 28 14
  Total 25 65 86 329 333 397 425 435 447 1026 1054 1068
Experiment 1 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.2835 0.2835 0.2835 0.2835 0.2835
 Position 175 179 181 181 181
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.2835 0.2834 0.2878 0.2874 0.2872
 (No limit) Position 173 177 112 112 113
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.2840 0.2838 0.2880
 (1 Hour) Position 174 173 45
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.2835 0.2834 0.2878 0.2874 0.2872
 (2 Hours) Position 173 177 112 44 33
   
   
Experiment 2 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.2797 0.2797 0.2797 0.2797 0.2797
 Position 187 191 194 194 194
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.2797 0.2796 0.2856 0.2851 0.2849
 (No limit) Position 188 191 185 187 187
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.2802 0.2800 0.2859
 (1 Hour) Position 184 188 45
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.2797 0.2796 0.2856 0.2851 0.2849








B.7 Full comparison result between the incident risk index and its position – CID 575 
   09:51:35 09:52:00 10:08:06 10:18:06 10:33:09 10:35:01 10:50:00 10:50:54 11:26:14 11:34:21 12:23:39 12:35:48
Incident Detected 25 40 21 243 4 64 28 10 12 579 28 14
  Total 25 65 86 329 333 397 425 435 447 1026 1054 1068
Experiment 1 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.1026 0.1026 0.1026
 Position 444 472 486
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.1026 0.1002 0.0991
 (No limit) Position 444 469 483
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.1499 0.1444
 (1 Hour) Position 65 12
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.1026 0.1002 0.0991
 (2 Hours) Position 444 156 149
   
   
Experiment 2 Stage 1 Risk Index 0.1090 0.1090 0.1090
 Position 434 462 476
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.1090 0.1063 0.1052
 (No limit) Position 441 469 483
               
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.1590 0.1532
 (1 Hour) Position 83 19
   
 Stage 2 Risk Index 0.1090 0.1063 0.1052




Results of the third stage of the evaluation study 
Appendix C extends the experimental results in the third stage of the evaluation study (see Section 
5.4).  
 
C.1 Different scenario in the third stage experiment 
Consequence of Event Likelihood of Event criticality maintainability replaceability dependability control severity exploitability sensitivity similarity frequency
Scenario 1 0.4444 0.5556 0.3859 0.6590 0.2210 0.1834 0.1437 0.4954 0.0716 0.0426 0.2300 0.1604
Scenario 2 0.1000 0.9000 0.3859 0.6590 0.2210 0.1834 0.1437 0.4954 0.0716 0.0426 0.2300 0.1604
Scenario 3 0.1667 0.8333 0.3859 0.6590 0.2210 0.1834 0.1437 0.4954 0.0716 0.0426 0.2300 0.1604
Scenario 4 0.3333 0.6667 0.3859 0.6590 0.2210 0.1834 0.1437 0.4954 0.0716 0.0426 0.2300 0.1604
Scenario 5 50.0000 50.0000 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000
 
C.2 Number of incidents updated using different time limitation. 
 
C.3 The incident distribution with the Plymouth dataset. 
Type
High Medium Low High Medium Low None Avoidance Mitigation Transfer Acceptance
FALSE 7.39% 74.44% 16.37% 0.01% 7.52% 0.00% 90.66% 0.00% 7.52% 90.68% 0.00%
TRUE 0.00% 0.06% 1.75% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 1.79% 0.00% 0.01% 1.80% 0.00%
Total 7.39% 74.50% 18.12% 0.02% 7.53% 0.00% 92.45% 0.00% 7.53% 92.47% 0.00%




























Average Incident Rated 
Average Incident Rated




C.4 The incident distribution with the Plymouth dataset – different limitation and scenario. 
Scenario Type Avoidance Mitigation Transfer Acceptance Avoidance Mitigation Transfer Acceptance Avoidance Mitigation Transfer Acceptance
1 FALSE - 7.55% 90.01% 0.63% - 7.52% 90.68% - - 7.52% 90.68% -
TRUE - 0.01% 1.80% - - 0.01% 1.80% - - 0.01% 1.80% -
Total - 7.56% 91.81% 0.63% - 7.53% 92.47% - - 7.53% 92.47% -
2 FALSE - 7.24% 65.21% 25.75% - 7.42% 56.74% 34.03% - 7.49% 56.25% 34.46%
TRUE - 0.01% 0.27% 1.52% - 0.01% - 1.80% - 0.01% - 1.80%
Total - 7.25% 65.48% 27.27% - 7.43% 56.74% 35.83% - 7.49% 56.25% 36.26%
3 FALSE - 7.29% 72.10% 18.81% - 7.44% 69.76% 20.99% - 7.51% 67.74% 22.94%
TRUE - 0.01% 0.46% 1.33% - 0.01% 0.01% 1.79% - 0.01% - 1.80%
Total - 7.30% 72.57% 20.14% - 7.45% 69.77% 22.78% - 7.52% 67.74% 24.74%
4 FALSE - 7.47% 89.46% 1.27% - 7.52% 88.84% 1.83% - 7.52% 88.78% 1.89%
TRUE - 0.01% 1.80% - - 0.01% 1.80% - - 0.01% 1.80% -
Total - 7.47% 91.25% 1.27% - 7.53% 90.64% 1.83% - 7.53% 90.58% 1.89%
5 FALSE - 6.81% 91.38% - - 7.10% 91.09% - - 7.35% 90.85% -
TRUE - 0.00% 1.80% - - 0.00% 1.80% - - 0.01% 1.80% -
Total - 6.82% 93.18% - - 7.11% 92.89% - - 7.35% 92.65% -
Scenario Type Avoidance Mitigation Transfer Acceptance Avoidance Mitigation Transfer Acceptance Avoidance Mitigation Transfer Acceptance
1 FALSE - 7.52% 90.68% - - 7.52% 90.68% - - 7.52% 90.68% -
TRUE - 0.01% 1.80% - - 0.01% 1.80% - - 0.01% 1.80% -
Total - 7.53% 92.47% - - 7.53% 92.47% - - 7.53% 92.47% -
2 FALSE - 7.51% 57.69% 33.00% - 7.52% 58.20% 32.47% - 7.52% 58.42% 32.26%
TRUE - 0.01% - 1.80% - 0.01% - 1.80% - 0.01% - 1.80%
Total - 7.52% 57.69% 34.80% - 7.53% 58.20% 34.27% - 7.53% 58.42% 34.06%
3 FALSE - 7.52% 64.65% 26.03% - 7.52% 61.55% 29.13% - 7.52% 59.58% 31.09%
TRUE - 0.01% - 1.80% - 0.01% - 1.80% - 0.01% - 1.80%
Total - 7.53% 64.65% 27.83% - 7.53% 61.55% 30.93% - 7.53% 59.58% 32.89%
4 FALSE - 7.52% 88.72% 1.96% - 7.52% 88.69% 1.98% - 7.52% 88.75% 1.93%
TRUE - 0.01% 1.80% - - 0.01% 1.80% - - 0.01% 1.80% -
Total - 7.53% 90.52% 1.96% - 7.53% 90.49% 1.98% - 7.53% 90.54% 1.93%
5 FALSE - 7.27% 90.93% - - 7.40% 90.80% - - 7.46% 90.74% -
TRUE - 0.01% 1.80% - - 0.01% 1.80% - - 0.01% 1.80% -
Total - 7.28% 92.72% - - 7.41% 92.59% - - 7.47% 92.53% -
Response Strategy Model (Time Limitation: 1 Hour) Response Strategy Model (Time Limitation: 3 Hours) Response Strategy Model (Time Limitation: 6 Hours)
Response Strategy Model (Time Limitation: 9 Hours) Response Strategy Model (Time Limitation: 12 Hours) Response Strategy Model (Time Limitation: 24 Hours)
 
  




C.5 The incident distribution with the Plymouth dataset – Scenario 1 with 24 hours limitation 
Date Total Alert
High Medium Low High Medium Low None Avoidance Mitigation Transfer Acceptance
17 May 2007 1149 9.40 65.01 25.59 0.00 0.70 0.00 99.30 0.00 0.70 99.30 0.00
18 May 2007 1774 5.19 76.10 18.71 0.00 32.47 0.00 67.53 0.00 32.41 67.59 0.00
19 May 2007 1166 4.20 91.51 4.29 0.00 28.73 0.00 71.27 0.00 28.73 71.27 0.00
20 May 2007 856 8.18 86.68 5.14 0.12 0.35 0.00 99.53 0.00 0.47 99.53 0.00
21 May 2007 1165 6.61 66.09 27.30 0.00 10.56 0.00 89.44 0.00 10.56 89.44 0.00
22 May 2007 1100 9.09 65.27 25.64 0.00 0.36 0.00 99.64 0.00 0.36 99.64 0.00
23 May 2007 1296 7.41 68.83 23.77 0.00 15.43 0.00 84.57 0.00 15.43 84.57 0.00
24 May 2007 1324 6.27 69.86 23.87 0.00 13.44 0.00 86.56 0.00 13.44 86.56 0.00
25 May 2007 1129 6.64 68.29 25.07 0.00 1.51 0.00 98.49 0.00 1.51 98.49 0.00
26 May 2007 846 8.63 87.12 4.26 0.00 0.24 0.00 99.76 0.00 0.24 99.76 0.00
27 May 2007 1038 7.42 88.54 4.05 0.00 15.99 0.00 84.01 0.00 15.99 84.01 0.00
28 May 2007 1137 7.74 83.55 8.71 0.09 14.34 0.00 85.57 0.00 14.34 85.66 0.00
29 May 2007 1097 10.76 72.47 16.77 0.09 2.01 0.00 97.90 0.00 2.01 97.99 0.00
30 May 2007 1534 5.93 75.62 18.45 0.00 13.17 0.00 86.83 0.00 13.17 86.83 0.00
31 May 2007 1228 6.84 70.93 22.23 0.00 4.40 0.00 95.60 0.00 4.40 95.60 0.00
01 June 2007 1386 7.14 71.50 21.36 0.00 12.63 0.00 87.37 0.00 12.63 87.37 0.00
02 June 2007 1022 6.46 89.43 4.11 0.10 9.88 0.00 90.02 0.00 9.88 90.12 0.00
03 June 2007 899 7.23 86.65 6.12 0.00 1.33 0.00 98.67 0.00 1.33 98.67 0.00
04 June 2007 1141 9.03 70.03 20.95 0.00 0.09 0.00 99.91 0.00 0.09 99.91 0.00
05 June 2007 1238 7.59 71.24 21.16 0.08 0.73 0.00 99.19 0.00 0.81 99.19 0.00
06 June 2007 1466 6.07 70.12 23.81 0.00 11.05 0.00 88.95 0.00 11.05 88.95 0.00
07 June 2007 1080 8.89 72.04 19.07 0.00 0.74 0.00 99.26 0.00 0.74 99.26 0.00
08 June 2007 1158 6.13 71.76 22.11 0.00 0.09 0.00 99.91 0.00 0.09 99.91 0.00
09 June 2007 1027 5.36 90.94 3.70 0.00 9.25 0.00 90.75 0.00 9.25 90.75 0.00
10 June 2007 1079 8.71 85.82 5.47 0.00 6.30 0.00 93.70 0.00 6.30 93.70 0.00
11 June 2007 1334 7.50 75.64 16.87 0.00 12.22 0.00 87.78 0.00 12.22 87.78 0.00
12 June 2007 1275 8.63 69.02 22.35 0.08 0.55 0.00 99.37 0.00 0.63 99.37 0.00
13 June 2007 1367 8.19 64.67 27.14 0.00 0.15 0.00 99.85 0.00 0.15 99.85 0.00
14 June 2007 1202 7.40 68.72 23.88 0.00 2.25 0.00 97.75 0.00 2.25 97.75 0.00
15 June 2007 1494 5.29 75.30 19.41 0.00 20.08 0.00 79.92 0.00 20.08 79.92 0.00
16 June 2007 1101 5.99 89.55 4.45 0.00 18.53 0.00 81.47 0.00 17.89 82.11 0.00
17 June 2007 1007 7.55 85.70 6.75 0.00 0.50 0.00 99.50 0.00 0.50 99.50 0.00
18 June 2007 1176 10.97 60.29 28.74 0.00 0.09 0.00 99.91 0.00 0.09 99.91 0.00
19 June 2007 1103 8.52 63.46 28.01 0.00 1.36 0.00 98.64 0.00 1.36 98.64 0.00
20 June 2007 1175 8.85 64.09 27.06 0.00 4.85 0.00 95.15 0.00 4.85 95.15 0.00
21 June 2007 1078 6.59 66.88 26.53 0.19 0.65 0.00 99.16 0.00 0.83 99.17 0.00
22 June 2007 977 6.86 68.47 24.67 0.10 0.20 0.00 99.70 0.00 0.31 99.69 0.00
23 June 2007 797 7.40 86.32 6.27 0.00 0.13 0.00 99.87 0.00 0.13 99.87 0.00
24 June 2007 813 7.87 85.49 6.64 0.00 0.12 0.00 99.88 0.00 0.12 99.88 0.00
25 June 2007 959 8.34 65.48 26.17 0.00 0.21 0.00 99.79 0.00 0.21 99.79 0.00
































































































































































PHP Source Codes 
 
E.1 The update_incident application daemon source code 
<?php 
  /*************************************************** 
  * This application daemon runs in background and  
  * update information in the sipm database 








 $count = 0;  
$sql_temp =  "SELECT event.sid,event.cid FROM event " . 
   "LEFT JOIN sipm_incident " . 
   "ON event.cid = sipm_incident.cid ". 
   "AND event.sid = sipm_incident.sid " .   
   "where sig_name is NULL $sql "; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 
 while($alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query)) 
 { 
  $count++; 
  if($count==1) 
   { 
   $timestart = time(); 






 {   
  $timeend = time(); 
  $time_diff = $timeend - $timestart; 
  echo "Incident Duration : $time_diff " . "second, " . 
   " date('Y-n-d G:i:s T') . ", Total updated : $count \n"; 
 }     
 








 $sql_temp =  " SELECT timestamp,signature, sig_name, sig_class_name, ". 
   " sig_priority, ip_src, ip_dst, ip_proto " . 
   " FROM (((event " . 
   " LEFT JOIN ". 
   " signature ON signature.sig_id = event.signature) " . 
   " LEFT JOIN ". 
   " iphdr ON iphdr.cid = event.cid AND iphdr.sid = event.sid) ". 
   " LEFT JOIN ". 
   " sig_class ON sig_class.sig_class_id = signature.sig_class_id) ". 
   " where event.cid = $cid " .  
   " AND event.sid = $sid " .  
   " limit 1" ; 
  
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 
 $alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query); 





 $timestamp = $alert['timestamp']; 
 $sig_name = $alert['sig_name']; 
 $signature = $alert['signature']; 
 $sig_class_name = $alert['sig_class_name']; 
 $sig_priority = $alert['sig_priority']; 
 $ip_src = $alert['ip_src']; 
 $ip_dst = $alert['ip_dst']; 
 $ip_proto = $alert['ip_proto']; 
 $layer4_sport = "-"; 
 $layer4_dport = "-"; 
   
 if($ip_proto==6 || $ip_proto==17) 
 list($layer4_sport,$layer4_dport) = getLayer4Protocol($sid,$cid,$ip_proto); 
   
 $sidcid = "$sid.$cid"; 
   
 if($ip_proto==6 || $ip_proto==17) 
 { 
 $sql_insert =  " INSERT INTO sipm_incident" .  
   " (sidcid,sid,cid,signature,sig_name,sig_class_name, ". 
   " sig_priority,timestamp,ip_src,ip_dst,ip_proto, ". 
   " layer4_sport,layer4_dport) " . 
   " VALUES " .  
   " ('$sidcid','$sid','$cid','$signature','$sig_name',". 
   " '$sig_class_name', ". 
   " '$sig_priority','$timestamp','$ip_src','$ip_dst',". 
   " '$ip_proto',". 




 $sql_insert =  " INSERT INTO sipm_incident" .  
   " (sidcid,sid,cid,signature,sig_name,sig_class_name,". 
   " sig_priority, ". 
   " timestamp,ip_src,ip_dst,ip_proto,layer4_sport,". 
   " layer4_dport) " . 
   " VALUES " .  
   " ('$sidcid','$sid','$cid','$signature','$sig_name',". 
   " '$sig_class_name',". 
   " '$sig_priority','$timestamp','$ip_src','$ip_dst',". 
   " '$ip_proto',". 




 //insert into new table sipm_incident_value 
 $sql_insert =  " INSERT INTO sipm_incident_value" .  
   " (sidcid,sid,cid) " . 
   " VALUES " .  
   " ('$sidcid','$sid','$cid') "; 
 mysql_query($sql_insert); 
  
 $sql_insert =  " INSERT INTO sipm_incident_false" .  
   " (sidcid,sid,cid) " . 
   " VALUES " .  
   " ('$sidcid','$sid','$cid') "; 
 mysql_query($sql_insert); 
  
 //insert into new table sipm_incident_value 
updateSimilarity($sid,$cid,$timestamp,$ip_proto,$ip_src,$ip_dst,$layer4_sport,$layer4_dport); 






 if($ip_proto== 6)  
 $sql_temp =  " SELECT tcp_sport as layer4_sport, tcp_dport as layer4_dport ". 
   " FROM tcphdr where cid = " . 
   " $cid . " AND sid =" . $sid . " limit 1"; 
 if($ip_proto == 17) 
 $sql_temp =  " SELECT udp_sport as layer4_sport, udp_dport as layer4_dport ". 
   " FROM udphdr where cid = " .  
   " $cid . " AND sid =" . $sid . " limit 1"; 
  
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 





 while($alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query)) 
 { 
  $layer4_sport = $alert['layer4_sport']; 
  $layer4_dport = $alert['layer4_dport']; 
 };     
  









   getNullIncident(); 
















 $interval = $GLOBALS['sipmIntervalTime']; 
 
 if($ip_proto == 6 || $ip_proto == 17) 
 { 
 $value = 0.5; 
 $value2 = 0.25; 
$total = 
calculateSimilarity($sid,$cid,$timestamp,$interval,$ip_proto,$ip_src,$ip_dst,$value); 





 $value = 0.5; 






 $sql_update =  " SELECT count(sipm_incident_value.cid) as total ". 
   " FROM sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN ". 
   " sipm_incident ON sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  
. 
   " WHERE timestamp ". 
   " BETWEEN '". $timestamp ."' - INTERVAL ". $interval .  
   " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.cid < $cid " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 $alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query); 
 $incident_count = $alert['total']; 
 
 $total = round($total,4); 
 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " SET incident_count=$incident_count, similarity = $total " . 
   " WHERE cid = $cid" . 
   " AND sid = $sid "; 







 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ". 
   " ON sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " SET similarity = similarity + $value ". 
   " WHERE timestamp ". 
   " BETWEEN '". $timestamp ."' - INTERVAL ". $interval .  
   " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND layer4_sport = $layer4_sport " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.ip_proto = $ip_proto " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 $count_src_similarity = ($sql_query ? mysql_affected_rows() : 0); 
 
 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ". 
   " ON sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " SET similarity = similarity + $value ". 
   " WHERE timestamp ". 
   " BETWEEN '". $timestamp ."' - INTERVAL ". $interval .  




   " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND layer4_dport = $layer4_dport " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.ip_proto = $ip_proto " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 $count_dst_similarity = ($sql_query ? mysql_affected_rows() : 0); 
 
 $total = ($value*$count_dst_similarity) + ($value*$count_src_similarity); 
   /*******************************************************************************/ 
 $sql_when =  " AND (timestamp BETWEEN '". $timestamp ."' - INTERVAL ". $interval .  
   " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."') " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.ip_proto = $ip_proto " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 
 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ON ". 
   " sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " SET dport = " . 
   " CASE WHEN (layer4_dport > $layer4_dport ". 
   " AND layer4_dport != $layer4_dport $sql_when ) ". 
" THEN layer4_dport - $layer4_dport ". 
   " ELSE $layer4_dport - layer4_dport END, ". 
   " sport =  ". 
   " CASE WHEN (layer4_sport > $layer4_sport ". 
   " AND layer4_sport != $layer4_sport $sql_when ) ". 
" THEN layer4_sport - $layer4_sport ". 
   " ELSE $layer4_sport - layer4_sport END " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 
 
 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ON ". 
   " sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " SET dport_value = " . 
   " CASE ". 
   " WHEN " . 
   " (dport > 0 AND dport <= 1024 $sql_when ) ". 
" THEN round((1-(dport/1024)),4) ". 
   " WHEN ". 
   " (dport > 1024 AND dport <= 49151 $sql_when ) ". 
" THEN round((1-(dport/49151)),4) ". 
   " WHEN ". 
   " (dport > 49151 AND dport <= 65535 $sql_when ) ". 
" THEN round((1-(dport/65535)),4) ". 
   " ELSE 0 END, ". 
   " sport_value = ". 
   " CASE ". 
   " WHEN ". 
   " (sport > 0 AND sport <= 1024 $sql_when ) ". 
" THEN round((1-(sport/1024)),4) ". 
   " WHEN ". 
   " (sport > 1024 AND sport <= 49151 $sql_when ) ". 
" THEN round((1-(sport/49151)),4) ". 
   " WHEN ". 
   " (sport > 49151 AND sport <= 65535 $sql_when ) ". 
" THEN round((1-(sport/65535)),4) ". 
   " ELSE 0 END " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 
 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN ". 
   " sipm_incident ON sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  
. 
   " SET port_temp = round(($value*sport_value + $value*dport_value),4), " 
   " similarity = ". 
" similarity + round(($value*sport_value + $value*dport_value),4) " . 
   " WHERE timestamp ". 
   " BETWEEN '". $timestamp ."' - INTERVAL ". $interval .  
   " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND sport_value < 1 AND dport_value < 1 " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.ip_proto = $ip_proto " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " . 




   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 
 $sql_update =  " SELECT sum(port_temp) as total FROM sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ". 
ON sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " WHERE timestamp ". 
   " BETWEEN '". $timestamp ."' - INTERVAL ". $interval .  
   " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND sport_value < 1 AND dport_value < 1 " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.ip_proto = $ip_proto " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 $alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query); 
 $total_unsimilar = $alert['total']; 
 







 $value2 = round($value/2,2); 
 
 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ". 
   " ON sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " SET similarity =  ". 
   " CASE ". 
   " WHEN ((ip_proto = $ip_proto) AND (ip_proto = 6 OR ip_proto = 17)) ". 
   " THEN similarity + $value2 " . 
   " ELSE similarity + $value END, ". 
   " similarity_src_temp =  ". 
   " CASE ". 
   " WHEN ((ip_proto = $ip_proto) AND (ip_proto = 6 OR ip_proto = 17)) ". 
   " THEN $value2 " . 
   " ELSE $value END ". 
   " WHERE timestamp ". 
   " BETWEEN '". $timestamp ."' - INTERVAL ". $interval .  
   " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND ip_src = $ip_src " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 
 
 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ". 
   " ON sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " SET similarity = ". 
   " CASE ". 
   " WHEN ((ip_proto = $ip_proto) AND (ip_proto = 6 OR ip_proto = 17)) ". 
   " THEN similarity + $value2 " . 
   " ELSE similarity + $value END, ". 
   " similarity_dst_temp =  ". 
   " CASE ". 
   " WHEN ((ip_proto = $ip_proto) AND (ip_proto = 6 OR ip_proto = 17)) ". 
   " THEN $value2 " . 
   " ELSE $value END ". 
   " WHERE timestamp ". 
   " BETWEEN '". $timestamp ."' - INTERVAL ". $interval .  
   " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND ip_dst = $ip_dst " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 
 list($rangemin,$rangemax) = getClass($ip_src); 
 
 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ". 




   " ON sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " SET similarity = ". 
   " CASE ". 
   " WHEN ((ip_proto =  $ip_proto) AND (ip_proto = 6 OR ip_proto = 17)) ". 
   " THEN similarity + round(($value2/2),4) " . 
   " ELSE similarity + $value2 END, ". 
   " similarity_src_temp = ". 
   " CASE ". 
   " WHEN ((ip_proto = $ip_proto) AND (ip_proto = 6 OR ip_proto = 17)) ". 
   " THEN similarity_src_temp + round(($value2/2),4) " . 
   " ELSE similarity_src_temp + $value2 END ". 
   " WHERE timestamp ". 
   " BETWEEN '". $timestamp ."' - INTERVAL ". $interval .  
   " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND (ip_src >=$rangemin AND ip_src <=$rangemax AND ip_src != $ip_src 
)". 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 
 
 list($rangemin,$rangemax) = getClass($ip_dst); 
 
$sql_update = " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ON ". 
   " sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " SET similarity = ". 
   " CASE ". 
   " WHEN ((ip_proto =  $ip_proto) AND (ip_proto = 6 OR ip_proto = 17) ) 
". 
   " THEN similarity + round(($value2/2),4) " . 
   " ELSE similarity + $value2 END, ". 
   " similarity_dst_temp = ". 
   " CASE ". 
   " WHEN ((ip_proto =  $ip_proto) AND (ip_proto = 6 OR ip_proto = 17) ) 
". 
   " THEN similarity_dst_temp + round(($value2/2),4) " . 
   " ELSE similarity_dst_temp + $value2 END ". 
   " WHERE timestamp ". 
   " BETWEEN '". $timestamp ."' - INTERVAL ". $interval .  
   " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND (ip_dst>= $rangemin AND ip_dst <=$rangemax AND ip_dst != $ip_dst 
)". 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 
 
 $sql_update =  " SELECT sum(similarity_dst_temp) as total, ". 
   " sum(similarity_src_temp) as total2 " . 
   " FROM  sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ON ". 
   " sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " WHERE timestamp ". 
   " BETWEEN '". $timestamp ."' - INTERVAL ". $interval .  
   " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 $alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query); 
 $total = $alert['total'] + $alert['total2'] ; 
 
 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value ". 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ON ". 
   " sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " SET similarity_dst_temp = 0, similarity_src_temp=0 ". 
   " WHERE timestamp ". 
   " BETWEEN '". $timestamp ."' - INTERVAL ". $interval .  
   " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error()); 
 









 $ip_address_ = explode(".", sipmLong2IP($ip_address)); 
 
 if($ip_address >= 0 && $ip_address <=2147483647) 
  $class =  "A"; 
 else if($ip_address >= 2147483648 && $ip_address <= 3221225471) 
  $class =  "B"; 
 else if($ip_address >= 3221225472 && $ip_address <=3758096383) 
  $class =  "C"; 
 else if($ip_address >= 3758096384 && $ip_address <=4026531839) 
  $class =  "D"; 
 else if($ip_address >= 4026531840 && $ip_address <=4294967295) 
  $class =  "E"; 
 
 switch ($class) 
 { 
 case "A": 
  $localip =  $ip_address_[0] . "." . "0.0.0"; 
  $rangemax = sipmIP2Long($localip) + 16777216; 
  break; 
 case "B": 
  $localip =  $ip_address_[0] . "." . $ip_address_[1] . ".0.0"; 
  $rangemax = sipmIP2Long($localip) + 65536; 
  break; 
 case "C": 
  $localip = $ip_address_[0] . "." . $ip_address_[1] . "." . $ip_address_[2] . 
".0"; 
  $rangemax = sipmIP2Long($localip) + 256; 
  break; 
 case "D": 
  $localip =  $ip_address_[0] . "." . $ip_address_[1] . ".0.0"; 
  $rangemax = sipmIP2Long('239.255.255.255'); 
  break; 
 case "E": 
  $localip =  $ip_address_[0] . "." . $ip_address_[1] . ".0.0"; 
  $rangemax = sipmIP2Long('255.255.255.255'); 
  break; 
} 
 $rangemin = sipmIP2Long($localip); 








E.3 The update_frequecy_v3.php source code 




   
 $signature_count_self = 0; 
 $sig_class_id_count_self = 0 ; 
  
 $interval = $GLOBALS['sipmIntervalTime']; 
     
 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value ". 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ON ". 
   " sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid ". 
   " SET frequency_signature = frequency_signature + 1 ".  
   " WHERE timestamp BETWEEN '". $timestamp . 
" ' - INTERVAL ". $interval . " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND signature = '$signature' " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " .   
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
  
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error());  
 $count_frequency_signature = ($sql_query ? mysql_affected_rows() : 0); 
  
 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ". 
" ON sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " SET frequency_sig_class = frequency_sig_class + 1 ".  
   " WHERE timestamp BETWEEN '". $timestamp . 
" ' - INTERVAL ". $interval . " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND sig_class_name = '$sig_class_name' " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " .   
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error());  
 $count_frequency_sig_class = ($sql_query ? mysql_affected_rows() : 0); 
  
 $sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " SET timeupdate=NOW(),". 
" frequency_signature = $count_frequency_signature   " . 
   " , frequency_sig_class = $count_frequency_sig_class " . 
   " WHERE cid = $cid" .    
   " AND sid = $sid "; 
 
$sql_query = mysql_query($sql_update) or die(mysql_error());  
  
$sql_update =  " UPDATE sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident ". 
" ON sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid "  . 
   " SET incident_count = incident_count + 1 ".  
   " WHERE timestamp BETWEEN '". $timestamp . 
" ' - INTERVAL ". $interval . " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " . 
   " AND sipm_incident.sid = $sid " .   
   " AND sipm_incident.cid <= $cid " ; 
 









E.4 The update_event_value application daemon source code 
<?php 
/*************************************************** 
* This application daemon runs in background  
* and update information in the sipm database 








 $count = 0;  
 $sql_temp =  " SELECT sipm_incident_value.sid, " . 
" sipm_incident_value.cid, sipm_incident.timestamp " . 
   " FROM ((sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_event_value " . 
" ON sipm_event_value.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid) " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident " . 
" ON sipm_incident_value.sidcid = sipm_incident.sidcid) " .     
   " WHERE sipm_event_value.timeupdate is NULL " .  
   " ORDER BY sipm_incident.timestamp DESC " . 
   " limit 1";                  
   
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 while($alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query)) 
 { 







 $count = 0;  
   
 $interval = $GLOBALS['sipmIntervalTime']; 
 
 $sql_temp = " SELECT sipm_incident_value.sid, " . 
" sipm_incident_value.cid, signature,timestamp " . 
   ",ip_src, ip_dst " . 
   " FROM sipm_incident_value ". 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_incident " . 
" ON sipm_incident.sidcid = sipm_incident_value.sidcid " . 
   " WHERE timestamp BETWEEN '". $timestamp . 
"' - INTERVAL ". $interval . " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."' " ; 
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 





  $timestart = time(); 








 {   
 $timeend = time(); 
 $time_diff = $timeend - $timestart; 
 echo "\nEvent Duration : $time_diff " . "second, " . date('Y-n-d G:i:s T') .", Update 
: $count";  
 checkEmptyCvss();  
 }     
} 
 
function updateEventValue($sid,$cid,$signature, $ip_src, $ip_dst, $timeupdate) 
{ 




  //get the asset detail on the event 
 
 $sql_temp =  " SELECT identityid, identityip, " . 
   " max(criticality) as criticality, " . 
" max(maintainability) as maintainability, " . 
   " max(replaceability) as replaceability, " . 
" max(dependability) as dependability, max(control) as control ". 
   " FROM sipm_asset_identity " . 
   " WHERE identityip LIKE '$ip_src' " .  
   " OR identityip LIKE '$ip_dst' "; 
   
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 $alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query); 
  
   
 if(is_NULL($alert['identityip'])) 
 { 
  $criticality = 0 ; 
  $maintainability = 0 ; 
  $replaceability = 0; 
  $dependability = 0; 
  $control = 0 ; 
  $identityid = 0 ; 
 } 
 else 
 {  
  $criticality = round(($alert['criticality']/100),4); 
  $maintainability = round(($alert['maintainability']/100),4); 
  $replaceability = round(($alert['replaceability']/100),4); 
  $dependability = round(($alert['dependability']/100),4); 
  $control = round(($alert['control']/100),4); 






 $sql_temp = " SELECT avg(base_score) as base_score, " .  
" avg(exploitability) as exploitability FROM sipm_cvss " . 
   " WHERE sig_id = $signature limit 1"; 
   
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 $alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query); 
 if(is_NULL($alert['base_score'])) 
 { 
  $severity = 0; 
  $exploitability = 0; 
 } 
 else 
 {  
  $severity = round(($alert['base_score']/10),4); 
  $exploitability = round(($alert['exploitability']/10),4); 
 } 
   
 $sql_temp = " SELECT similarity, frequency_signature, " . 
" frequency_sig_class, sensitivity, incident_count " .  
   " FROM sipm_incident_value " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sipm_sensor " . 
" on sipm_incident_value.sid = sipm_sensor.sid " . 
   " WHERE sipm_incident_value.cid = $cid " . 
   " AND sipm_incident_value.sid = $sid limit 1"; 
   
   
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 $alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query); 
    
 $sensitivity = round(($alert['sensitivity']/10),4); 
 $similarity = round(($alert['similarity']/$alert['incident_count']),4); 
 $frequency  = 0.5*(round(($alert['frequency_signature']/$alert['incident_count']),4)) 
+ 0.5*(round(($alert['frequency_sig_class']/$alert['incident_count']),4));  
 $frequency = round($frequency,4); 
   
 $sidcid = $sid . "." . $cid; 
   
$sql_update_2 = " INSERT INTO sipm_event_value " . 
    " (sidcid,sid,cid,timeupdate,severity, " . 
 " exploitability,sensitivity,similarity,frequency, " . 




    " identityid,criticality,maintainability, " . 
 " replaceability,dependability,control) ". 
    " VALUES "  . 
     " ('$sidcid',$sid,$cid,'$timeupdate', " . 
 " $severity,$exploitability,$sensitivity,$similarity,$frequency, ".  
    " $identityid,$criticality,$maintainability, " . 
 " $replaceability,$dependability,$control) " . 
    " ON DUPLICATE KEY " . 
 " UPDATE timeupdate= '$timeupdate', severity = $severity " . 
    ", exploitability = $exploitability " . 
    ", sensitivity = $sensitivity " . 
    ", similarity = $similarity " .     
    ", frequency = $frequency " . 
    ", identityid = $identityid " .     
    ", criticality = $criticality " .     
    ", maintainability = $maintainability " .     
    ", replaceability = $replaceability " .     
    ", dependability = $dependability " .     
    ", control = $control " ;     
























 $flag == 0; 
 
 $sql_temp =  " SELECT min(value) as value " . 
   " FROM sipm_scenario ". 
   " WHERE timeupdate = " . 
   " (SELECT timestamp from sipm_incident order by timestamp DESC limit 1) 
". 
   " AND scenario_id = $scenario_id " . 
   " limit 1" ; 
  
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 $alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query); 
   
 if($alert['value'] == 0)  
 { 
  doUpdate($scenario_id); 








 $sql_temp ="SELECT timestamp from sipm_incident order by timestamp DESC limit 1"; 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 $alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query); 
 $timestamp =  $alert['timestamp']; 
     
 $count = retrieveScenarioValue($timestamp,$scenario_id); 
 echo date('Y-n-d G:i:s T');          





 $count = 0;  
   
 $interval = $GLOBALS['sipmIntervalTime']; 
   
 $sql_temp =  " SELECT " . 
   " asset_index, event_index, " . 
   " criticality_index, maintainability_index, replaceability_index, 
    " dependability_index, control_index, " . 
   " severity_index, exploitability_index, sensitivity_index,". 
   " similarity_index, frequency_index " . 
   " FROM sipm_scenario_setting ". 
   " WHERE scenario_id = $scenario_id " ; 
               
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 $alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query); 
   
 $event_index =  $alert['event_index']; 
 $asset_index =  $alert['asset_index']; 
 $total_event_index =  
array($alert['severity_index'],$alert['exploitability_index'],$alert['sensitivity_index'],$ale
rt['similarity_index'],$alert['frequency_index']);  
 $total_asset_index =  
array($alert['criticality_index'],$alert['maintainability_index'],$alert['replaceability_index
'],$alert['dependability_index'],$alert['control_index']); 
   
 $sql_temp =  "SELECT sipm_incident.sid,sipm_incident.cid " . 
   " FROM sipm_incident " . 
   " WHERE timestamp BETWEEN '". $timestamp . 
"' - INTERVAL ". $interval . " HOUR and '". $timestamp ."'" ; 
              
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 





 while($alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query)) 
 { 
  $count++; 
  if($count==1) 
   $timestart = time(); 






 {   
  $timeend = time(); 
  
  $time_diff = $timeend - $timestart; 
  echo "\nScenario $scenario_id Duration : $time_diff " . "second,";   
 }     
 









 $sql_temp =  " SELECT ". 
   " severity, exploitability, sensitivity, similarity, frequency, " . 
   " criticality, ". 
" maintainability, replaceability , dependability, control " .  
   " FROM sipm_event_value " . 
   " WHERE sipm_event_value.cid = $cid " . 
   " AND sipm_event_value.sid = $sid limit 1"; 
  
   
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 $alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query); 
    
  
 $severity  = round(($total_event_index[0]/100 * $alert['severity']),4); 
 $exploitability  = round(($total_event_index[1]/100 * $alert['exploitability']),4); 
 $sensitivity  = round(($total_event_index[2]/100 * $alert['sensitivity']),4); 
 $similarity  = round(($total_event_index[3]/100 * $alert['similarity']),4); 
 $frequency  = round(($total_event_index[4]/100 * $alert['frequency']),4); 
 $event_value_list = $severity . "," . $exploitability . "," . $sensitivity . "," 
.$similarity  . "," . $frequency; 
   
 $criticality  = round(($total_asset_index[0]/100 * $alert['criticality']),4); 
 $maintainability  = round(($total_asset_index[1]/100 * $alert['maintainability']),4); 
 $replaceability  = round(($total_asset_index[2]/100 * $alert['replaceability']),4); 
 $dependability  = round(($total_asset_index[3]/100 * $alert['dependability']),4); 
 $control  = round(($total_asset_index[4]/100 * $alert['control']),4); 
 $asset_value_list = $criticality . "," . $maintainability . "," . $replaceability . 
"," .$dependability  . "," . $control ; 
   
 $scenario_value = 




 $scenario_value = round($scenario_value,4); 
 $sidcidsn = "$sid.$cid.$scenario_id"; 
 $sidcid = "$sid.$cid"; 
   
   
  
   
 $sql_update_2 =  " INSERT INTO sipm_scenario ".  
    " (sidcidsn,sidcid,sid,cid,scenario_id,timeupdate, ". 
" asset_value,event_value,value) " . 
    " VALUES ('$sidcidsn','$sidcid',$sid,$cid,$scenario_id, ". 
" '$timestamp','$asset_value_list','$event_value_list', ". 
" $scenario_value) " .  
    " ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE ". 
" timeupdate= '$timestamp', sidcid=$sidcid, ". 




" asset_value='$asset_value_list', ". 
" event_value='$event_value_list', value=$scenario_value "; 
                 
 mysql_query($sql_update_2); 
   
 $sql_update_3 =  " INSERT INTO sipm_scenario_history " .  
    " (sidcidsn,sidcid,sid,cid,scenario_id,timeupdate,value) " . 
    " VALUES ('$sidcidsn','$sidcid',$sid,$cid, ". 









 $sql_temp =  " SELECT scenario_id  " . 
   " FROM sipm_scenario_setting" ;  
 
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 if ($sql_query)  
 { 
  while($alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query)) 
  { 
   $scenario_id = $alert['scenario_id']; 
   checkLastScenarioValue($scenario_id); 
  }; 
 }  
 else  
 { 
















 * This function retrieves the base score  
 * and exploitability of incidents using CVE ID 






 $file = "http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-" . $cve; 
 $doc = new DOMDocument(); 
 $doc->loadHTMLFile($file); 
 $xpath = new DOMXpath($doc); 
 $elements = $xpath->query("//div[@class='row']"); 
 
 $count=0; 
 if (!is_null($elements))  
 { 
  foreach ($elements as $element)  
  { 
  $count++; 
          
         //get Original release date  
  if($count== 1) 
  { 
   $nodes = $element->childNodes; 
   $i=0; 
   foreach ($nodes as $node)  
   { 
   $i++; 
    //echo "$i " . $node->nodeValue . "\n"; 
   if($i==2) 
   $release_date = trim($node->nodeValue); 
   } 
  } 
         
  //get Original revise date  
  if($count== 2) 
  { 
   $nodes = $element->childNodes; 
   $i=0; 
   foreach ($nodes as $node)  
   { 
    $i++; 
    //echo "$i " . $node->nodeValue . "\n"; 
    if($i==2) 
    $revise_date = trim($node->nodeValue); 
                   
   } 
  } 
         
  //get CVSS 
  if($count== 4) 
         { 
   $nodes = $element->childNodes; 
   $i=0;  
   foreach ($nodes as $node)  
   { 
   $i++; 
   // echo "$i " . $node->nodeValue . "\n"; 
   if($i==2) 
   $base_score = trim($node->nodeValue); 
     
             } 
         } 
         
  //get   $exploitability 
  if($count== 6) 
  { 
   $nodes = $element->childNodes; 
   $i=0; 
   foreach ($nodes as $node)  




   { 
    $i++; 
    if($i==2) 
    $exploitability = trim($node->nodeValue); 
   } 
  } 
  } 
 } 
 







   
 $sql_temp =  " SELECT sig_id,ref_tag,reference.ref_id " . 
   " FROM ((reference " . 
   " LEFT JOIN reference_system " . 
   " ON reference_system.ref_system_id = reference.ref_system_id) " . 
   " LEFT JOIN sig_reference on sig_reference.ref_id = reference.ref_id) " 
.  
   " WHERE ref_system_name LIKE '%cve%' " . 
   " AND ref_tag NOT IN ".  
   " (SELECT ref_tag FROM sipm_cvss)"; 
   
 $sql_query = mysql_query($sql_temp); 
 
 while($alert = mysql_fetch_assoc($sql_query)) 
 { 
  
   $ref_tag  = $alert['ref_tag']; 
   $sig_id   = $alert['sig_id']; 
   $ref_id   = $alert['ref_id']; 
        
 list($release_date,$revise_date,$base_score,$exploitability) = retrieveCvss($ref_tag); 
 
 $date = explode("/",$release_date); 
 $release_date =   $date[2] . "-" . $date[0] .  "-" . $date[1]; 
 $date = explode("/",$revise_date);                          
 $revise_date =   $date[2] . "-" . $date[0] .  "-" . $date[1]; 
 
 $sql_insert = " INSERT INTO sipm_cvss ".  
   " (ref_tag,sig_id,ref_id,release_date, ". 
" revise_date,base_score,exploitability) " . 
   " VALUES " .  
   " ('$ref_tag','$sig_id','$ref_id','$release_date', ". 
" '$revise_date','$base_score','$exploitability') "; 
     
 mysql_query($sql_insert);    
     
 echo "\nCVSS $ref_tag Update : " . date('Y-n-d G:i:s T') ;             
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